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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: Citizens, Markets, and Turkey
Abstract The concept of citizenship is typically divided into distinct com-
ponents. Following the pioneering work of T.H. Marshall, we focus on 
social and economic citizenship. We ask in particular whether the “basic 
equality of membership” at the heart of Marshall’s definition of citizenship 
can be advanced by market-centered policies such as social cash transfer, 
even in cases such as that of forced migrants in which political or civil 
elements of citizenship are not present. Contemporary Turkey provides an 
ideal setting in which to investigate this question.
Keywords Citizenship • T.H. Marshall • Markets • Migration • Social 
cash transfer • Turkey
Why begin a book whose empirical studies focus on a very specific type of 
policy—cash transfer programs aimed at helping very low income 
households in Turkey meet basic needs—with a discussion of citizenship? 
The most fundamental reason is that policy never exists in isolation. As 
noted a generation ago by Hugh Heclo (1974/2010: 4), “Policy acquires 
meaning because an observer perceives and interprets a course of action 
amid the confusion of a complex world.” The existence of economic 
support policies is premised on a broader shared understanding. The 
answer to specific questions: How—if at all—should assistance be extended 
to those who cannot provide for the basic needs of themselves and their families? 
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Who—if anyone—should provide this assistance? depends on the answer to 
much more general questions: What kind of society do we aspire to live in? 
Who is a member of that society? What does membership entail? A central 
premise of this book is that answers to these questions are neither self- 
evident nor universal; they are specific as to time and place. To give 
meaning to contemporary cash transfer (CT) programs in Turkey, 
accordingly, requires several dimensions of contextualization. In this 
introduction, we focus on the broadest of these, the notion of citizenship 
regimes as a source of answers to questions about the scope and content 
of social membership.
1  What Does It Mean to Be a CItIzen?
The literature on citizenship provides a rich starting point for considering 
questions relating to the limits and content of membership. In the simplest 
form of the concept, citizenship is a status—“legal recognition both 
domestic and international, that one is a member, native born or 
naturalized, of a state” (Shklar 1991)—that one does or does not have. 
The various strands of the citizenship literature, however, typically go 
beyond this restrictive notion to unpack the concept of citizenship into 
several components. Typically, this involves distinguishing status, on the 
one hand, from the practical content of that status, on the other hand. 
Thus, Joppke (2010) suggests that citizenship involves status, identity, 
and rights. Another variation on this theme is provided by Bartle (2006), 
who divides citizenship into rights, participation, and belonging. This 
exercise in unpacking seems necessary because the notion of legal status by 
itself does not encompass the range of meanings given to citizenship either 
in academic or in vernacular speech. In ordinary conversation, we often 
speak not only of citizens, but of “full” citizens or “good” citizens. In 
English-language usage, the notion of “citizenship” notably extends 
beyond the relationship between an individual and a national state; 
Americans in particular speak of being a (good) citizen of one’s local 
community or of the world (Smyrl 2013).
Even this type of unpacking is not enough. There is not only one way 
to be a “good” or “full” citizen. The answer to the question, “what does 
citizenship entail?” can only be understood in the context of a given 
citizenship regime. The academic debate with which we will engage in the 
chapters that follow focuses on contemporary “market citizenship,” 
distinguishing it both from the “industrial citizenship” of the twentieth 
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century and various preindustrial regimes. In making this distinction, it is 
important to stress from the outset that to speak of citizenship regimes at 
all is to impose generalizations from the outside. These labels do not 
correspond to any legal status of citizenship or explicit policy program. 
They seek rather to bring together features that to a greater or lesser extent 
became common in North America and Western Europe at particular 
moments in time. It is in this sense that we speak in terms of citizenship 
regimes as sets of conceptually coherent but loosely articulated policies. 
We will consider throughout this book the extent to which these labels are 
useful as a tool for understanding policy developments in Turkey. For now, 
we seek to sketch the general outline of the contrasting regimes.
A common feature of the general definitions noted above is a central 
place for objective rights, on the one hand, and subjective feelings and 
behaviors (identity, belonging, participation), on the other hand. While 
the psychological dimensions of identity and belonging are largely beyond 
the scope of this book, we are very much interested in rights and 
participation. What should citizens expect from state and society? How do 
state and society expect them to behave? The link with policy, here, is 
evident. Whether we see policy instruments as embodying “a bundle of 
dispositions” encouraging some behaviors rather than others (Majone and 
Wildavsky 1979) or as organizing a “a specific set of social relations 
between public authority and its intended audience” (Lascoumes and Le 
Galès 2004: 13—our translation), they form a clear link between an overall 
vision of social purpose and a desired behavior. What, then, does this 
overall vision encompass? In the classic approach of T.H. Marshall (1950), 
to which we will return throughout this book, it begins with a set of 
rights, civil, political, and social, that make meaningful participation 
possible, and are thus logically prior to it. Taken together, these rights are 
meant to contribute to the “basic equality of membership” that, for 
Marshall as for many others, is the essence of citizenship. While we will 
revisit the question of civil and political rights in the specific context of 
international migration, our focus in this book is on what Marshall called 
social rights, which he defined as “the whole range of rights from the right 
to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the 
full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according 
to the standards prevailing in the society.” (Marshall 1950: 11) It is 
important to emphasize that the equality for which Marshall is calling here 
is not an even distribution of wealth and income. He is arguing, rather, for 
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a society in which the guaranteed minimum is adequate for “civilized life.” 
It is access to this life, for him, that must be equal for all.
In this identification of “basic equality of membership” not only with 
legal equality but also with a certain way living, Marshall was far from 
alone. This belief was at the core of ethical arguments in support of 
post-1945 welfare states. At a more theoretical level, Rawls’ (1971) vision 
of liberal equality stressed not only universal civic and political rights but 
also equal opportunity to acquire socially valued goods—and insisted that 
preference should be given to redistribution in favor of those at the bottom 
of the social and economic hierarchy. More recent authors come to similar 
conclusion. Böhnke (2007) points out that poverty, discrimination, or 
handicap can be barriers to full citizenship if they bring limited social 
relation and a lack of social support. With membership comes 
responsibilities. The legal status of national citizenship, and increasingly of 
permanent legal residence or “denizenship” (Turner 2016) has always 
been associated with counterparts such as paying tax, obeying laws, and in 
many cases performing military service. Even when we go beyond this to 
consider, as we propose to do here, citizenship as centered on right and 
membership, Root (2007: 10) argues that meaningful membership 
involves not only securing one’s own rights but also accepting responsibility 
for others.
Accepting the proposition that citizenship should be identified with 
membership in a constituted community, and that this membership in 
turn requires a measure not just of legal but of economic equality and 
solidarity, leaves unaddressed the question of ways and means. How is 
membership to be achieved? For Marshall, it seemed evident that “basic 
equality of membership” with respect to social and economic status could 
only be achieved by ensuring the universal provision of not only the 
physical but also the social necessities of life, removing these from the 
sphere of market transaction to achieve what he called the “divorce of real 
and money income.”
Marshall was well aware that this program was at best imperfectly real-
ized at the time of his writing; he proposed it as an aspiration and a chal-
lenge. From a similarly aspirational perspective, we propose to approach 
“market citizenship” as a regime that seeks to employ market- enhancing 
policy instruments to achieve “basic equality of membership.” It is fair to 
ask at least two questions in this context: “what does equality mean in 
practice?’; and ‘membership in what?’
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We share with Marshall (1950: 9) the starting point that “equality of 
membership” may be “consistent with the inequalities of social class.” 
Equality of membership does not imply a perfectly even distribution of 
wealth or status. It does imply that no one is systematically and arbitrarily 
excluded from the opportunity of gaining wealth and status. This, in turn, 
suggests the answer to our second question. In a market-centered society 
“equality of membership” rests on the freest possible access to the market, 
as consumers, producers, and workers. We are very close here to Sen’s 
(1981: 2) notion of the market as a set of entitlements: the right to the 
products of one’s trade, production, labor, or inheritance. Restrictions on 
what one can buy, where one can live, or whether and how one can work 
are barriers to such access. The challenge for public policy is transforming 
theoretical rights into actual capacity. As Sen (1981: 161) pithily puts it:
If one doesn’t have much to exchange, one can’t demand very much, and may 
thus lose out in competition with others whose needs may be a good deal less 
acute, but whose entitlements are stronger.
Rather than distinguishing real from money income, regimes based on 
market citizenship propose to ensure money income sufficient to acquire 
the social as well as physical necessities of life. In the logic of the market 
model, the ordinary source of income is employment. In cases where work 
cannot be found or provides inadequate income, the cash-transfer 
instruments at the empirical heart of this study represent a direct attempt 
to compensate for this income in a market-compatible manner.
This approach does not imply a diminished role for public authority. 
Rather, it suggests that state intervention should focus on ensuring 
adequate purchasing power for citizens. Direct transfer of “stimulus 
payments” to all citizens, as the US government did in response to the 
financial crisis of 2008 and again in the wake of the Coronavirus pandemic 
of 2020 is an extreme but not unrepresentative version of such a policy. 
The bulk of this book will be devoted to a critical reflection on policies 
intended to ensure adequate “money income,” which naturally leads to an 
emphasis on their distinctive features. It is worth emphasizing from the 
outset, however, that this approach shares with what we might call the 
Marshallian vision of the welfare state a number of important features.
Both approaches are based on a core of rights, and in particular on the 
recognition of a right to meaningful economic participation and to a 
socially appropriate standard of living. In both cases, the starting point is 
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an assertion that persons with inadequate economic means cannot be full 
citizens (regardless of their formal status or identity), and that it is a central 
function of public authority to remedy this situation. It would be logically 
incorrect, thus, to contrast “rights-based” and “market-based” frameworks. 
What we can contrast are market-limiting and market-enhancing 
approaches to ensuring economic and social rights. Both approaches 
involve a selective use of market transactions; neither is absolutist. 
Marshall’s market-limiting framework leaves a place for a market sector 
once selected necessities are removed from it. Market-enhancing 
frameworks leave a place for the nonmarket instruments, such as the 
provision of money income as a form of public assistance that forms the 
empirical core of this book. As such, both frameworks must be distinguished 
from the imaginary extremes of market-less socialism, on the one hand, 
and state-less libertarian capitalism, on the other hand.
Each framework seeks to encourage the fullest extent of economic par-
ticipation, and considers participation a key element of membership and a 
justification for economic intervention. In the Marshallian, or social- 
democratic, framework intervention takes the form of nonmarket access 
to a socially necessary minimum level of education, housing, healthcare, 
etc. In the market-enhancing framework, economic intervention can take 
the form of ensuring access to a socially necessary minimum level of money 
income. In both cases, policies of economic support can be justified on the 
ground that they are necessary elements of social citizenship in, both, the 
sense of “basic equality of membership” and of meaningful participation. 
In both frameworks, economic and social rights, and the policy instruments 
intended to support them are not necessarily coterminous with civil or 
political rights. Instruments that provide economic support and encourage 
economic participation can extend to all residents of a constituted group 
of states such as the European Union (EU), or to migrants to whom civil 
and political rights are denied.
In an example to which we will devote considerable attention here, the 
rights extended to migrants, including and especially those outside the 
usual legal process of voluntary immigration and naturalization, are 
frequently a topic of intense political conflict. To the extent that inclusion 
is attempted, however, the approach to social citizenship extended to 
migrants tends to be patterned on that already in place for those enjoying 
the civil and political status of citizen. In systems that follow a market- 
limiting logic of providing basic services such as health or education free 
at point of service to their own legal residents, the debate typically turns 
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around whether some form of this should be made available to migrants. 
Likewise, the turn to cash assistance for legal residents naturally suggests a 
similar approach for migrants.
The policy mix in the early twenty-first century typically contains both 
market-limiting and market-enhancing elements. There is a clear tendency 
in the past few decades, nevertheless, to privilege the latter. This observation 
forms the empirical starting point for this book. We choose Turkey as a 
setting because it provides examples of recently established CT programs 
aimed at both citizens and forced migrants.1 These are administered by a 
wide variety of agencies including local and national authorities, 
international organizations, and nongovernmental and para-statal 
organizations. This combination of a constant national social and economic 
context and considerable variation in implementation conditions makes it 
possible to identify and assess the key variables that mediate the outcomes 
of the instruments we study.
Based on an extensive meta-study of CT programs worldwide, and bas-
ing his definitions as we do on the foundations laid down by T.H. Marshall, 
Leisering (2019: 320) concludes that “cash transfer reflects a citizenship 
approach to poverty”—emphasis in the original. While welcoming this as 
an initial hypothesis, our approach throughout is to treat the compatibility 
of CT programs and meaningful citizenship regimes as an open question, 
subject to empirical answers. We also have the temerity to employ 
Marshall’s core concepts in a way that, were he still with us, he might well 
not approve. The policies we study purport to accomplish the ends he set 
out by means other than those he envisaged.
Whether these policies are ideal from the point of view of social theory 
is not the question we ask; they are the policies we have. While we discuss 
the perspective of Marxist and other external critics of the market economy, 
our principal goal is to produce an internal critique of the programs we 
study, assessing them in terms of the goals and objectives that they put 
forward for themselves and of the broader market framework of which 
they are a part. To this end, we seek to distinguish this study from both 
the critics of market citizenship and the cheerleaders for CT programming 
1 In both the academic and professional literature on the Syrian war, the term “refugee” is 
used as a functional equivalent of “forced migrants.” Despite the inexactness of this juxtapo-
sition, we will follow this practice here, using both terms indifferently except when we explic-
itly invoke international treaty definitions of the term “refugee.” Also, unless explicitly 
noted, we will use the general term “migrants” to mean international migrants rather than 
those who move within their country of origin.
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by remembering that, beyond the debate over abstract policy instruments, 
we should not lose sight of the way in which they are constructed and 
implemented in practice. As we noted above, Majone and Wildavsky 
(1979) remind us that policy instruments are at best “a bundle of 
dispositions” encouraging some behaviors rather than others. To this they 
add that dispositions are not destiny; one can, in a pinch, stir paint with a 
screwdriver or hammer nails with a shoe. Context matters: it is the focus 
of this book.
2  FroM LoCaL stuDIes to GLoBaL hypotheses
The research that produced this book was conducted as part of several 
distinct empirical research programs: completed, ongoing, or conducted 
with a view to proposing future projects. As such, it includes  several 
different approaches, and is based on explicit methodological choices. We 
begin with a systematic consideration of competing interpretations of the 
interaction between citizenship regimes and instruments of social assistance 
(Chap. 2), and then  discuss  the application of this debate to Turkey 
(Chaps. 3 and 4). We also consider in a similar way the turn to cash-based 
assistance in the humanitarian context and its application to the Syrian 
refugee population in Turkey (Chaps. 5 and 6). From a foundation in the 
scientific literature, these discussions are further informed by a systematic 
survey of relevant Turkish and EU documentation. This provides the 
background critical to understanding and evaluating the practical policy 
examples that form the book’s empirical core. A secondary, but important, 
purpose is to provide readers interested in pursuing the issues we raise 
with a thorough and balanced survey of relevant sources.
Chapters 4 and 6 present the first-hand studies that constitute our orig-
inal contribution to these debates. We use these to test assertions that 
emerge from the scientific and professional literatures, and to propose fur-
ther testable hypotheses. It is important to emphasize from the outset the 
illustrative purpose of the case studies: we do not seek to provide either an 
encyclopedic survey of all cash transfer programs in Turkey or an all-
encompassing vision of the issues facing international forced migrants. 
Our choice of this approach is informed by the questions we seek to 
answer: assessing “membership” or “inclusion” requires close observa-
tion—even if this necessarily restricts the ground that can be covered.
Complementing the documentary sources, our case studies are 
informed by interviews, as well as unstructured background conversations, 
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with program designers and administrators, and nondirective interviews 
with the recipients of social assistance, supplemented by participant 
observation of program procedures.  These were carried out as part of 
several different research programs in 2014, 2019, and 2020. All interviews 
and observations were carried out by the authors, and done on the basis 
of anonymity and non-identifiability. For this reason, we do not give name 
or location of the two districts described in Chap. 4—referring only to an 
“urban” and a “rural” district. Similarly, we do not provide details about 
persons interviewed, citing interviews only by date.
For the two local cases in Chap. 4, a total of 49 unstructured interviews 
were carried out with officials of district municipalities, political parties, 
and district Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations as well as 
recipients of aid. In the case of the urban district, this was complemented 
by participant observations accompanying workers for competing parties 
over the course of a local election campaign.
In the case of cash assistance to Syrian refugees, a total of 18 unstruc-
tured interviews were carried out with persons directly involved in the 
design and management of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) the 
principal program of unrestricted cash transfer for forced migrants. In 
every case, the views expressed were those of the individuals interviewed 
and not of the institutions to which they belonged. 
This was complemented by participant observation, carried out at the 
invitation and with the authorization of the World Food Program, with 
mixed WFP/TRC teams carrying out home visits in the context of the 
Comprehensive Vulnerability Monitoring Exercise intended to provide 
these agencies with information on the determinants of refugee 
vulnerability. Our observation was necessarily limited by language barriers 
but was carried out to the greatest extent possible with the assistance of 
Arabic-speaking members of the WFP/TRC teams with which the visits 
were made.
3  a note on CurrenCy ConversIon
A ubiquitous problem faced in presenting historical economic data lies in 
determining the present value of monetary sums. Throughout this book, 
we present all monetary amounts as they existed at the time, that is, in local 
currency expressed in nominal terms. The following elements allow readers 
to approximate the contemporary value of these amounts. European 
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central bank data show the value of the Turkish Lira (TL) at between 2 
and 3 for €1 between 2010 and 2014, between 3 and 4 for €1 from the 
start of 2015 through the first semester of 2017, and trending toward a 
further loss of value since then. At the time of this writing, in August 
2020, the TL was valued at approximately 8.5 for €1.2 A more useful 
contextualization is provided by reference to the evolution of the minimum 
wage in Turkey during the time covered by this study. According to 
OECD data, gross minimum wage rose from 750 TL per month in 2010, 
to 1275 TL per month in 2015, and 2030 per month in 2018.3 The sums 
proposed by the various programs analyzed in this book, typically between 
100 TL and 200 TL, must accordingly be understood as significant but 
nevertheless modest sums, even in the context of a low-income household.
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CHAPTER 2
Origins and Consequences of Market 
Citizenship
Abstract In this chapter, we establish the historical context needed to 
understand the place of cash transfer in contemporary market-enhancing 
social policy. To this end we outline the circumstances that led to the 
establishment of the twentieth-century regime of “industrial citizenship,” 
to growing criticism of it, and finally to the rise to prominence of a com-
peting model, labeled (largely by its opponents) as “market citizenship.” 
We pay considerable attention at each step to the social and philosophical 
debates that surrounded this evolution, trying to understand not just how 
one citizenship regime was challenged and partially replaced by another, 
but why.
Keywords Industrial citizenship • Market citizenship • Income support 
• Incorporation regimes • Social cash transfer
How do abstract principles of citizenship translate into concrete programs 
of social support? To what extent do these apply to migrants who do not 
yet—and may never—attain the civic or political elements of citizenship? 
The answer to such questions, we argue in this chapter, is not determined 
once and for all but depends critically on the citizenship regime in place. 
A better understanding of how and why citizenship regimes have evolved 
over the past century is thus a necessary starting point.
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1  The Rise of indusTRial CiTizenship
The various types of “welfare state” established in Europe and North 
America after 1945 were reactions to the traumatic social transformations 
brought on by a century of industrialization and economic crisis, from the 
nineteenth century’s “hungry 40s” that form the backdrop of Engels’ 
study of the English working class, to the twentieth-century trauma of the 
1930s’ “great depression.” Underlying the choices made in the 1940s and 
1950s, however, were debates that went back much farther on the role of 
social class and both the effectiveness and the moral status of markets. It is 
in this broader historical context that we begin our story.
1.1  The Rise and Fall of the First Market Society
For T.H. Marshall, “social citizenship” (by which he meant integration 
into the economy) was made possible initially by the reduction of eco-
nomic inequality subsequent to the rise of the industrial economy. While 
throughout he uses the language of social class, his sense of this term is far 
more English than Marxist. The existence of class, for Marshall, did not 
necessarily imply conflict any more than industrialization necessarily led to 
“pauperization.” Quite to the contrary, he noted that (in England at least) 
“[a] rise in money income … altered the economic distance which sepa-
rated the classes from one another, diminishing the gap between skilled 
and unskilled labor and between skilled labor and non-manual workers” 
(Marshall 1950: 46). At the same time, the rise in saving and the invention 
of progressive income tax blurred the distinction between the propertied 
classes and the rest, while the advent of mass-produced consumer goods 
contributed to a much more equal material standard of living than had 
ever been possible before. It was in this context that “the diminution of 
inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition” (46).1 In Marshall’s 
logic, this ultimate abolition of inequality with regard to the essential ele-
ments of social welfare could only be achieved through limiting the scope 
of the market. The concrete examples he proposes focus on universal 
access to socially necessary goods and services, housing, education, and 
health, for example, and more generally to “the progressive divorce 
1 Marshall’s observations on this point are supported by the recent work of Piketty (2019), 
who notes that nineteenth-century economic inequality peaked in 1914 and fell precipitously 
starting in 1918. The post-1945 welfare states, in other words, were implemented in a world 
in which inequality had already declined significantly.
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between real and money incomes” (81), that is, between market transac-
tions and standard of living.
Using a different vocabulary to express a similar sentiment a generation 
later, this removal of socially necessary goods and services from the market 
was labeled by Esping-Andersen (1990) as “de-commodification.” In 
making this point, Esping-Andersen, much more than Marshall, empha-
sized an element of economic history that will prove central to the argu-
ment of this book: the relevance to the present of the economic and social 
heritage of preindustrial society. In such a society what we subsequently 
labeled social welfare was “only imperfectly commodified” in the sense 
that nonmarket forces played a determining role in defining access to 
socially necessary goods and services. “Thus, in the middle ages, it was not 
the labor contract but the family, the church, or the lord that decided a 
person’s capacity for survival” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 35). Esping- 
Andersen, here, echoes the sentiments of Marc Bloch (1939: 109) who, 
writing about the “first feudal age,” had noted that “Buying and selling 
were not unknown to the society of that time, but it did not live, as does 
ours, by buying and selling”—(our translation). The limited role for mar-
ket transactions noted by these authors in premodern Western Europe is 
not an artifact of a distant period of history. Rather, it persisted well into 
the nineteenth century even in Britain, and longer elsewhere. Putting this 
statement back into Marshall’s vocabulary, we see that the “divorce 
between real and money income” was already present—or more to the 
point that the marriage between the two had yet to be fully consummated. 
Indeed, as Polanyi (1944/1957) famously chronicled, it was the move 
toward a social and economic system in which both the means of survival 
and the labor that allowed access to them were treated as commodities 
subject to a market price that constituted the socially disruptive “great 
transformation” of the nineteenth century.
It is noteworthy that among the opponents of this transformation were 
found the most conservative, as well as most revolutionary elements of 
European and North American societies. The subjugation of workers to 
market forces beyond their control was central to the Marxist critique of 
the capitalist system of production, but conservatives, as Esping-Andersen 
(1990: 36) points out, “opposed outright the principle of commodifying 
humanity” because they feared—rightly, we might add—that this “would 
lend a fatal blow to the perpetuation of the old order.” Nor was this fear a 
new one. Fontaine (2014: 144) in her study of the evolution of market 
relations in early modern Europe returns again and again to the 
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antagonism between the market and the aristocratic views of society. To 
enter into a market bargain with someone was, at some level to acknowl-
edge him or her as a social equal. She points to the profound aristocratic 
resistance to the expansion of market transactions whose point of refer-
ence was “the validity of the exchange rather than the social rank of the 
persons involved”—(our translation). As seen from the summit of society, 
the market was a threat to “quality” in the social sense, and thus to social 
order more generally.
The twentieth-century welfare state can be understood as one of several 
possible responses to Polanyi’s “great transformation” toward the all- 
encompassing market that threatened both workers and aristocrats, an 
attempt to attenuate the market’s social costs while consolidating its pro-
ductive capacity. When we take into account the multiple sources of oppo-
sition to the market, we understand why Esping-Andersen emphasizes 
that welfare state regimes had two distinct and not altogether compatible 
purposes: to decommodify labor and to support—or restore—“a system 
of stratification.”
1.2  The “Industrial” Model of Citizenship 
and the Twentieth- Century Welfare State
In his 1967 study of “the new industrial state,” the economist J.K. Galbraith 
emphasized the largely successful counterattack against the all- 
encompassing market, not by labor but rather by major industrial corpora-
tions. Beside a “market system” made up of small firms, which really are 
subject to market rules, Galbraith posited the existence of what he labeled 
the “planning system” made up of firms whose position was quite differ-
ent. The dominant position of the largest corporations largely insulated 
them from market forces, allowing them to devote their energies to ensur-
ing long-term security rather than short-term profits. Support for social 
policies, in this context, came as managers saw the opportunity to “trade 
profits for protection against such undirected events with such unpredict-
able consequences as a strike and its accompanying effect on identification 
and motivation.” This was made possible in large part because the postwar 
era was the high-water mark of managerial—as opposed to shareholder—
control of corporations, which meant, as Galbraith put it, that “those who 
make the decisions do not have to pay” (Galbraith 1967/1979: 240). 
Swenson, looking back on this moment a generation later, also empha-
sized the role of business interests in the establishment of the “regulatory 
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welfare state” from the 1940s to the 1970s, concluding that: “… chang-
ing alignments or sharing of interests across class lines, not a shifting of the 
balance of power favoring labor at capital’s expense, might be the most 
significant source of progressive change” (Swenson 2004: 3).
This is the world that gave rise to the model of “industrial citizenship.” 
As defined by Canadian legal scholar Henry Arthurs, in a text exactly con-
temporary to Galbraith’s New Industrial State but looking at the question 
from a legal point of view, this was a system in which “the worker lives 
increasingly in a world of rights and duties created not only by his employ-
ment contractual act, but by a process of public and private legislation.” 
(Arthurs 1967: 787) Such legislation set the terms of permissible employ-
ment contracts, and recognized the central role of labor unions in bargain-
ing for them, as well as providing support for those who could not work 
due to accident, sickness, or old age.
A “formidable array of rights” (Marshall 1950), was indeed produced 
in twentieth century Europe and North America, but so was “a system of 
stratification.” (Esping-Andersen 1990) This took the form of corporatist 
governance of social policy in “conservative” regimes such as France and 
Germany, in which different professional groups received very different 
benefits. In the “liberal” United States and United Kingdom, stratification 
took the form of means-tested support programs, the social stigma of 
which was such that they were refused by some who might have been eli-
gible for them—as is still regularly the case today in the United States 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 58–65). Social democratic regimes faced a differ-
ent set of challenges. The first, as Esping-Andersen points out, was over-
coming the heritage of labor-union dominance that tended to segregate 
industrial workers into self-contained communities to the exclusion of all 
other classes. The prestige and power that such systems brought to unions 
made them reluctant to abandon it, despite the universalist aspirations of 
socialist ideology. It is noteworthy that Arthurs’ definition of “industrial 
citizenship” in Canada was explicitly limited to unionized workers, and 
did not include other types of employees, let alone all Canadians. The 
legal “rights and duties” that existed beyond the scope of employment 
contracts were seen, in this logic, as a natural extension of industrial rela-
tions; they served above all to ensure equal treatment across unionized 
sectors—not beyond them.
The move to universalism, moreover, brought challenges of its own. 
Even the most all-encompassing social democratic models saw the need to 
introduce earning-graduated benefits in order to retain the support of 
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higher earners (Heclo 1974: 227–283; Esping-Andersen 1990: 65–69; 
Steinmo 2013). The point of these arguments is not to suggest that redis-
tribution in favor of workers, children, and the elderly was an illusion. It 
did indeed occur, especially in states following social-democratic models. 
Even in such systems, however, it was accompanied by continued inequal-
ity and consolidated social control.
Introducing the question of social control reminds us that often lost in 
critiques of the market are the social and human costs of the absence of 
markets, especially as these relate to interpersonal relationships. A world in 
which it was “family, the church, or the lord that decided a person’s capac-
ity for survival,” to return to Esping-Andersen’s characterization of the 
preindustrial world, was a world of personal dependence. In such a world, 
the capacity to give was a source of power, understood as such by both 
givers and receivers at all levels of society. As seen from the top of society, 
we have Montaigne’s defense of the practice of venality: “to purchase an 
office is to give only money; to receive it as a grant is to give one’s self.”2 
The view from the bottom, on this topic at least, was not so different. 
Judith Shklar (1991: 83) in her essays on American citizenship evokes the 
joy and pride expressed by Frederick Douglas, escaped slave and subse-
quently a leader of the campaign against slavery in the nineteenth-century 
United States, at being for the first time paid for his labor, the “tremen-
dous fact” that truly placed him “in a state of independence.” For the 
American former slave just as for the French aristocrat, to pay one’s own 
way was to be one’s own man.
In return for the protection it offered from market risk, the model of 
“industrial citizenship” displaced rather than eliminated dependence. 
From church, lord, and family, it was shifted to corporations, unions, and 
the public institutions of the welfare state. Individuals, whether in their 
role as workers or as receivers of services, were protected from the insecu-
rity of the market, but at the price of accepting a passive role. As put by 
Julian Le Grand (2003), they were “pawns” and not “queens.” Le Grand 
emphasizes the extent to which, in Britain at least, the collectivist ethos of 
the 1940s and 1950s was translated into an increase in the power of civil 
servants, whose genuinely public spirited motivations in no way dimin-
ished—indeed strengthened by legitimating—their quest for control. In 
its public ideology and perhaps in its collective memory, this was the soci-
ety that provides the model for Root’s (2007) ideal of citizenship, in 
2 Montaigne, Essais 3: 9.
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which individuals accept responsibility for each other. In practice, how-
ever, the altruistic “knights rampant” (Le Grand 2003: 4) of the civil ser-
vice took responsibility for everyone. Citizens, for their part, were expected 
to display a passive form of altruism through their uncomplaining willing-
ness to accept the redistributive tax system that paid for it all. Le Grand’s 
observations rest on analytical foundations that go back a generation; in 
1974, Hugh Heclo demonstrated through close empirical study of the 
policy-making process the extent to which British and Swedish social- 
policy bureaucrats worked to solve policy “puzzles” that they themselves 
had identified, rather than responding to any identifiable social or political 
demand. Looking to a subsequent generation of policy-making in Sweden, 
Steinmo (2013: 85) comes to similar conclusions, noting that: “the unique 
features of the Swedish political economy are the products of a particularly 
successful brand of social democracy that was invented by a particularly 
technocratic and remarkably autonomous governing elite.”
The industrial regime of citizenship was indeed “inextricably linked to 
the growth of the welfare state and social rights,” and an “element in the 
attempt to build a bridge between citizenship and class” (Fudge 2005, 
632) through efforts to limit the commodification of workers. We are 
brought back to Marshall’s prediction of an increasing distinction between 
real and money income, and the ever-growing importance of the former. 
What Marshall and other proponents of the welfare state and the citizen-
ship regime that accompanied it failed fully to appreciate was that this 
came at the price of agreeing to live by the rules of the paternalistic society 
and the industrial planning system; by the 1960s, this was a price that 
increasing numbers of citizens in Europe and North America were no 
longer willing to pay.
2  fRom indusTRial To maRkeT CiTizenship
The regime of industrial citizenship was closely tied to the historical 
moment in which it arose; it was part of what historians of the twentieth 
century have long designated as the “post-war consensus” (Addison 1975) 
founded on trade union strength, Keynesian demand management, and 
the various models of the welfare state. As one after another of these ele-
ments were eroded, the industrial regime of citizenship itself was called 
into question.
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2.1  The Revolt against Industrial Citizenship
Not all, even at the high point of the “industrial” system, were equally 
enthusiastic. The critiques and warnings of unrepentant liberals such as 
Fredrich Hayek are well known, but more ironic, as Le Grand (2003: 6) 
points out, is the fact that Keynes was at best a “reluctant supporter” of 
the welfare state that is too often associated with his name. The “welfare 
state” was many things, but it was “Keynesian” only indirectly and coinci-
dentally. Keynesian macroeconomic management was meant to reduce the 
need for any targeted “welfare” policies on the part of the state by ensur-
ing full employment; it depended fundamentally on the acquisitiveness of 
consumers, not the solidarity of citizens, for its organizing logic and eco-
nomic engine. There can be no doubt, however, that the crisis of Keynesian 
demand management that erupted in the 1960s and paved the way for the 
liberalization of the 1980s coincided with and contributed to mounting 
pressure both on welfare state policies and, more generally, on the “indus-
trial” citizenship regime. In addition to the economic crisis, however, it is 
critical to recall that the social transformations that ultimately led to the 
“neo-liberal turn” (Jobert 1994) toward a market model of society had a 
number of converging causes. The liberalism of the 1980s triumphed over 
an economic and social model that, by then, had been on the defensive for 
over a decade.
One line of attack was philosophical: the “critical sociology” associated 
with the Frankfurt school in Germany and the French “new left” of the 
1960s. Taking for granted the economic success of “advanced capitalism,” 
these writers and activists sought to undermine its social and moral status: 
for them, “the impending crisis of capitalism was not one of production 
but of legitimation” (Streeck 2014: 14). Against the prison of lifetime 
employment in hierarchical firms, they promoted empowerment through 
workers’ collective self-management of those same enterprises. In a similar 
vein, the burgeoning environmentalist movements of this same period saw 
the danger not in the collapse of the industrial system but in its unchecked 
economic success, accompanied by mounting ecological damage.
Although it is generally understood as a critique of an economic and 
political model, the revolt against the postwar attempt to establish “dem-
ocratic capitalism” (Streeck 2014) should also be seen, in the context of 
this book, as a growing rejection of the “industrial” regime of citizenship 
whose foundations were acquiescence to top-down control (of the 
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economy by large firms and of social policy by national governments) and 
to the centrality of the patriarchal family as the fundamental unit of social 
intervention. Along with the erosion of authority came a calling into 
question of the enforced uniformity that seemed to be the price to pay for 
the security of lifetime industrial employment and the assurance of a uni-
versal social safety net. As pointed out by Le Grand (2003: 8) “… it 
became increasingly apparent that many people—particularly but not 
exclusively the middle classes—wanted different kinds and different levels 
of services.”
A second fundamental element of industrial citizenship, the patriarchal 
family associating a male “bread-winner” and a female provider of unpaid 
domestic services, was also under attack. This family model, especially but 
not exclusively in the “conservative” variants of the welfare state, had 
bridged the gap between policies tailored above all to unionized salaried 
workers and the aspiration to universal social rights. It was through their 
association with an employed man that wives and children, in this ideal-
ized model, had access to the rights and benefits of industrial citizenship. 
Feminist contestation of the patriarchal family necessarily brought contes-
tation of the industrial model as well. An important manifestation of this 
was a massive turn by women to the market. To the consternation of neo- 
Marxists, “Beginning in the 1970s, women throughout the western world 
poured into labor markets, and what had been branded shortly before as 
historically obsolete wage slavery was now experienced as liberation from 
unpaid household drudgery” (Streeck 2014: 17).
Whether we understand these developments as a genuine social desire 
for greater individual autonomy (Le Grand 2003; Barnett 2005), or as a 
victory for the propaganda of the wealthy and a deplorable descent into 
collective false consciousness (Blyth 2002; Root 2007; Streeck 2014), the 
fact remains that industrial citizenship was well on its way to being rejected 
as a social model before the economy that supported it entered into open 
crisis. It was a much weakened economic and social order that was left to 
face the inflation and unemployment crises of the later 1970s. Between 
them, these brought down the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange 
rates and opened the way to what proved to be a devastating counterattack 
from philosophical liberals and leaders of finance on both the managerial 
capitalism of the “new industrial state” and the paternalistic welfare pro-
grams central to “industrial citizenship.”
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2.2  Toward a New Citizenship Regime
On both sides of the Atlantic, the movement away from “industrial citi-
zenship” was led by a coalition of financial interests and a generation of 
political leaders who were at once politically conservative and economi-
cally liberal. In the business world, this took the form of the devastatingly 
successful counterattack by shareholders and financial interests more gen-
erally on the managerial planning system of the “new industrial state” 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Generally couched in terms of “share-
holder rights” this became the new orthodoxy of “good corporate gover-
nance” by the 1990s, consecrated as such by a “Principles of Corporate 
Governance” produced by the OECD at the end of the decade (OECD 
1999). From the “leveraged buy-outs” and “de-regulation” of 1970s 
America to the financial “big bang” of the 1980s in Europe, the “neo- 
liberal turn” (Jobert, ed. 1994) was underway within the corporation. 
Quantitative study of its impact largely validated Galbraith’s hypotheses by 
showing that while managers left to themselves preferred a “quiet life” 
(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003), the threat of hostile takeover typically 
led to a fall in salaries and a reduction in capacity. The policy of ensuring 
labor peace through salary increases, fringe benefits, and guaranteed 
employment was increasingly a thing of the past. A point too often ignored 
in the literature on the resurgence of business influence in the politics of 
Europe and North America in the 1980s (Vogel 1989; Blyth 2002) is that 
this influence was wielded by corporations that had undergone, or were in 
the throes of, this internal revolution. What these new-model corpora-
tions wanted from government was very different from what their equally 
influential predecessors of the 1950s required, and high on the new list of 
demands was the reduction of the union influence that had been at the 
heart of the “industrial” regime of citizenship.
Political leadership converged with this economic movement after 
1979. For Reagan, Thatcher, and those who emulated them, the inflation-
ary crisis of the late 1970s provided the perfect pretext for action against 
both the entrenched power of labor unions and the expansion of the wel-
fare state (Blyth 2002). The proximate result of this was the “supply side 
economics” of the 1980s, which provided justification for tax cuts and the 
deregulation of economic sectors ranging from banking to air transport. A 
far more lasting development went beyond popular economics: the con-
cept of the market as an ideal of personal liberty and empowerment, in 
past decades largely the province of a small albeit influential group of 
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philosophical liberals ranging from Friedrich Hayek to Milton Friedman, 
had become by the mid-1980s a mainstream view, and would remain so 
for a generation.
While the attack on unions was remarkably successful, the outcome for 
the social policies that, collectively, had typified the various models of the 
welfare state was more nuanced. Many of the specific institutions and pro-
grams central to the postwar social model, from the US Social Security 
System to the British National Health Service proved surprisingly resistant 
to direct “retrenchment” (Pierson 1994). The broader regime of indus-
trial citizenship, however, with its collectivist ideal, found itself with few 
active supporters. In its place grew a vision of individualized citizenship 
better suited to the resurgent market ideology. In this context, the history 
of the welfare state was reimagined by its critics in the 1970s and 1980s. 
From a heroic narrative of working class conquest, it was recast as a story 
of public sector hubris.
At the core of this new narrative were two distinct streams. At the 
broadest level was what Pierson (1994) called “systemic retrenchment,” 
subsequently better known and much studied as “austerity” (Blyth 2013; 
Schäfer and Streeck 2013). Among the founding documents of this stream 
was the 1975 Trilateral Commission report on “The Crisis of Democracy” 
(Crozier et al. 1975: 9), whose diagnosis could be summed up as: “The 
demands on democratic government grow, while the capacity of demo-
cratic government stagnates.” Numerous observers of all political stripes 
have pointed out that while the debate on “austerity” has raged for now 
almost 50 years, public spending has continued to rise. Change was more 
subtle but ultimately more important; the belief, central to the postwar 
ideal of industrial citizenship, in a state monopoly on the provision of 
welfare-enhancing services, has arguably never recovered. A second, more 
targeted stream of argument strengthened this effort to discredit the wel-
fare state by claiming that actual harm was caused by attempts to secure 
welfare outside the market economy. The indisputably poor quality of 
some public services lent—and continues to lend—credibility to this argu-
ment. For welfare state supporters, the idea of de-commodified social ser-
vices may evoke images of bright cheerful child-care centers, presumably 
somewhere in the suburbs of Stockholm. The frankly Dickensian analysis 
of the calculated cruelty of the New York City system of shelters for the 
homeless in the 2000s given by Bonnet (2019) serves as a reminder that 
what Polanyi referred to as the “workhouse test,” that is, the explicit pol-
icy of making the conditions of public assistance so degrading that only 
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the truly desperate will accept them, cannot be consigned to the history of 
a less enlightened time.
At the heart of the vision of citizenship that rose to prominence in the 
1980s and remained dominant for a generation was a skeptical assessment 
of public action and a renewed belief in the empowering virtue of markets. 
At the societal level, this implied an end to efforts to impose a public sec-
tor monopoly on social services. From the return of “corporate social 
responsibility” and “social enterprise” to the rise of nongovernmental 
organizations and the trend to public–private partnerships, the idea that 
the state should be, at best, one actor among many in the social field 
became widespread. Religious groups, the public role of which some 
believed to have been relegated to distant history, played a part as well. In 
fact, they had never gone away, as attested by the prevalence of religiously 
affiliated schools in Germany and the United Kingdom, or the quasi- 
official role of the French Secours Catholique in working with irregular 
migrants. The renewed prominence in the United States of “faith-based 
initiatives” since the 2000s is likewise the recognition of a long-standing 
reality. Underscoring the compatibility of all of these with a certain vision 
of modernity, the nebulous but increasingly ubiquitous notion of “social 
innovation,” frequently put forward by the European Union, has emerged 
to encompass initiatives that combine the use of innovative technology 
with the systematic blurring of the lines between public and private. (Ark- 
Yıldırım and Smyrl 2019)
At the individual level, this vision idealized the decision-making agent 
rather than the passive subject, valuing initiative rather than solidarity. The 
feminism of the 1970s, as we have noted, had anticipated this turn as large 
numbers of women found in salaried work outside the home not merely 
increased financial autonomy but, perhaps more importantly, personal and 
social validation. Individual autonomy was also at the heart of calls for 
change in public and professional services, ranging from individualized 
education programs to patient-centered medicine. In the field of eco-
nomic development, individual empowerment increasingly displaced col-
lective solidarity as the organizing principle. This took forms as diverse as 
the sale of public housing and other schemes to promote homeownership 
in Europe and North America, or micro-credit schemes and incentives for 
self-employment in developing economies. All of these had in common, to 
return to Le Grand’s evocative language, the presumption that citizens 
wished to be “queens” rather than “pawns” and that empowering them to 
achieve this was in the general interest. If the ideal citizens of the industrial 
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regime were the corporate manager and the salaried union member, the 
new model was the entrepreneurial property owner—even on a very 
small scale.
Marshallian “full equality of membership,” in this context, was cen-
tered on market participation. In a society that “lives by buying and sell-
ing,” as Bloch put it to mark the contrast with earlier ages, engaging in the 
petty market transactions of daily life becomes the clearest marker of the 
responsible adult citizen. Being one’s own man (or woman …), in such a 
world, just as it had for Frederick Douglas a century earlier, implied paying 
one’s own way.
3  poliCies foR maRkeT inTegRaTion
Critics of the market turn have typically pointed to the policies outlined 
above as exacerbating the marginalization of those who, for one reason or 
another, failed to live up to the neo-entrepreneurial ethos of the market 
regime. It does not follow, however, that a market-enhancing perspective 
is incapable of going beyond policies intended to provide opportunities 
for personal enterprise or to mitigate life accidents such as sickness or tem-
porary unemployment. Market-enhancing policies can also seek to address 
issues of chronic poverty. In the terms we have used throughout this dis-
cussion, the former seek to prevent persons who would normally enjoy full 
social citizenship from losing it due to mischance not of their own making. 
The latter tackles the more difficult problem of including those who in 
Marshall’s terms lack the “modicum of economic welfare and security” 
necessary to “live the life of a civilized being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11).
3.1  From Income Maintenance to Cash Transfer
The question of how best to accomplish this is not new. A major concep-
tual step, as described by Heclo (1974/2010) was taken in the first half of 
the twentieth century by the move from “relief” as an exceptional mea-
sure, with its uneasy mixture of charity and stigma, to “income mainte-
nance” understood both as a right for those receiving it and as socially 
useful for the public at large. The development of unemployment insur-
ance, but also of early forms of health insurance, such as the 1911 British 
scheme intended to replace earnings lost through illness or accident, can 
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be put into this category. Each sought to maintain “money income” rather 
than replacing it though the provision of services outside the market.
For contemporary proponents of such schemes, the key is to go beyond 
“income maintenance” to income creation through cash payments to low- 
income persons. This could, in principle, take the form of universal basic 
income, but while much spoken of, this has so far never been attempted.3 
Despite this, a point of view frequently found in academic writing on 
social policy is that anything short of a universal benefit represents, at 
most, a second-best solution. Thus, Buğra and Adar (2008: 91) propose 
that while policies such as universal old age and health benefits and non- 
means- tested income maintenance schemes are most compatible with citi-
zenship, “in those socio-economic contexts in which poverty is a serious 
problem and resources are scarce, means-tested benefits may be the only 
way to prevent social exclusion due to the inability of certain segments of 
the population to gain access to basic minimum means of social 
integration.”
An alternative approach begins from the premise that if the ultimate 
goal is to protect citizens against poverty—or in the more sweeping terms 
of the UN’s sustainable development goals, to “eradicate poverty”—then 
means-tested benefits can be the most effective instrument for achieving 
universal protection against poverty. Returning, as we do, to Marshall’s 
construction of social citizenship, Leisering (2019: 57) emphasizes the 
point that “equality of membership” rests on the capacity to participate in 
social and economic life. It is this that must be universal, not access to a 
given public program. It is because of its potential to provide the capacity 
for participation to those who might otherwise lack it—bearing in mind 
Sen’s (1981: 2) reminder that those who have little to exchange can’t 
demand very much—that Leisering (2019: 320) concludes that a means- 
tested transfer of purchasing power not only meets the requirements of 
universality but can be considered a “citizenship approach to poverty.”
Grouped under the label “cash transfer” (CT), policy instruments of 
this sort are noncontributory schemes of social support through transfer 
of purchasing power to individuals. They are thus distinct both from social 
insurance (based on contributions) and from in-kind provision of goods 
or services ranging from free healthcare to the distribution of food 
3 It is sometimes argued that the redistribution of oil revenue in the state of Alaska through 
the Permanent Fund should be counted as an example of universal basic income 
(Raventos 2007).
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packages. Examples of this approach in Europe, such as the French “active 
solidarity income” (revenue de solidarité active), rely on targeting resources 
to those who need them most.4 Variations on the CT model have prolifer-
ated in the global south since the mid-2000s. Honorati et al. (2015) count 
some 130 low- and middle-income countries that have at least one non-
contributory unconditional CT program (including poverty-targeted 
transfers and old-age social pensions). Similarly, 63 countries have at least 
one conditional CT program, compared with two countries in 1997 and 
27 countries in 2008 (Bastagli et al. 2016). By another accounting, CT 
programs had reached 750 million people in low- and middle-income 
countries by 2010 (Molyneaux et  al. 2017: 1). The Cash Learning 
Partnership notes in the context of humanitarian assistance that
The benefits of cash-based assistance have been shown to cut across multiple sec-
tors. And opportunities have been identified to align CT Programs with major 
reforms at every level, from achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, to strengthening social protec-
tion… (CaLP 2020: 3)
Assessments such as these suggest that CT is the ideal social policy for 
the regime of market citizenship. Questions, however, remain on at least 
two dimensions: the first focused on the relative advisability of broad 
policy types and the second assessing empirical outcomes of specific 
programs.
In the first category is found the ongoing debate between proponents 
of “conditional” and “unconditional” CT.  The debate is framed by a 
deceptively simple question: if the situation to be remedied is inadequate 
income, why not, to cite the evocative title of the study by Hanlon et al. 
(2010), “just give money to the poor,” and let them decide how best to 
spend it? The second half of the question gives away the answer most fre-
quently put forward by proponents of conditional CT. It has been shown 
repeatedly that cash payments would be the most cost-effective way to 
provide “relief” (Marical et al. 2008), but from the perspective of those 
providing it, the idea of allowing “the poor” to spend it as they wish has 
more often than not proven unacceptable. We are once more confronted 
with the persistence of the moral stratification most recently encountered 
with the “knights rampant” of the de-commodifying welfare state (Le 
4 https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/N19775
2 ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MARKET CITIZENSHIP 
28
Grand 2003), but seen previously in the aristocracy’s fear of loss of privi-
lege based on moral superiority (Fontaine 2014). At the core of this moral 
paternalism is the deeply held belief that “the poor” must not only be 
“relieved” but “improved.” The underlying fear is what Milton Friedman 
(1962/1982: 21) ironically pointed to as the problem with economic 
freedom: “It gives people what they want, rather than what a particular 
group thinks they ought to want.”
Conditional CT encourages people to seek “what they ought to want” 
through cash incentives for socially approved behavior. Contemporary sys-
tems of conditional CT such as Brazil’s much studied Bolsa Familia are 
contingent on actions such as sending children to school or pursuing job 
training. Proponents of conditional transfers point to their potential for 
encouraging longer-term social transformation and poverty reduction 
through building human capital. The popularity of such programs is unde-
niable; Morais de Sá e Silva (2017: 3) refers to conditional CT as “a magic 
silver bullet in the policy world.” When it comes to assessing concrete 
outcomes, however, this same author takes a more measured tone, noting 
that in the case of Brazil there was consensus among officials that the Bolsa 
Familia was effectively an incomes policy, rather than an educational one. 
Evidence linking the program to longer-term educational outcomes is at 
best ambiguous. (137).
What can be done with the purchasing power transferred can also be 
constrained. Most common are programs that explicitly link purchasing 
power to food, from the SNAP food assistance program in the United 
States (Alderman et al. 2018) to the local cash-transfer schemes we will 
study in Turkey. The Turkish local programs discussed in Chap. 4 also 
embrace another common constraint: the designation of specific busi-
nesses in which purchases can be made. A final type of limitation is the link 
between CT and unrelated policy priorities. CT for Syrian refugees in 
Turkey, as we will see in Chap. 6, is presented as unconditional, but 
requires recipients to be registered with Turkish immigration authorities 
and imposes limits on their mobility within Turkey.
On the other side of the divide are programs not linked to behavior 
(“unrestricted” CT) or to specific purchases (multipurpose cash, or MPC). 
For Hanlon et  al. (2010: 11) the choice is a starkly moral one: “Cash 
transfers are a direct challenge to the traditional belief, explicit or at least 
subconscious, that impoverished people are at least partly responsible for 
their plight.” Low-income households, in this view, do not need to be 
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morally improved, or “nudged” into more productive behavior; they need 
to be economically supported.
Just as with conditional CT, empirical evidence concerning concrete 
outcomes is somewhat harder to come by than sweeping theoretical pro-
nouncements. A sense of cautious optimism, nevertheless, seems to be 
emerging. Focused studies of unconditional CT programs in Africa have 
pointed to positive effects on early childhood nutrition (Agüero et  al. 
2007) or on economic outcomes and psychological well-being (Haushofer 
and Shapiro 2016). Other researchers have pointed to improvements in 
mental health (Kilburn et al. 2016; Angeles et al. 2019) or, more gener-
ally, to improved health and educational outcomes (Marinescu 2018). 
With respect to education, however, studies or unconditional CT, just like 
those of the conditional programs cited above, tend to assess “educational 
outcome” in terms of school attendance; evidence of improvement in edu-
cational attainment is much less evident. (Baird et al. 2014) Summing up 
the state of current knowledge, the 2020 report of the Cash Learning 
partnership cites evidence that:
Cash is usually spent according to a hierarchy of needs—most immediate needs 
first (e.g. food, basic shelter, primary health) and other needs later (e.g. liveli-
hoods, less essential goods). (CaLP 2020: 106)
Bringing together these streams of evidence suggests that the distinc-
tion between conditional and unconditional cash may be less obvious in 
practice than in moral theory. Evidence from World Bank funded condi-
tional CT programs in Turkey suggest that they do work to motivate fami-
lies to send their children to school (World Bank 2006). A similar outcome, 
however, is reported for the unconditional CT for refugees in Turkey that 
will be our focus in Chaps. 5 and 6 (Maunder et al. 2018: 29). A recurring 
theme in reporting on these programs is that CT can help to overcome 
stigma. From Brazil, comes the view that the Bolsa Familia is first and 
foremost an incomes program:
“The fundamental premise is that poor children are not in school because their 
families lack the means to do so. In the words of interviewee C16, “sometimes 
poor children do not attend school because they do not have basic items such as 
school uniforms.” Morais de Sá e Silva (2017: 138)
2 ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF MARKET CITIZENSHIP 
30
Likewise from a beneficiary of the conditional CT program in Turkey: 
“It’s money we can spend on pencils, shoes and uniforms, so the children 
don’t feel humiliated at school” (World Bank 2006: 1). To return to the 
vocabulary proposed by Sen (1981), the problem is not one of supply or 
even of rights, but of (market) entitlement. In an example directly relevant 
to our final case, Baban et al. (2016: 10) make this point directly noting 
that in the case of Syrian refugees in Turkey:
The kimlik (registration card) enables Syrian children to have identical rights 
to Turkish children regarding the right to a free education in a Turkish school. 
However, as with health care, accessing this right can be more difficult in the 
everyday realities of Syrian families in the face of poverty, where families can-
not afford to clothe and pay for the transportation costs of sending their chil-
dren to school.
The premise of unrestricted cash, supported at least partly by some of 
the studies cited above (Maunder et al. 2018; Marinescu 2018), is that 
this is a spending choice families will make as soon as they have the means 
to do so, with or without explicit conditions.
With this discussion, we are brought back to two of this book’s central 
points of focus. In the first place, it highlights the limited value of theoreti-
cal rights for those who do not have the practical means to access them. 
“Equality of membership,” as exemplified here by school attendance, 
depends on more than the existence of a universal school system. The 
explicit reference to Syrian refugees, moreover, reminds us that one of the 
questions we ask is whether and to what extent some elements of 
Marshallian social citizenship might be extended, using market-enhancing 
instruments such as CT, to migrants—including forced migrants. In gen-
eral terms, this is the question of scope: Is assistance a right or privilege? If 
the former, how is it earned? If the latter, who is entitled to it—all workers, 
all citizens, all persons regardless of status? It is in this context that we turn 
to the question of migration in the following section.
3.2  Market Citizenship and Migration
A recurring criticism of Marshall’s model of citizenship is that it makes no 
allowance for—indeed takes no notice of—migration (Joppke 2010). 
Although this is self-evidently true with respect to Marshall’s empirical 
examples, it is much less so if we consider his analysis in the more abstract 
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sense employed in these pages. Here, Marshall’s division of citizenship 
into distinct components proves surprisingly useful. If “citizenship” were 
seen as a binary question of status, an indivisible whole, it clearly could not 
apply to “non-citizen” migrants. The position we have taken throughout 
this book, however, precludes such summary dismissal. Instead, we follow 
not only Marshall but much of the contemporary discourse on citizenship 
by understanding it as a more complex and evolving array of rights 
and duties.
This starting point allows us to consider the prospect that the social and 
economic aspects of citizenship may have partial autonomy from the civil 
and political elements. Marshall’s historical analysis provides a mirror- 
image argument in favor of this proposition through its demonstration 
that civil and political citizenship can, and long did, exist in the absence of 
economic and social rights. In this book, we reverse the perspective to ask 
a question beyond the scope of Marshall’s analysis but not, we suggest, 
incompatible with his logic, namely, whether and to what extent the eco-
nomic and social rights granted to migrants constitute elements of citizen-
ship in Marshallian terms, as “basic equality of membership.”
Granting the elements of “social citizenship” to migrants is far from 
obvious. It is no coincidence that the classic exponents of the mid- 
twentieth century European welfare states from Titmuss to Esping- 
Andersen make no more mention of immigration than does Marshall. 
Welfare states, as Freeman (1986: 52) pointed out a generation ago, are 
“by their nature meant to be closed systems” because “individuals who 
agree to share according to need have to experience a sense of solidarity 
that comes from common membership.” Deploying a more instrumental-
ist argument, Rieger and Leibfried (1998: 375) suggest that “Only clo-
sure seemed to protect the massive investments in national human 
capital—the welfare state’s move toward the education, health, and social 
state—and to increase the efficiency of political rule.” Complementary to 
these arguments are those made by Castles (1989) about mid-twentieth- 
century Australia and New Zealand, where strongly egalitarian working- 
class culture and powerful labor unions—the perfect context for industrial 
citizenship—ensured high levels of social and economic equality without 
the need for extensive redistribution, through strong labor regulation and 
high wage levels made possible by an extremely restrictive immigration 
regime that prevented labor market competition.
In this context, it is a mark of the relative weakness of labor in Western 
Europe, even at the apogee of the industrial era, that the industrial regime 
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of citizenship proved to be not only open to migration but, in a dynamic 
unintended by its political architects, served as a stimulus for it as employ-
ers turned massively to immigrant workers as a way to restore a measure of 
flexibility to the labor market. (Freeman 1986: 55) Perhaps to the surprise 
of these same employers, however, “… guest workers without formal citi-
zenship have been incorporated into various aspects of the social and insti-
tutional order of their countries” (Nuhoğlu Soysal 1994: 2). For this 
author, this was attributable to an emerging model of “postnational citi-
zenship” in which “what were previously defined as national rights become 
entitlements” legitimated by an emerging norm of “human rights as a 
world-level organizing principle” (3). Giving substance to these rights, 
however, was by no means automatic. Rather, it required an “incorpora-
tion regime” conditioned by “the institutional repertoire of the host polit-
ical systems, which afford the model and rationale for both state and 
migrant action” (5).
The notion of an incorporation regime is one to which we will return 
in subsequent chapters, but in so doing two critical elements must be 
added to the analysis. Most obviously, we will focus on the features of the 
Turkish institutional repertoire that distinguish it from the European 
examples studied by Nuhoğlu Soysal. A more radical question is to what 
extent a concept originally conceived for the case of guest workers can be 
adapted to the problem of refugees.5 Access to employment is only the 
most obvious difference between guest workers and refugees, and the like-
lihood of their being treated differently not only from citizens but also 
from other migrants by host country institutions is significant. When we 
speak of an “incorporation regime” for refugees, thus, we do not imply 
that these will face a situation identical to that of the guest workers ana-
lyzed by Nuhoğlu Soysal. Rather, we seek to underscore two key elements 
of her insight: that rights long associated with national citizenship are now 
strongly influenced by international laws and norms, and that the transla-
tion of legal abstractions into daily reality depends critically on the “insti-
tutional repertoire” of host countries.
5 Throughout this volume and we will use the term “refugee” in the generic sense to des-
ignate involuntary migrants whose reason for leaving their country of origin was to flee vio-
lence or the threat of violence, as distinguished from other types of involuntary migrants 
such as victims of human trafficking. Only when explicitly noted will we use the term in the 
technical legal sense as defined by the successive Geneva conventions and their translations 
into national laws.
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On one level, the various postwar international commitments from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent protocols would 
seem to provide a paradigmatic example of “human rights as a world-level 
organizing principle.” The Universal Declaration pointedly employs the 
word “everyone” to designate the holders of the rights it enumerates, 
avoiding all reference to citizens or residents. Among the rights held by 
“everyone” is to “seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion” (Article 14). While the 1951 Convention and its protocols subse-
quently attempted to impose a strict definition of “refugee” as a legal 
status,6 the texts taken together suggest that even those denied this status 
cannot simply be expelled (the principle of non-refoulement) and that 
while they remain they are entitled to the same human rights as anyone 
else—including, if one takes the Declaration at face value, freedom of 
movement, equal access to public services, education, and employment.
Even before the Syrian crisis, the number of migrants classified by the 
UN as “international displaced persons,” whatever the legal status granted 
by their host country, numbered in the tens of millions. The example of 
the Palestinians, moreover, reminds us that such “displacement” can last 
for generations. Can any form of citizenship, even “postnational,” be 
applied to persons in this situation? It requires neither expertise in inter-
national law nor extensive knowledge of world affairs to discern that trans-
lation of principles into reality is far from automatic. As with the guest 
workers studied by Nuhoğlu Soysal, the question of national “incorpora-
tion regimes” is critical.
Experience in the past decades suggests that there is a close link between 
such “incorporation regimes” and domestic welfare regimes, although not 
exactly the one anticipated by Rieger and Leibfried (1998), as cited above. 
Rather than turning to closure to protect their “massive investment in 
national human capital,” contemporary states have generally chosen to 
extend certain economic and social rights to migrants, even in situations 
where these are not, or not yet, considered to be candidates for other 
types of rights. As a rule, moreover, the rights extended to migrants are 
6 According to the convention, refugee statues applies to any person who “owing to well- 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
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patterned on those already in place for permanent legal residents (Sainsbury 
2006), although they may not be identical. Leerkes (2016: 149) notes 
that in cases where migrants are considered to be illegally present in host 
states—after they have formally been refused asylum, for example—eco-
nomic and social policies may be characterized by “ relatively unattractive 
and, in some ways, quite archaic form of poor relief and pauperism con-
trol.” In cases where migrants’ presence is acknowledged, even provision-
ally, as legitimate by the host state, nonetheless, this same author 
acknowledges a tendency for the rights of immigrants—whether guest 
workers or refugees—to resemble those of citizens. Different welfare 
regimes, accordingly, will tend to produce different “incorporation 
regimes.”
While such isomorphism may be institutionally and morally coherent, it 
has proven politically problematic in numerous cases. Looking at the 
examples of Canada and Denmark, Kevins and van Kersbergen (2019: 13) 
suggest that there is a clear correlation between “inclusive” regimes of citi-
zenship, with their focus on “broad solidarity and access to welfare state 
provisions” and strong political resistance to any broad rights-based 
“incorporation regime” for migrants. Political opposition to migrants 
claiming the status of refugees has become particularly strong. The irony 
here is that it is the institutional proclivity of states to pattern the attri-
butes of “social citizenship,” in the Marshallian sense, of migrants on 
those of permanent legal residents (Sainsbury 2006) that may make states 
where social citizenship comes closest to Marshall’s ideal—and closest to 
the ideal industrial citizenship regime—reluctant to admit migrants in the 
first place, or that ensures that they will pay a high price in the form of 
political push-back if they should do so.
In the context of our broader argument, this observation leads to an 
obvious question. Would economic policies and a welfare regime closer to 
the ideal type of “market citizenship” make incorporating migrants easier? 
The observations of Kevins and van Kesbergen with respect to Canada 
suggest that this may be the case. Joppke and Morawska (2003: 27) like-
wise assert that “More market-based welfare states, such as the United 
States, where paths from school to work are much less regulated by public 
policies, allow more space for immigrants to incorporate themselves ‘on 
their own’ by applying their cultural and social capitals.” Looking to the 
European Union, Joppke (2010) notes a shift toward a “thinner” regime 
of social and economic citizenship for everyone, with fewer public services 
and a greater centrality of market approaches to policy. To the extent that 
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the twentieth-century welfare state, by focusing on de-commodification 
and social cohesion, made states and societies less able to integrate 
migrants—either refusing them altogether or consigning them explicitly 
(as in Germany) or implicitly (as in France or the United Kingdom) to a 
second-class status, moves in the direction of the more market-oriented 
pattern may make it easier not only to accept but also to integrate migrants. 
Bartle’s (2006) discussion of “market citizenship” in the EU following the 
implementation of the Single Market notes its link to free movement of 
persons among the member states of the Union. In such a scheme, the 
social and economic rights associated with citizenship are centered on 
being an active consumer, making choices in a competitive market place 
(Bartle 2006: 421). This shift to a market vision allows a market- compatible 
version of “social citizenship” to be extended to nonnationals. This, how-
ever, comes at a cost; Bartle’s conclusions are clearly critical of what he 
considers to be an impoverished citizenship regime. By designating 
market- compatible citizenship as “thinner,” Joppke is likewise staking out 
clear normative ground. He subsequently underscores this, referring to 
“citizenship light.” Even more explicit is the argument made by Turner 
(2016: 7) that the net effect of market reforms and migration is the gen-
eral erosion of social citizenship so that “citizenship” and the “denizen” 
status of permanent noncitizen residents becomes in effect identical: 
“Denizenship is becoming more common not because citizenship is 
becoming more flexible, but because it is becoming weaker.” In taking 
this position, these authors join other critics of market citizenship, to 
whose views we now turn.
3.3  Critiques of Market Citizenship and their Limits
It is perhaps no coincidence that the term “market citizenship” has most 
frequently been used by critics of this new regime. For many of them, 
indeed, it seems to be intended as irony, bringing with it the strong pre-
sumption that the social and political relationships so labeled do not, in 
the best and truest sense, correspond to “citizenship” at all. In this way, 
Schild (2000: 276) states: “Because the cultural contents shaping these 
neo-liberal political subjects are none other than the liberal norms of the 
marketplace, I refer to such citizens as market citizens.” Under such con-
ditions, she concludes that the weakening of collective bargaining laws 
and minimum employment standards calls the state’s commitment to eco-
nomic solidarity into question. Noting the coresponding market turn in 
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social policy, Fudge (2005: 645) notes that “Increasingly, there is an obli-
gation either to work or to engage in training as a condition for obtaining 
social assistance.” More insidiously, by insisting on treating people as indi-
viduals rather than as members of constituted groups, the market approach 
encourages the belief that people are equal by ignoring relevant differ-
ences among them, of which gender is only the most obvious (Schild 
2000; Fudge 2001). In this way of thinking, the logic of distribution 
within society is changed as an expansion of the domain of the market 
necessarily leads to a contraction of social rights. In particular, the monop-
oly of both regulatory and redistributive action claimed for the public 
sector by partisans of the welfare state no longer applies (Fudge 2005: 
645): “Government responsibility for the social welfare of its citizens is 
replaced with a new political and social order in which governments are 
only responsible for helping citizens to help themselves.” In such a system, 
citizenship is based on “active participation of clients as consumer in the 
delivery of services” (Schild 2000: 276).
Underpinning this generalized social critique is a practical point. The 
state has become, in the provision of social services, one of several partners 
along with philanthropic and professional organizations and, in some cases, 
for-profit enterprises. For Root (2007: 43), the participation of for- profit 
firms amounts to a “major structural change in citizenship.” Bonnet (2019) 
points out that even reliance on the nonprofit sector brings a loss of public 
control and the risk of policy capture by self-interested actors. In the 
Turkish context, Buğra and Adar (2008, 103) point to the increased role of 
philanthropic actors in social assistance as an erosion of citizenship.
Arguments about the loss of state monopoly in social services, however, 
rely for their critical force on an implicit historical comparison that is at 
best misleading. The twentieth-century welfare state in each of its varia-
tions was built through the cooperation of the state and private actors. In 
the American case, Hacker (2002) has detailed the rise of the “private sec-
tor welfare state” in the 1950s and 1960s, as major corporations estab-
lished wide-ranging (albeit not universal) health and pension plans made 
possible in large part by tax incentives provided by the US federal govern-
ment. The Bismarkian model, for its part, relied on the active participation 
of employers and labor unions. Even in France, the ideology of “dirigisme” 
and the myth of the “strong state” (Smyrl 2018) gave way to the reality of 
cooperation with the “social partners” along lines inspired by a corporat-
ist, rather than a statist, vision (Merrien 1990). Even in those examples 
that seemed from the outside to approach most closely the collectivist 
ideal of state-led solidarity, the state was never alone. Steinmo (2013: 90) 
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emphasizes in the case of Sweden that the policies implemented by social-
democratic governments of the 1950s and 1960s were explicitly pro-busi-
ness, noting that: “The welfare state, in this sense, was intended not to 
compensate for the market but to help make it more efficient and more 
competitive.”
This rejoinder with respect to the role of the state is, in fact, one exam-
ple of a larger problem with much of the critical literature on market citi-
zenship: a tendency, at least implicitly, to compare an untarnished (and 
never realized) ideal of rights-based democratic citizenship with the taw-
dry practices of the market. This is as much a logical fallacy as its mirror 
image, the tendency of liberals such as Friedman and his disciples to 
blithely assert that the only alternative to their libertarian utopia is the 
Gulag. In the chapters that follow, we strive to compare like to like. In 
practice, this means contrasting the reality of Turkish CT programs to the 
corresponding reality of the policies (or policy vacuum) that they replaced. 
We seek to avoid the logical trap of comparing the messy reality of policy 
regimes and their associated instruments with the austere utopias of uni-
versal rights, be these of citizens or of migrants. To the extent that we 
consider broader principles, our purpose is to propose an internal critique 
of market-enhancing policies and instruments. We question their coher-
ence and ask whether they advance in practice the social ideals that they 
themselves claim as justification.
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CHAPTER 3
The Turkish Context
Abstract In Chap. 2, we traced the emergence of a new and controversial 
model of citizenship centered on the market. We turn now to the national 
case that is the focus of this book, Turkey. The central question of this 
chapter is whether the transition to a market-based model of citizenship 
much studied in Europe and North America can be applied to countries 
like Turkey, typified by late industrialization and a distinct social welfare 
model. To this end, we consider the evolution of the operational content 
and context of social and economic citizenship in Turkey. In a final sec-
tion, we expand the scope of reflection to discuss the situation of migrants, 
and the evolution of the Turkish “incorporation regime.”
Keywords Turkey • Economy • Social policy • Migration policy • 
Cash transfer programs
Whether we are looking at policies aimed at permanent legal residents or 
at recent migrants, we must be careful not to let Turkey’s position “at the 
edge of Europe,” whether this is understood geographically or institution-
ally, lead to unexamined assumptions about its policy trajectory. While the 
circulation of ideas and the emulation of instruments play an important 
role, we will focus on the dynamic of translation, which implies neither 
convergence nor recapitulation but rather a process through which ideas 
coming from outside are combined with already existing practices so as to 
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create new instruments or processes (Campbell 2004: 80). The outcome 
of translation is different both from the past experience of the system into 
which new elements are translated and from the external examples that 
provide the imported elements. Taking, as we will from here on in this 
book, the perspective of Turkey, we can say that our first chapter focused 
on defining and contextualizing the “ideas coming from the outside.” In 
this chapter, the focus shifts to “already existing practices.” Subsequent 
chapters will provide concrete examples of “new instruments or processes.”
As we consider the Turkish context, we will see that it is not static. Both 
with respect to social protection and to international migration, the 
“already existing practices” embodied by Turkish policy instruments are 
changing and evolving. The image we should retain, thus, is not so much 
the juxtaposition of two fixed patterns as the (partial) merging of two 
streams, each in motion and each with an original contribution to make to 
ultimate outcomes. These outcomes, in the context of our argument, are 
not limited to economic or political results. We seek to better understand 
the institutional context for the evolving question of integrating persons 
at the margins of society into a social and economic system whose govern-
ment, since the 1980s has increasingly chosen a pro-market approach. By 
looking in some detail at economic and social policies, in other words, we 
define the background against which questions of Marshallian “social citi-
zenship” can meaningfully be asked in Turkey.
1  Rich and PooR: FRom alms to social assistance
We have noted already that the approaches taken by states to economic 
organization, on the one hand, and social protection, on the other hand, 
were closely integrated, if not always synchronized. While, the deep insti-
tutionalization of social protection models in Europe and North America 
encouraged the persistence in these areas of market-limiting approaches 
after these had been largely abandoned in the production sphere, signifi-
cant albeit incomplete change was evident in the choice of social protec-
tion instruments as well. As we turn to the case of Turkey, we must ask the 
same questions in a different context. We turn first, accordingly, to a brief 
overview of the overall evolution of the Turkish economy since the found-
ing of the Republic before turning to a more detailed analysis of the 
changing role of social protection policy and the instruments that 
embody it.
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1.1  The Turkish Economy: From Late Industrialization 
to State-Led Marketization
The Turkish republic inherited from its Ottoman predecessors the juxta-
position of a largely rural economy with the international trading center 
of Istanbul. In 1923, the newly installed Kemalist regime ended the hege-
mony of Istanbul, moving the capital to Ankara and dividing the country 
into provinces headed by centrally appointed civil servants. Turkey’s 
economy and population were decreased as a consequence of military 
conflicts, internal upheaval, and massive population transfers over the 
period spanning the Balkan Wars of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, World War I, and the subsequent War of Liberation. The 
terms of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, formalized the situation, leaving a 
country that was smaller and less populated than the late Ottoman state 
had been.
During the single-party period, from 1923 until 1946 the Kemalist 
regime pursued a policy of “national developmentalism” similar to that of 
Latin American states such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Esen 2014). 
Centered on self-sufficiency in an environment marked by global depres-
sion and world war, Turkey remained a largely agrarian country, despite 
increasing strains to the rural economy made worse by a drought in 1928. 
After 1929, the effects of the Great Depression and World War II on the 
terms of trade of agricultural products put yet more strain on an already 
weakened economy (Buğra 2007: 39; Oktar and Varlı 2010). The strongly 
interventionist National Production Law (Milli Koruma Kanunu) was 
enacted in order to regulate price fluctuations in agriculture and prevent 
unjust profits. By this regulation, the property of small farmers and mer-
chants engaged in foreign trade or the assets of industrialists could be 
seized (Oktar and Varlı 2010). Despite these problems,  there was little 
rural-to-urban migration; urban population reached 25% only in 1950 
(Buğra 2007: 39).
After the end of the single-party regime in 1946, governments domi-
nated by the Democratic Party continued to give priority to the agricul-
ture sector. The mechanization made possible in large part by Marshall-Plan 
aid and the more liberal international trade regime of the postwar world 
encouraged an export-led agricultural strategy. Supported by a coalition of 
large landowners and small-holding peasants, leading policies of this 
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period included distribution of land (Kepenek and Yentürk 2007: 108), 
expansion of low-interest credit, and price support through guaranteed 
state purchases of certain commodities (Önis ̧and Şenses 2007). Even so, 
increasing mechanization led to a decline in the need for rural labor and a 
corresponding incentive for migration toward cities.
A more radical break with the past came after the military coup of 1960, 
which ushered in a move from a broadly liberal policy centered on agricul-
tural exports to a protectionist regime focused on import substitution 
industrialization policies. A period of planned development was intro-
duced in which targeted state investment boosted the private sector. 
Supported by, both, industrialists and labor unions as well as the rapidly 
expanding state bureaucracy, this policy encouraged the production of 
consumer goods for domestic consumption (Koray 2008: 143–144). It 
also witnessed a significant increase in the rural-to-urban migration that 
had begun after 1950. The oil crisis in the 1970s coincided in Turkey with 
the limits of import substitution industrialization policy and unstable 
coalition governments. To deficits in the current account balance were 
added budget deficits, and increase in both external debt and inflation 
(Şism̧an 2017). Economic growth halted and then regressed; public 
investment declined; increased interest rates prevented the opening of new 
employment opportunities. A balance-of-payments crisis from 1977 to 
1980 triggered an IMF-imposed structural adjustment program aimed at 
reducing state spending on subsidies. By the late 1970s, a renewed turn 
toward an open economy was underway (Bozkurt-Güngen 2018).
The 1980 military coup-d’état hastened the transformation of a system 
already in transition. Internalizing the spirit of the “Washington consen-
sus,” import substitution was abandoned and the 1980s were dominated 
by export promotion through subsidies as well as a significant decrease in 
real cost of labor; formal wages failed to keep up with inflation, and low- 
wage informal employment was encouraged by the proliferation of small 
subcontracting firms in sectors such as textile and apparel (Buğra and 
Keyder 2006: 220). Turkey eliminated controls on foreign capital transac-
tions and declared the convertibility of the Turkish Lira in 1989 (Boratav 
et al. 2001). The subsequent decade was marked by further pro-market 
reforms, as Turkey participated in the general enthusiasm for laissez-faire 
market economics that was at the time hegemonic in much of the world. 
This experience of unbridled economic liberalization brought results simi-
lar to those of contemporary Latin American states, as initially rapid 
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export-led growth foundered on obstacles of domestic inflation, which 
peaked at over 100% per year in 1994, and remained at double-digit levels 
until 2003, as well a rapidly devaluing currency whose value went from 
approximately 80 for US$1  in 1980 to effectively valueless on interna-
tional markets (over one million to the dollar) before being replaced by 
the New Lira in 2005.1
This period was brought to an end by the dual shock of a sharp eco-
nomic crisis in 2001 and the national electoral victory in November 2002 
of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—here-
after, AKP) representing the modernist wing of the Turkish Islamist move-
ment led by Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In a world emerging 
from the hegemony of the Washington consensus, “a modified version of 
neoliberal economic policies based on strong regulatory institutions and 
social policies designed to mitigate excessive inequalities,” was acceptable 
to international partners and politically successful (Önis ̧2019: 5).
In the nearly two decades it has held power at the national level, the 
AKP-led government has embraced an increasingly state-led version of the 
market economy, shifting from “rolling back” the state to what Peck and 
Tickell (2002: 37) dubbed “roll-out neoliberalism” and defined as “the 
purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, 
modes of governance, and regulatory relations.” In the Turkish case, this 
has focused on close links between the state and private investment part-
ners. Large export-oriented firms proved a critical source of political sup-
port for the AKP government (Önis ̧and Şenses 2007). As they became 
increasingly transnational in its operations there emerged a growing alli-
ance between, on the one hand, a growing group of transnational inves-
tors, export-oriented small and medium-sized businessmen and financial 
interests, and, on the other hand, growing segments of the new regulatory 
bureaucratic agencies, including institutions such as the Competition 
Board, Central Bank, and the Bank Regulations and Supervisory Board 
(Önis ̧and Şenses 2007: 15). Analysis by the OECD highlights the central 
role played by schemes such as “priority projects,” “large-scale projects,” 
and “strategic projects,” which can be supported by a wide array of direct 
public subsidies and preferential tax treatment (OECD 2018: 40).
1 According to OECD historical data, the average exchange rate for 2001 was 1.228 
 million Turkish Lira to US$ 1. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic- 
surveys-turkey-2002_eco_surveys-tur-2002-en#page1.
3 THE TURKISH CONTEXT 
48
This policy achieved a considerable measure of economic stabilization 
and renewed growth in the years following 2005, including well-above-
average performance during the global downturn following 2008. During 
this period, per-capita levels of income and production were on a trajec-
tory of convergence with the OECD average. Significantly, a number of 
indicators suggest that this growth was relatively inclusive. Dorlach (2015: 
522) points to a growth rate of approximately 5% per year between 2006 
and 2011 both for the Turkish economy as a whole and for the bottom 
40% of the population. The same analysis, however, points out that, while 
encouraging growth, recent policies have done little to further redistribu-
tion. Taken together, taxes and public transfers in Turkey make one of the 
smallest contributions of any OECD state to bringing down the nation’s 
GINI coefficient, which stood at approximately 40 in 2011, down only 
slightly from the estimate of 42.7 a decade earlier.2 Also problematic in 
this period were high rates of unemployment, which remained over 10% 
(Yeldan and Ünüvar 2016) as well as persistently high current account 
deficit.
The elections of June 2011, which constituted the third successive elec-
toral victory for the AKP can be seen as marking a further turn in Turkey’s 
political economy). Pointing to the international emergence of a “Beijing 
consensus” of state-led and (politically) nonliberal capitalism, Önis ̧(2019) 
suggests that Turkish state capitalism has increasingly taken this path. The 
balance of power between the state and its private-sector partners has 
shifted in favor the former as the economy is largely penetrated by the 
increasingly intermingled apparatuses of the state and the AKP.
Whether attributable to this shift or to broader international trends, it 
is also notable that the post-2011 period has also witnessed the return of 
some traditional points of weakness of the Turkish economy, most notably 
inflation and currency depreciation, with the Turkish Lira losing approxi-
mately 75% of its value relative to the Euro between 2012 and 2020.3 This 
2 Conventionally expressed on a scale of 1 (most unequal) to 100 (perfectly equal) the 
GINI coefficient is a broadly used measure of income distribution. Most recent available data 
from the World Bank estimate the coefficient for Turkey for 2018 to be 41.9, a level very 
similar to that of Argentina or the United States, but significantly more unequal than France 
or Germany (both approximately 32). (World Bank, GINI Index, consulted on 30 August, 
2020 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/.)
3 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_
exchange_rates/, consulted on 30 August 2020.
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period was also marked by the Gezi Park protests of 2013 and more 
importantly the failed coup d’état of July 2016. The latter, especially, led 
to significant institutional transformation toward a more presidential sys-
tem, institutionalized after the 2018 general elections. There was also a 
significant turnover in the civil service and in the state’s relations with 
media, associations, and other private sector bodies as those suspected of 
participation in or sympathy for the coup were excluded.
For many analysts, this latest period is also marked by a reversal of the 
Europeanizing trend of Turkish economics and foreign policy (Önis ̧2019; 
Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016). While there can be no doubt that 
Turkish accession to the EU is no longer being pursued actively by either 
side, we must be careful nonetheless in generalizing this point. Relations 
between Turkey and the EU have always been complex and are increas-
ingly conflictual, but with respect to the policies of interest to this study, 
be they instruments intended to assist very low income families or the laws 
and regulations relating to migration and asylum, interaction between 
Turkey and Europe remains of the first importance. It is with this shifting 
context in mind that we turn our attention first to the evolution of instru-
ments of social assistance and, in a following section, to Turkey’s immigra-
tion regime.
1.2  Social Welfare and Citizenship in Turkey 
in the Twentieth Century
Going back to the nineteenth century, social welfare in Turkey as in 
Europe was a matter largely of local concern. Giving alms to the poor was 
at once a religious duty—in Islam just as in Christianity—and a source of 
patronage and influence for local notables. A central institution in this 
context, and one whose legacy is still highly relevant to the contemporary 
policy discourse, was the vakıf or philanthropic foundation (Buğra 2008). 
Gradual modernization of this system, again as Europe and North America 
with the partial exception of social-democratic Scandinavia, led to social 
policies sharply divided between those aimed primarily at the middle class 
and those for the benefit of low-income persons. In the case of the former, 
the evolution of policy from the 1940s to the 1980s resulted in a gradual 
and partial translation of the elements of industrial citizenship to Turkey, 
with instruments largely modeled on the “Bismarkian” systems of 
Western Europe.
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The Turkish social security system after World War II (Buğra 2018) was 
organized according to occupational status and based on three public 
insurance schemes—the Social Insurance Organization (Sosyal Sigortalar 
Kurumu, SSK) for formal workers, Civil Servants Retirement Chest 
(Emekli Sandigi, ES), and the Pension Fund for the Self-Employed (Esnaf, 
Sanatkarlar ve Diger Bagımsız Olanlar Sigortalar Kurumu, BAĞ-KUR). 
In 1983, the fund for the self-employed was expanded to include indepen-
dent peasant producers (Buğra 2018). All of these combined retirement 
pensions with health insurance. As with the “Bismarckian” systems of 
Western Europe, these instruments were neither universal nor egalitarian. 
General tax revenue did not contribute to the financing, which came 
exclusively from employees and employers.4 Unpaid family workers and all 
participants in the informal sector remained outside of the system (Buğra 
and Keyder 2006). In an important departure from the Bismarckian 
model, however, there was no role for autonomous trade unions in the 
administration of the insurance funds (Yılmaz 2013: 60).
Additional elements of industrial citizenship were introduced following 
the adoption of the 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, which 
included for the first time the idea of the “social state” responsible for the 
well-being of its citizens. With the five-year development plans imple-
mented from 1963  in the context of the push to import substituting 
industrialization, economic and social development was linked to the plan, 
and the duties and responsibilities of the “social state” were made more 
prominent. The 1963 Law on Trade Unions No. 274 and the Collective 
Labor Agreement Strike Lockout Act No. 275 recognized the legal right 
to strike. At the same time, the right to insurance coverage was extended 
to immediate family of workers (Buğra 2008).
In a first step toward broader coverage, the Law granting a pension to 
“Needy Powerless and Lonely Turkish Citizens over 65”5 came into force 
in 1976. It provided cash benefits to the elderly and the disabled without 
relatives to provide for them. Beneficiaries of this scheme remained limited 
in number due to the conditionality on the absence of relatives.  This 
remained the only means-tested social assistance program until 1992, 
4 This remained the case in France, to take one example, until 1990 when the Contribution 
Sociale Généralisée was introduced as a complement to worker and employer contributions.
5 The Law Regarding Putting Needy, Powerless And Lonely Turkish Citizens, Older Than 65 
Years Old, On Salary—65 Yası̧nı Doldurmus,̧ Muhtaç, Güçsüz ve Kimsesiz Türk 
Vatandasļarına Aylık Bağlanması Hakkında Kanun dated 1 July, 1976 numbered: 2022.
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when a means-tested scheme of health insurance, using the so-called 
“green card,” was put in place for low-income citizens (Buğra 2018: 321). 
Of far more significance to the welfare of low-income persons prior to 
the 1990s were state policies for housing and agriculture (Buğra and Adar 
2008: 26), which Eder (2010) has labeled “indirect welfarism” and which 
long succeeded in limiting the extent of “absolute poverty” in rural Turkey 
rather more effectively than in contemporary Latin America, and in avoid-
ing the appearance of an urban under-class on the British or North 
American model (Pinarcioğlu and Isi̧k 2008). The second pillar of “indi-
rect welfarism,” which became particularly important as rural-to-urban 
migration swelled was the systematic toleration of informal urban hous-
ing. As noted by Eder (2010: 162), the peculiar feature of informal urban 
housing in Turkey was that they were largely built on public land, “invaded 
and appropriated, mostly by the new migrants into the city.” Building and 
then selling such housing to more recently arrived migrants resulted in 
what Pinarcioğlu and Isi̧k (2008) have labeled “poverty in turns,” but 
which might just as well be seen as a clear path to economic upward mobil-
ity, at least for early arrivals. Toleration of this practice provided an effec-
tive if indirect housing subsidy for urban dwellers, while regular amnesties 
acted as capital transfers to squatters by transforming them into recog-
nized property owners—a practice whose fading echoes can be seen as 
recently as 2018 (Ark-Yıldırım 2020).
2  the aKP GoveRnment and ReFoRm 
oF social Policy
Erosion of “indirect welfarism” was evident since the liberal turn of the 
1980s, under pressure from the growth of flexible employment, the com-
mercialization of agricultural and urban land and the growing fiscal pres-
sure on the state. This trend accelerated after the arrival to national power 
of the AKP in 2002. In addition to the direct cost of agricultural subsidies, 
both policies proved incompatible with the new government’s economic 
priorities. Product and input subsidies for agriculture, already in decline, 
were eliminated in the context of IMF-led restructuring after the 2001 
budget crisis (Eder 2010: 163). The toleration of informal urban housing, 
for its part, clashed with the AKP government’s policy of using the urban 
property market above all as a magnet for investment (Kuyucu 2014). 
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While some former squatters benefitted from the acquisition of rights to 
the property they occupied (Ark-Yıldırım 2020), it became evident that 
there would be no toleration of renewed large-scale urban land appropri-
ation—a question to which we will return in our discussion of the fate of 
Syrian and other forced migrants.
2.1  Market-Compatible Instruments of Social Policy
As it hastened the dismantling of the “indirect welfarism” of past decades, 
the AKP government moved to introduce new forms of targeted social 
policy. This was of particular urgency, for a government that counted on 
the electoral support of a significant portion of the low-income urban 
population, because the combined effects of the 2001 economic crisis and 
its own urban transformation policies risked introducing into Turkey 
urban poverty in the European sense. Taking a broad measure that includes 
pension and health programs targeted at the middle class, public social 
spending increased from 3.4% in 1995 to 12.5% of GDP in 2016. While 
remaining below the OECD average of 20.5% for 20166 this sharp increase 
is significant; we are not here in a context of “retrenchment.”
A starting point was the unification of the three branches of the social 
security system and, as of 2006, the addition of a measure of general tax 
revenue to its funding mix, albeit more modest than the European norm7 
(Adar 2007). The system was expanded to include citizens, and special 
access provisions for civil servants were largely eliminated. With respect to 
healthcare, those with incomes above one-third of the official minimum 
wage are expected to contribute to the health insurance fund. Below this 
threshold, the universal health system, which replaced the “green card” 
after 2008, provides access to healthcare with contributions paid by the 
government. Furthermore, children under the age of 18 will be covered 
by the health insurance scheme without having to pay premiums 
(Yentürk 2018).
This policy mix has been labeled “social neo-liberalism” (Önis ̧2012), 
as pro-market economic policies were combined with significant redistri-
bution, especially in the health and education sectors. Dorlach (2015: 
6 OECD, “Social expenditure statistics”: https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode= 
SOCX_AGG.
7 The contributions are 5% and 3% of total contributions for social security and health 
insurance, respectively, while EU countries do not fall below 20% (Adar 2007).
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525) expands on this insight by suggesting that the AKP government 
expanded policies typical of the “productive welfare state,” such as health, 
education, and active labor market policies (training schemes and public 
works), while retrenching the “protective welfare state” focused on passive 
labor market policies (unemployment insurance, workplace regulation, 
and toleration of labor union activities), agricultural supports and housing 
subsidies. These latter, significantly, are meant to “shield citizens from or 
in the market” (530).
At the same time, in a pattern consistent with the model of market citi-
zenship sketched out in the Chap. 2, assistance to the poorest citizens has 
increased significantly. Among such programs, the social (i.e. noncontrib-
utory) pensions for the elderly and disabled, whose modest origins in 
1976 we noted above, have been repeatedly expanded and reached some 
1.3 million persons in 2018 (Öktem 2018: 29). Also notable are programs 
aimed at widows, children, or students. Adjusted for inflation, overall 
spending on means-tested social assistance increased by some 176% in 
between 2006 and 2017 and accounted for 7.3% of total spending on 
social protection programs by the end of that period (Yentürk 2018: 49). 
Marked in detail by a piecemeal approach that has produced a bewildering 
array of programs (43 as of 2019 by the official count of the Ministry of 
Family, Labor, and Social Services), the pattern that emerges is one of 
targeted social CT intended to empower low-income citizens to act within 
the market, making choices and accepting risk.
In terms of governance, these programs are coordinated and imple-
mented by the Directorate General for Social Assistance (Sosyal Yardımlar 
Genel Müdürlügü̆). This institution was established in 2004, under the 
name The Directorate General for Social Assistance and Solidarity, within 
the precursor of the present Ministry of Family, Labor, and Services. The 
financial resources for these programs come from several sources. As of 
2020, eight of these programs are funded by the state’s general budget, 2 
by the European Union, and the rest by the Fund for the encouragement 
of the social assistance and solidarity, whose operation is detailed in the 
following section (MoFLSS 2019). As of 2019, these programs collec-
tively, reached some 3.3 million households and accounted for spending 
equivalent to 1.2% of Turkey’s GDP (Ministry of Family and Social Policies 
2017: 136). While the sums transferred to a given beneficiary have always 
been modest, Öktem (2018) has estimated that their value in terms of 
purchasing power had stayed roughly constant through 2018.
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Two national-level instruments were developed to manage this array of 
programs. Launched in 2010, the Integrated Social Assistance Information 
System (ISAIS) is a database and online management system that aggre-
gates data from 22 public institutions and 112 web-based services, and 
makes it available to all public agencies involved in administering social 
support policies. These data are used to assess eligibility, disburse funds, 
and carry out audits for an array of national programs (MFSP 2017). In 
2013, the PTT card, a multipurpose smart card, was developed as a com-
mon vehicle for user to access these programs. It can be used to withdraw 
cash, or directly for purchases in shops equipped with POS terminals. As 
of 2018, over 2 million Turkish citizens used this card (MoLFSS 
2019: 150).
2.2  Persisting Centrality of the Local Level
From the perspective of this book, the relevant question concerning these 
examples of market-enhancing social policy relate less to their aggregate 
scope than to their impact on beneficiaries. Do they contribute, even 
incrementally, to creating or enhancing social citizenship, in the sense of 
“basic equality of membership” in a broader society? At the macro level, a 
number of elements suggest caution. Basing his calculation on the 
European Union’s “at risk of poverty threshold,” Öktem (2018: 62) con-
cludes that, with the notable exception of some programs aimed at the 
severely disabled, the sums transferred are insufficient to lift beneficiaries 
out of poverty. Looking to program design, critical analysts have pointed 
out the fragmented nature of these programs and the often arbitrary defi-
nitions of eligibility perpetuate a logic of discretionary charity rather than 
of stable social rights (Buğra 2015), and do not include “a guaranteed 
minimum income policy in conformity with an the logic of citizenship” 
(Buğra 2018: 323), while others (Bahçe and Köse 2017) have chosen to 
define the increase in social transfer payments as an instrument of “pau-
perization” of the working class.
While significant, however, these elements do not directly address our 
central question. Returning as ever to T.H. Marshall, we are reminded 
that while the membership at the heart of social citizenship undeniably 
requires securing a “modicum of economic welfare and security,” its pur-
pose is to allow all citizens to “live the life of a civilized being according to 
the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11). To determine 
whether and to what extent social CT programs contribute to this ideal in 
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the context of the standards prevailing in a market-centered society, we 
suggest that it is necessary to ascertain how the citizens in question feel 
about it. For this reason, as set out in the introduction to this book, our 
initial empirical studies are situated at the local level, looking at cases in 
which means-tested programs of social CT using digital smart cards have 
explicitly replaced in-kind distribution. Doing this allows us to work on a 
manageable scale, and also to focus our analysis on the means of assis-
tance—cash versus in-kind—rather than its quantity.
While we propose that this shift to the local level provides useful ana-
lytical clarity, it requires us to complement the global picture of the evolu-
tion of Turkish social policy given so far with an additional element of 
“already existing practices” (Campbell 2004), namely, the quite consider-
able institutional capacities for social assistance found in Turkey at the 
district level. The district is both a unit of government, with an elected 
assembly and mayor, and an administrative unit of the national state. 
Several districts typically make up a province, with the province taking the 
name of the largest city within it.8 For “metropolitan cities” such as Ankara 
or Istanbul, which comprise regions all by themselves, districts can be 
thought of as largely self-governing urban boroughs.
The role of district municipalities in social assistance has gained impor-
tance since the mid-1990s. In the municipalities under its control, the 
Welfare Party—precursor to today’s AKP—invested heavily in social provi-
sion such as direct programs to distribute food, coal, and clothing (Akinci 
1999). Municipal initiatives gained further momentum after the AKP 
came to national power in 2002. Particularly important in our context was 
the municipal law of 2005,9 which introduced the possibility of partner-
ships for poor-relief activities with the private sector and philanthropic 
NGOs and of cooperating with the private sector in meting out social 
8 As of 2019, Turkey composed of 81 provinces: 30 metropolitan municipalities and 51 
provincial municipalities, further divided into 921 districts. In metropolitan cities; a two- 
degree local administration model, metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities, 
has been established. In non-metropolitan provinces, as many as five levels can exist, includ-
ing special provincial administrations, provincial municipalities, district municipalities, town 
municipalities (belde belediyeleri), and villages. (Karaarslan, M. (2015). Nasıl Bir Yerel 
Yönetim? 6360 Sayılı Kanun Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme. Dicle Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi 
Dergisi, 17–18 (26–27–28–29), 123–162. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/
pub/duhfd/issue/23027/246195, p.  131; TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 2019 Yerel 
Yönetimler Raporu, Yerel Seçimlere Yönelik Değerlendirmeler/Öneriler) http://www.
mimaresk.org.tr/yonetim/dosyalar/632019134557R.pdf.
9 Municipal law 5393 of 2005, Official Gazette, no. 25874.
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assistance. Within the framework of their own social assistance activities, 
this law allows municipalities to supplement their budgets with private 
donations (art. 59) as well as to employ volunteer workers (art. 75–77). 
With these new powers, some municipalities have been able to set up local 
social funds partly financed by contributions in cash or in kind made by 
local companies or charities, allowing them a considerable degree of 
autonomy in this area vis-à-vis the national authorities. The district munic-
ipality of U, which will provide one of the case studies of Chap. 4, is 
among those that initiated such an instrument. The reinforcement of cen-
tral authority noted in the previous section has had an impact in this area 
as well. The Investment Monitoring and Coordination Presidency 
(Yatırım Iżleme ve Koordinasyon Basķanlıgı̆) was established in 2016 with 
authority to intervene in cases that “negatively affect the health, peace, 
well-being, public order, and security.” A 2018 presidential decree10 fur-
ther stipulated that municipalities must notify the Ministry of Treasury 
and Finance of their monthly budgets and can implement their programs 
only after approval by the Ministry.
A second, and more complex, institutional actor present at the district 
level is comprised of the national-level “Fund for the Encouragement of 
Social Cooperation and Solidarity” (Sosyal Yardımlasm̧a ve Dayanısm̧ayı 
Tesv̧ik Fonu—hereafter, Solidarity Fund) and the district-level “Social 
Assistance and Solidarity Foundations” (hereafter SASFs) associated with 
it. We will encounter the SASF in one of our local cases, but also in the 
context of assistance to Syrian refugees. Created in 1986 to assist persons 
outside the formal social security system, the Solidarity Fund was signifi-
cantly expanded by the AKP government after 2002. The 1986 legislation 
set up the Fund as an “umbrella organization,” potentially available as a 
source of financing for diverse social initiatives (Göçmen 2014: 98). The 
fund gained importance after the Marmara earthquake of 1999, when it 
managed a World Bank grant for reconstruction. After the economic crisis 
of 2001, conditional cash transfer (CT) aids provided by the World Bank 
were also distributed via the Fund (Buğra and Candas ̧2011). In 2004, it 
was organized institutionally under “The Prime Ministry General 
Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity.” Responsibility was subse-
quently shifted to the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. The 
Solidarity Fund’s resources are diverse, funding sources include 2.8% of 
10 The President of the Republic issued Presidential Decree numbered 17 on the scope of 
new Treasury Single Account, dated 8 August, 2018.
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total income and corporate tax collection, 50% of the budget from traffic 
fines, and 15% of the revenue of the radio and television supreme coun-
cil.11 In principle, it can also accept private charitable contributions, but 
Öktem and Erdoğan (2018: 21–22) calculate from data  that they 
 acknowledge to be imperfect that these are probably negligible, below 1% 
of the Solidarity Fund’s annual budget.
The fund is led by a Board of Governors chaired by The Minister of 
Family, Labor, and Social Services. Also participating are representatives 
of the Prime minister and of the ministries of Interior, Finance, and 
Health, as well as the General Directorate of Social Assistance and the 
General Director of Foundations. CT forms an important and growing 
part of social assistance, accounting for 67.4% of total social assistance 
transfers in 2017,12 86% in 2018, and 93% in 2019 (Ministry of family 
report 2019). While the remainder still consists largely of in-kind distribu-
tion, public authorities increasingly are finding new ways to monetize aid 
to the poor.
The General Directorate conducts all its relations with citizens 
through 1,003 local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations 
(SASFs) whose function is to provide social assistance to vulnerable and 
needy persons. While social assistance programs are designed centrally, 
they are implemented through the SASFs. Although these, like autono-
mous religious or charitable bodies, are legally included in the category 
of “foundation,” they cannot be categorized as NGOs but are more 
appropriately considered parastatal (Öktem 2018), because they are 
established by law and district governors serve as the chairman of their 
boards of trustees empowered to make their own decisions (Yılmaz and 
Yakut Çakar 2008: 3). As seen from the center, this structure takes 
advantage of local knowledge.13 Working with the SASFs, from this per-
spective, ensures flexibility and speed and also a measure of enhanced 
control  since  SASF staff is contractual and can be kept or removed 
according to performance.
11 https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/sygm/hakkimizda/sosyal-yardimlasma-ve-dayan% 
C4%B1smayi-tesvik-fonu/.
12 http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=27622.
13 Interview, 2020.
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As summarized by Aytaç (2013: 1218, 1234) each SASF has a board of 
trustees headed by the district governor. In urban areas the committees 
have 14 members, of which 7 are centrally appointed local civil servants, 3 
are elected neighborhood head men (muhtar), 2 are representatives from 
local nongovernmental organizations, and 2 are local philanthropists. As 
set out in a 2017 synthesis document prepared by a team of experts from 
the Ministry of Family and Social Policy and the World Bank (MFSP 
2017), the executive committee serves as a critical link between national 
and local sources of information. Participation in means-tested social assis-
tance programs is not automatic: potential beneficiaries must take the ini-
tiative. Those desiring assistance apply to their local SASF by completing 
a questionnaire that is cross-referenced with information available through 
the ISAIS to establish an income estimate, and then combine this with 
other variables such as demographic and geographic data to compute a 
“poverty score.” This, in turn, is compared with local cost-of-living esti-
mates to determine whether or not an applicant is below the “poverty 
threshold” for their place of residence (MFSP 2017: 28). Eligibility is 
confirmed by an on-site visit of SASF staff whose task is to assess actual 
living conditions, including an estimate of the value or real and other 
property so as to determine “income status” on a scale of 1 (very poor) to 
5 (well-off). Information derived from inspections, in turn, is uploaded to 
the ISAIS. A decision is then made by the executive committee based on 
the sum of this information.
The effective discretion left to the executive committee remains an 
open question. Writing in 2013, Aytaç concluded that the committee is 
formally bound neither by the computer-generated scores nor by the 
reports of its inspectors. He noted its “authority to override certain formal 
eligibility requirements for enrollment, and /…/ enroll individuals who 
are formally not eligible but are considered needy” (Aytaç 2013: 1218). 
Our observations, carried out in 2019, showed less discretion with respect 
to national social programs. In the case of aid to forced migrants, the dis-
cretion allowed the executive committees is greater, as we will discuss in 
Chap. 6. Beyond the question of discretion, however, it is evident even 
from formal descriptions that the system depends for its effectiveness on 
the accuracy of the data supplied to it. This is a question, particularly with 
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respect to the reliability of on-site inspection, to which we will return with 
respect both to domestic programs and to programs for migrants.
2.3  Does Cash Transfer Contribute to Market Citizenship? 
Avoiding False Comparisons
Significantly, the symbolic legitimating reference for the Solidarity 
Fund and the district SASF’s is not to a twentieth-century Western model 
but rather to Ottoman history. The preamble of the law that established 
the fund stated that:
Islamic foundations, the most ancient and persistent institutions of the Islamic 
Turkish Anatolian civilization and the most beautiful examples of cooperation 
and solidarity for a thousand years, are the most progressive institution of our 
times in fulfilling social, economic and cultural needs.
… The honor of serving the part of society that is placed under the middle 
classes and who are without social security would be possible through the support 
of the charitable and self-sacrificing citizens alongside with our state.14
The role of diverse actors was further strengthened in the 1980s and 
afterward by the increasing number of religiously motivated associations 
in the field of social aid distribution (Göçmen 2014) as well as the increas-
ing role of municipal governments in that field, as noted above. 
Implementing this policy required making changes to municipal and tax 
legislation. Government allowed tax exemption from individual or firms 
who give money to NGOs engaged in food banking activities, and tax 
reduction from individual or firms who give the money to NGOs engaged 
in activity to alleviate poverty.15 According to Buğra and Adar (2008: 
103), this empowered role of nonstate actors, which “implies a change in 
the content of social rights, which come to be defined outside the formal 
boundaries of the citizenship relation.”
In the context that we have established for this book, two points of cau-
tion should be evident. In the first place, we must be careful to avoid 
14 Turkey, Parliament Deb., 454 (16 May, 1986) Proposed Law on the Encouragement of 
Social Cooperation and Solidarity and the Report of the Commission on Plan and Budget, 
p. 3 (translation from Buğra and Candas ̧2011: 520).
15 Law numbered 5035 (25December, 2003) and 5281 (30 December, 2004). Donations 
made are also exempted from VAT.  See also: https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/
fakirlere-yardim-eden-daha-az-vergi-odeyecek-7361419.
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confusing political rhetoric with effective policy. The glorification of pri-
vate benevolence should be tempered evidence (Öktem and Erdoğan 
2018: 21–22) of the limited budgetary impact of private donations. To 
the extent that private actors are indeed playing a larger role, moreover, 
what may at first seem like a peculiarly Turkish debate should be seen as 
part of the much broader discussion of the appropriate boundary between 
public and private in the provision of social assistance. Noting that “a 
hybrid combination of public and private funds for the provision of social 
welfare services played a crucial role in the social, cultural and economic 
life of the Turkic world from the 8th to the 19th century” Göçmen (2014: 
95) emphasizes that “the idea of introducing a social-assistance institution 
modeled on vakıfs is significant for two reasons: it is based on Islamic prin-
ciples and it emphasizes citizens’ duty to care for the poor.” In the second 
of these, we find a clear echo of the injunction that citizenship involves 
“accepting responsibility for others.” But what of the first?
The explicitly religious reference has been made much of by both sym-
pathetic and critical observers (Öktem and Erdoğan 2018). It may be 
tempting to contrast this with twentieth-century welfare state ideology, 
which emphasized a shift in responsibility for social care away from reli-
gious authorities toward the secular state. We must avoid, however, the 
logical fallacy of comparing theory and practice as if they were the same 
thing. As we have seen, the ideology of state monopoly was at best imper-
fectly reflected in European and North American practice—and the quasi- 
public role of faith-based organizations remains important. The resurgence 
of religious symbolism and even the explicit participation of religious insti-
tutions in Turkey, thus, are less surprising—and less “Turkish”—than it 
might initially seem.
Going beyond the rather sterile debate on the state monopoly of social 
services, Buğra (2015) suggests that the evolution of the Turkish system 
hearkens back to a “logic of charity,” the purpose of which is to allow 
those who are well-off to acquire moral virtue by temporarily relieving the 
suffering of the poor rather than a concerted effort to address the sources 
of poverty itself. This is not a criticism that should be dismissed out of 
hand—and it applies far beyond Turkey. In principle, it constitutes the 
exact opposite of Leisering’s (2019: 320) “citizenship approach to pov-
erty.” Which of these best characterizes a given situation is an empirical 
question. It is a point to which we will return in the context of the local 
examples discussed in Chap. 4, but also in our subsequent discussion of 
humanitarian assistance.
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3  tuRKs and otheRs: the evolvinG 
incoRPoRation ReGime
Like its institutions of social support, the Turkish incorporation regime for 
migrants has undergone significant changes in recent years and continues 
to evolve. More than in the case of social policy, moreover, recent reforms 
to Turkish immigration policies bear the marks not just of diffuse policy 
emulation but of explicit policy transfer from the member states of the 
European Union, initially in the context of Turkish candidacy for EU 
membership and more recently due to agreements relating to Syrian and 
other refugees. As these will be our focus in Chaps. 5 and 6, we go into 
more detail in the pages that follow about this particular aspect of the 
Turkish incorporation regime, while providing only a brief outline of poli-
cies applied to other types of migrants.
3.1  A Restrictive Regime of Naturalization
Turkish immigration policy emerges from the same history as the eco-
nomic and social policies we have been considering. Two critical factors, 
in this context, are the inflow of ethnic Turkish populations in the 1920s 
and 1930s, and the emigration of Turkish workers and their families to 
Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. From the first of these and from 
the period of the nationalist revolution and war of Independence more 
generally, came a theory and practice of nationality akin to Brubaker’s 
(1992) description of “volk-centered” nationalism in Germany, in which 
the status of citizen was closely tied to ethnic identity. The experience of 
the 1950s and 1960s reinforced the notion that Turkey was a country 
characterized by surplus labor. How to employ this was a challenge to 
which first import substitution and emigration, and subsequently export 
promotion were proposed as responses, but the perceived need for 
imported labor that Nuhoğlu Soysal (1994) points to as central in shaping 
the “incorporation regimes” of Western Europe has no equivalent here.
In this context, immigration policy focused on assimilation, with the 
only groups allowed by right to settle permanently in Turkey being those 
of Turkish cultural or linguistic origin (Iç̇duygu and Aksel 2013). The 
acquisition of Turkish nationality was largely limited to persons of Turkish 
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ethnicity and heritage and Sunni Muslim religion.16 Change began with a 
2003 law granting Turkish citizenship after three years of marriage to a 
Turkish citizen. Further reforms in 2009 granted citizenship to stateless 
children born in Turkey if they are unable to acquire their parents’ citizen-
ship (Koser Akcapar and Simsek 2018).17 A 2010 implementation decision 
also made provision for  naturalization after five years of uninterrupted 
residence in Turkey, allowed citizenship for those who owned real prop-
erty, made investments, transferred their permanent workplace, or com-
pleted their education in Turkey. In each case, however, citizenship was 
not automatic; an application must be made in the prefecture of residence, 
and applicants must prove that they have sufficient means to provide for 
themselves and their family.18 The acquisition of citizenship was also pos-
sible under “exceptional circumstances.” At the same time, however, per-
sons with temporary or international protection status—who are at the 
heart of our discussion in Chaps. 5 and 6—were excluded from the law’s 
provisions.
Article 12 of the 2009 law made explicit the criteria for “exceptional 
citizenship,” stating that this applied to persons recognized as migrants 
under the meaning of pre-existing laws (that is, persons of Turkish cultural 
or ethnic origin) and also to those who have already contributed and/or 
have the potential to contribute at an exceptional level to Turkish society 
in the fields of science, technology economy, social life, sports, culture and 
arts. To these were added, “persons deemed necessary for naturalization.” 
Alternatively,  a  2016  amendment  (number 2016/9601) specified eco-
nomic conditions that could justify “exceptional status.” As fur-
ther amended in September 2018,19 these are:
• Making a permanent  capital investment of at least 500.000 
USD in Turkey
• Purchasing real property worth at least 250.000 USD and keeping it 
for at least 3 years
16 The relevant laws were: Citizenship Law 1312 of 1928; Law on Settlement 2510 of 
1934; Citizenship Law 403 of 1964.
17 Citizenship law 4866 of 2003; Citizenship Law 5901 of 2009.
18 April 2010 (Decision No. 2010/139) numbered 27544 - article 15.
19 Türk Vatandasļığı kanunun uygulamasına ilisķin yönetmelikte değisi̧klik yapılamasına 
dair yönetmelik (Regulation on amending the regulation on the application of Turkish 
Citizenship law).
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• Providing employment for at least 50 workers; having at least 
500.000 USD or equivalent deposits in another currency in Turkish 
banks, provided there are no withdrawals for at least three years
• Keeping government  debt instruments equaling at least 500.000 
USD for three years
The acquisition of Turkish nationality through this process is by invita-
tion. It can be initiated only by the government, not the potential benefi-
ciary. Persons whom the government deems to be relevant after an 
evaluation process, are contacted directly and called for interviews (Koser 
Akcapar and Simsek 2018).
The legal aspects of Turkish citizenship—what Marshall would have 
called civic and political citizenship or more contemporary authors would 
designate as status as distinct from rights—remain difficult to acquire. But 
what of the elements of social citizenship that have been our focus 
throughout this volume? A central theme of our argument has been that 
these can, at least to a limited extent, be seen as decoupled from civic and 
political citizenship. This allows us to consider in Chap. 4 the possibility 
that, nationality status notwithstanding, persons unable to meet socially 
defined basic needs are less than full citizens. The mirror image of this 
argument allows us to ask whether and to what extent addressing the basic 
needs of forced migrants, confers on them a limited but significant mea-
sure of social citizenship.
3.2  The Evolving Status of Internationally Displaced Persons
The unanticipated and unprecedented population movement caused by 
the Syrian civil war, which began in earnest in 2011, came at a time when 
Turkish law and practice with respect to forced migrants was already evolv-
ing, and it has led to further rapid change. Turkey initially ratified the 
1951 Geneva Refugee Convention with both time and geographical limi-
tations to apply only to persons coming from Europe before 1951. While 
the time limitation was removed by a 1967 Protocol, the geographical 
limitation was retained. Until 1994, the UNHCR was the only institution 
responsible for evaluating refugees’ asylum claims and resettling them into 
third countries in Europe. A first change came with a 1994 regulation, 
prompted by large-scale movement of Kurds from northern Iraq, allowing 
for the possibility of granting “temporary asylum” to people from outside 
of Europe (Sarı and Dinçer 2017: 62). The definition of “asylum seekers” 
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was identical to the 1951 Convention’s definition of refugees, without 
geographical limitation, but did not give rights, even theoretically, to per-
manent residence.
More sweeping changes followed the 1999 recognition of Turkey as an 
EU candidate with the stated intention of bringing Turkish law and prac-
tices into closer alignment with those of the European Union (Binder 
2014: 83). A critical step in this reform was outlined in the 2003 National 
Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis Communautaires, which was 
followed in 2005 by the National Action Plan for Adoption of the EU Acquis 
in the Field of Asylum and Immigration and the 2007 Action Plan for 
Integrated Border Control. Together, these have been seen as marking a 
“novel, external and technical character of the emergence of migration 
governance in Turkey” (Üstübici 2019: 59). Implementing the principles 
contained in these plans took almost a decade, leading ultimately to the 
Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) of 4 April 2013.
A central element of the Acquis Communautaires incorporated into the 
new law alongside the legacy of preexisting Turkish laws and practices 
noted above, was the provision of wider protection opportunities to 
migrants. Legal institutions directly inspired by EU law such as “adminis-
trative detention,” “accelerated procedure,” and “inadmissible applica-
tions,” made their way into Turkish law, along with the notion of Subsidiary 
protection status (Öztürk-Övünç 2017). Subsidiary protection  can be, 
provided for individuals who cannot be qualified either as “refugees” or as 
“conditional refugees” by the criteria of the Geneva Convention, but who 
also cannot be sent back to their country of origin because of the risk of 
death or torture. This status is not an interim status, such as conditional 
refugee status, and gives its recipient permanent settlement rights. These 
three statuses are considered collectively as “international protection sta-
tus.” With respect to refugees, the geographical limitation version of the 
refugee status of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 
still applies. That means refugee status can be granted only to people flee-
ing from “events occurring in Europe.” “Conditional refugee status,” 
adapted from the 1994 category “asylum seekers” can be given to persons 
who would qualify within the refugee definition of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention if they were from Europe. Persons with conditional refugee 
status are expected to settle in a third country. This is not a permanent 
status and is not intended to result in longer-term integration. Taken 
together, these three statuses—refugee, conditional refugee, and subsid-
iary protection—are known as “international protection status.”
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Faced with the massive arrival of persons displaced by the Syrian con-
flict after 2011, a new set of instruments were gradually put in place. 
Syrians were initially defined as “guests” in Turkey, which is not a legal 
status under either Turkish or international law. It was announced that 
Turkey would grant Syrians Temporary Protection Status in October 2011 
but this announcement was not initially followed by any law or regulation. 
When the number of Syrian refugees exceeded 100,000, as of October 
2012 a directive was issued (Memisoglu and Ilgit 2016), but it remained 
unclear what this meant in practice because the regulation was not made 
public. Clarification came with the Law on Foreigners and International 
Protection—LFIP and with the Regulation on Temporary Protection 
issued in October 2014 based on article 91 of LFIP. By the terms of this 
law, individuals entering Turkey directly from Syria were expected to apply 
for Temporary Protection Status (thus the commonly used acronym SuTP, 
for Syrians under Temporary Protection). Persons arriving from countries 
other than Syria may apply for one or another of the categories of 
International Protection. Recognition of these statuses is under the 
authority of the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), 
as indicated by Law on Foreigners and International Protection.20
Temporary Protection Status (TPS) extends collective protection to 
migrants who cannot meet the criteria under the 1951 Convention when 
the determination of an individual’s status proves impossible. This status 
promises group-based protection, providing immediate protection from 
refoulement and guaranteeing basic minimum treatment. This status was 
applied by EU member states in the 1990s to persons fleeing from the 
conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia and subsequently formalized by Council 
Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, which set minimum standards 
for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced 
persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member 
states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences. It consti-
tutes the legal basis of temporary protection in EU refugee law, and as 
such was part of the Acquis translated into Turkish law. This translation 
was not complete, since Turkey does not set an upper time limit for the 
20 UNHCR initially provided support to DGMM for registration of international protec-
tion applicants and referral processes. As of 10 September 2018, UNHCR stopped register-
ing foreigners wishing to apply for international protection in Turkey. https://static.help.
unhcr.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/09/06134921/UNHCR_ending_regis-
tration_leaflet_ENG.pdf.
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duration of TPS, leaving this matter to the discretion of national authority 
(Öztürk-Övünç 2017). This point was further modified by the amend-
ment of the regulation on temporary protection, numbered 1851, of 
December 2019 that vested this authority on this matter in the presi-
dent.21 Turkish law now defines temporary protection as a status that “may 
be provided to foreigners, who were forced to leave their countries and are 
unable to return to the countries they left and have arrived at or crossed 
the borders of Turkey in a mass influx seeking immediate and temporary 
protection.” This status legally entitles those who hold it to public services 
such as education and health as well access to the labor market.
The choice of TPS status in the case of Syrians provides flexibility to the 
Turkish Government as it had for European Countries  in the case of 
Bosnian refugees (Koser 2007). TPS is not a status defined in interna-
tional law, but one governed by national and administrative law and regu-
lations; no formal process is required in order to withdraw status and force 
repatriation. Even so, this distinction may be somewhat less important in 
practice than in principle. In Turkey, Sarı and Dinçer (2017: 75–76) argue 
that after failed coup of July 2016, the state of emergency increased deten-
tion and deportation of all migrants through Decree Law No. 676 dated 
October 2016. Article 36 of this decree explicitly facilitated the scope of 
deportation for national security reasons of people who have applied for or 
have received international protection status, which in this case proves no 
more secure than TPS.  An additional regulation specified that persons 
with TPS could also be deported if they are found to have links with ter-
rorist organizations. Although, the deported person can appeal, deporta-
tion can occur prior to any trial.22
Increasing use of TPS has been criticized as a weakening of the prior 
regime of refugee rights (Fitzpatrick 2000). While this is true in principle, 
the experience of repeated “refugee crises” of the twenty-first century sug-
gests that the contemporary political climate of Europe and North America 
rules out any sweeping application of refugee status, in its strict 1951 defi-
nition, to large numbers of forced migrants. The German experience of 
2015–2016, when over one million forced migrants, mostly from Syria, 
were allowed to enter the country with a majority subsequently granted 
permanent right of residence, is the outstanding current exception to this. 
With five years of hindsight, however, it may be the exception that proves 
21 https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2019/12/20191225-38.pdf.
22 https://www.goc.gov.tr/sinir-disi-etme.
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the rule. Taking into account both the human and political consequences 
of this decision, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has famously and fre-
quently repeated that it was the right thing to do … and must never be 
done again.23
In Turkey as elsewhere, thus, TPS is the relevant policy instrument. 
Taking the provisions detailed above at face value, it would seem that the 
social rights granted are quite extensive, including notably access to health 
and education. In Turkey, as we will see, these have largely been provided. 
More generally, this enumeration of rights brings us back to the discussion 
in Chap. 2 on the notion of “denizens.” Should we conclude that the 
granting of TPS to millions of forced migrants has endowed them with at 
least the core elements of Marshallian “social citizenship,” albeit in the 
absence of civic and political citizenship?
One obvious note of caution comes from the very word “temporary.” 
Although the Turkish TPS regime does not envisage an explicit upper 
limit for length of stay, access both to market transactions and to social 
services is not intended to be permanent.24 Beyond this problem of stabil-
ity are others, and here the situation of forced migrants rejoins that of 
other low-income persons. Formal rights are one thing, daily life is another. 
We noted in the introduction that poverty, discrimination, or handicap 
can be barriers to full citizenship, whatever one’s formal status. What 
remains to be seen is whether and to what extent theoretical rights can be 
translated to practical “full membership” in a market society. Proponents 
of CT see this instrument as providing a solution to precisely this prob-
lem—Leisering’s (2019: 320) “citizenship approach to poverty.” In the 
chapters that follow, we look to concrete examples to consider whether 
and under what conditions this claim might be justified.
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Öktem, Kerem, and Cansu Erdoğan. 2018. Between Welfare State and (State- 
organised) Charity: How Turkey’s Social Assistance Regime Blends Two 
Competing Policy Paradigms. Working paper 2 of the program “How ‘social’ 
is Turkey?”, University of Bielefeld.
Önis,̧ Ziya. 2012. The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy 
of the AKP Era. Turkish Studies 13 (2): 135–152. https://doi.org/10.108
0/14683849.2012.685252.
———. 2019. Turkey Under the Challenge of State Capitalism: The Political 
Economy of the Late AKP Era. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19 
(2): 201–225. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1594856.
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CHAPTER 4
Cash Transfer with Turkish Characteristics: 
Two Local Examples
Abstract Having discussed the emergence of cash transfer (CT) as an 
instrument not only for economic assistance but potentially for inclusion 
in a market-centered society, and the policy environment of contemporary 
Turkey, we now bring these together through examination of two case 
studies of CT programs designed and implemented at the local level. By 
proceeding in this way, we are explicitly eschewing any claim to providing 
a universal treatment of social policy, or even of CT programs, in contem-
porary Turkey. Rather, we consider these cases with a view to highlighting 
the elements that seem most closely tied to particular outcomes, and then 
to generalizing these in the form of hypotheses applicable beyond Turkey.
Keywords Turkey • Local government • Social cash transfer • 
Outcomes • Social citizenship
As detailed in Chap. 3, the use of various types of CT instruments has 
become widespread in twenty-first-century Turkey. These include categor-
ical programs aimed at widows, students, disabled persons, etc. There has 
also been an increase in conditional CT programs, such as those launched 
under the Word Bank’s Social Risk Mitigation Program (SRMP) in 2002 
(World Bank 2008). The impact of such programs remains an open ques-
tion. In the introduction to a World Bank sponsored study of the use of 
cash for food assistance, Alderman et al. (2018: 2) conclude that: “… cash 
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can, under the right circumstances, provide choice, empower recipients, 
and generate local economic multipliers.” But what are the right circum-
stances? And how, if it does occur, does such choice and empowerment 
translate into the type of inclusion conducive to the “basic equality of 
membership” at the core of Marshallian social citizenship?
It is to begin answering these questions that we turn to two case stud-
ies of unconditional CT designed and implemented at the local level. 
Our first case is a program led by the district Social Assistance and 
Solidarity Foundation (SASF), while the second was put in place by a 
district municipality. In both cases, CT programs replaced existing 
schemes of in-kind food distribution. An important reason for our choice 
of these cases is that, unlike the World Bank’s Social Risk Mitigation 
Program, they are the result of Turkish initiatives at the local level, and 
emerge from local practice. Because they share the national institutional 
context detailed in Chap. 3, comparison between them can control for 
the effect of national-level institutions and laws, and notoriously prob-
lematic factors such as “national culture,” allowing us to focus on the 
differences that matter: elements of program design and concrete imple-
mentation that determine outcomes in practice. In order to preserve the 
anonymity of our interview partners, we do not identify the specific dis-
tricts taken as examples, but rather give a general description of their 
location and situation. As the first is in a predominantly rural zone and 
the second in a major urban area, we will designate them as “R” and 
“U”, respectively.
1  The Case of a RuRal DisTRiCT
The district of R is largely rural: in February 2019 it had a population of 
approximately 61,000, of which one-third lived in villages and two-thirds 
in the capital city. Politically, the district and the province of which it is a 
part have been dominated since 2009 by the CHP, the center-left secular 
party in opposition at the national level. Our principal finding in this case 
was that the small scale and limited resources of authorities had several 
negative consequences. The number and training of social assistance work-
ers was inadequate for evaluation of applicants’ needs; they produced data 
whose accuracy was difficult to assess. The district SASF depended for 
implementation on a private-sector contractor. This, in turn allowed the 
service provider to limit participating merchants to those already in its 
network, leading to higher-priced shops being chosen and limiting the 
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value of cash transfer. Authorities’ attempts to monitor transactions, 
finally, were an administrative burden on participating shops. Failure to 
comply with monitoring requirements led to reimbursement to shops 
being withheld to the detriment of the program’s sustainability.
1.1  An Instrument for Individual Empowerment?
In 2015, the district’s SASF replaced the distribution of food parcels to 
the lowest income families with prepaid smart cards that allow them to 
purchase a defined set of products on the model of the “gift cards” sold by 
certain companies. The technical specifications of the card were modeled 
on those of the Electronic Platform for Public Procurement [Elektronik 
Kamu Alımı Platformu, EKAP] as well as electronic card suppliers such as 
Multinet and Sodexo. Since it did not have the technical resources to 
design such a tool itself, the SASF issued a call for tenders including both 
the physical aspects of the instrument (smart cards and the associated 
computer management system) and its commercial aspects (network of 
shops where the card would be accepted). In the end, only one company 
responded, probably because the scale of the district limited profits for 
large companies. The local foundation signed a contract with Multinet, 
which was replaced by Metropol in 2016 following suspicion that the for-
mer had links to the movement of Imam Fethullah Gülen, who was 
accused by the authorities of orchestrating the failed coup d’état in the 
summer of 2016.1
The use of the card, as originally conceived, was limited to the purchase 
of food during Ramadan and the Feast of Sacrifice (kurban bayramı). In 
2018, 750 families were able to benefit from these cards, which had a 
registration number but did not bear the name or photo of the user. The 
card was reloaded in increments of 200 Turkish Liras (TL)2 and could be 
used in the local branches of five national supermarket chains, selected by 
Multinet and then Metropol as part of their management contract. Certain 
items such as alcohol, tobacco products, jewelry, furniture and cleaning 
products could not be purchased with this card.
1 Interview: 2019. For background on the failed coup, see: https://www.hurriyet.com. 
tr/gundem/dakika-dakika-darbe-girisimi-15-16-temmuz-2016-40149409, consulted 10 
April 2020.
2 See the discussion of currency conversion in Chap. 1.
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The payment card program was financed from the national budget of 
the Solidarity Fund. Prior to launching the card program the local SASF 
received a monthly payment (periodik yardım) of TL 123,500 from the 
General Directorate of Social Assistance to ensure the payment of the sala-
ries of its seven employees. Additional shares of aid were paid to the SASF 
on the occasion of Ramadan and the Feast of Sacrifice. In the past, these 
had financed the distribution of food packages; they became the source of 
funds distributed to the families through the prepaid cards.
From the point of view of the local foundation, the switch from in-kind 
donations to the social card program was justified in terms of the quality 
of the products available and the freedom of choice left to the beneficia-
ries. The foundation director explained:
Before the food cards, we used to distribute food parcels during the holiday sea-
son. Although there are quality specifications in the food packaging process, the 
food was of very poor quality. We drank the tea that was in the food parcel, it 
tasted horrible. We told the companies that wanted to participate in the tender 
that they had to at least provide good quality tea. But another company won the 
tender, and the quality of the tea was poor.
One day I went to an old lady’s house. She was very poor. She told me, “I 
looked out my window all winter long. There was a street vendor selling oranges 
and apples. But I can’t even buy one.”3
As with all actions financed by the Solidarity Fund, whether in-kind or 
cash, information on low-income people is provided by Turkey’s inte-
grated Social Assistance Information System (ISAIS). Home visits to col-
lect and maintain this information are at the heart of this system. These are 
carried out by inspectors employed by local foundations. According to 
official documentation, the visits are carried out at least once a year to 
allow for a consistent and objective assessment of needs  (Ministry of 
Family and Social Policy and World Bank 2017: 23).
Reinforcing its market-enhancing perspective, the monetization of 
social assistance is closely integrated with the local economy. While the 
food parcels at the heart of the old system did not come from the local 
market, beneficiaries of the social card spend the resulting income in local 
shops, providing an indirect subsidy to the participating businesses. The 
3 Interview, 2019.
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local authorities can, in principle, exert an important influence on local 
economic life by selecting the shops entitled to participate in this program.
1.2  Problems of Implementation
In practice, the procedures observed deviated significantly from the ideals 
of market citizenship. From the outset, the fact that the SASF had to call 
on external suppliers resulted in a delegation of the choice of participating 
businesses to the Multinet and then Metropol companies. In their role as 
service providers, they were the ones who selected the participating busi-
nesses from among their business partners. The selected shops were all 
branches of large national supermarket chains. This led directly to several 
problems.
From the perspective of the SASF, administration proved difficult. In 
order to monitor users and purchases, the Foundation asked participating 
businesses for an invoice for each purchase and a photocopy of the identity 
cards of the person making the purchase. If these were not provided, it 
refused to pay the merchant. The participating supermarkets proved 
unable or unwilling to collect the information required by the card provid-
ers who, in turn, were unable to provide it to the Foundation. This resulted 
in refusals to pay and reduced profitability for the suppliers. Finally, the 
Foundation itself did not have the human resources to carry out its part of 
the control procedures. Purchases related to each card had to be verified 
on a monthly basis. The Foundation’s staff of seven people, two of whom 
were dedicated to the verification of card purchases, was insufficient for 
this task, which finally could not be carried out. This led to a weakening 
of the relation between system designers and service providers, to the det-
riment of the program’s sustainability.4
A distinct problem, from the perspective of users, was limited choice. 
The restriction of the use of the card to the five supermarkets selected by 
the companies providing the program was also widely criticized by pro-
gram users. “We cannot go to A101 or BIṀ [national discount stores]! 
There is a restriction of shops for purchase. We buy the same food with 
more expensive prices!”5 Under these circumstances, some expressed a 
preference for the old system:
4 Interview, 2019.
5 Interview, 2019.
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There used to be food parcels. There was a lot of food in that parcel. Oil, dish 
soap, flour, dry food in large quantities! We couldn’t buy the same amount with 
the card. It was better before. But, thank God for this anyway. (Fakat buna 
da sü̧kür)!6
A third set of problems were linked to the system of home inspection 
that was intended to verify the eligibility of users. Although the data found 
in the Integrated Social Assistance System (ISAIS) were used, the behavior 
of the social assistance inspectors showed considerable discretionary 
power. To some extent, this was built into the procedures; some items on 
the assessment forms were left to the inspectors’ judgment: “did you find 
a negative attitude towards children in the family?”; “did you find a pat-
tern of negative habits in the family?”. In addition, inspectors sometimes 
chose not to apply the official questionnaire directly. The lengthy survey 
provided for in the procedure (49 questions) was usually completed by the 
inspectors themselves without the questions being asked directly to the 
respondents.7 Inspectors, moreover, had no standardized procedures or 
protocols, nor any formal training on the technical or ethical aspects of 
assessing poverty and need. In practice, procedures were generated by the 
inspectors themselves and informally passed on within the inspection 
teams, with the more experienced inspectors teaching newcomers what 
they considered relevant. There was no guarantee that assessment would 
be consistent from one inspector to another.8 Moreover, our interviews 
with card recipients suggested that inspections were carried out only once, 
to determine initial eligibility, and were not repeated afterward, contrary 
to official procedure.9 Overall, the picture that emerged from the house-
hold visits is one of subjectivity rather than of the technical uniformity 
intended when the instrument was adopted. These visits were intended to 
provide additional information to the ISAIS. In the case of R, however, 
the impression of coherence and harmonization evoked by this system was 
misleading.
From the point of view of the director of the local foundation, the pro-
gram was not considered a success.10 In his view, the poorly educated 
beneficiaries, especially the older ones and those with disabilities, were not 
6 Interview, 2019.
7 Interview, 2019.
8 Interview, 2019.
9 Interview, 2019.
10 For all information in this paragraph: interview, 2019.
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able to use the cards properly: many forgot the password associated with 
their card, while others did not understand that the card had a limited 
amount of money on it and tried to make purchases beyond the credit 
they had been given.
The gap between principle and reality was also evident from the point 
of view of program beneficiaries, but the reasons they gave proved to be 
quite different from that of the local authorities.11 The use of the cards 
themselves—storage of access codes, etc.—did not seem to be a problem. 
Quite to the contrary these same people were already using the national 
PTT card. In their view, having money gave them more freedom in their 
choice of consumption, although the Foundation authorities did not 
anticipate the resulting choices. One disabled respondent thus managed to 
divert the use of the card to purchase medicines, which are normally 
excluded from accessible products, by the expedient of first purchasing 
food which he exchanged for cash with a neighbor, and then using the 
cash to purchase medication.12
Beyond such benign creativity, however, was a more general feeling of 
diffidence about the program and the way it was carried out. Did aid really 
go to the neediest? Some persons interviewed expressed a preference for 
informal employment, since the resulting unreported income did not 
enter into the determination of their eligibility for social assistance. Others 
recounted an anecdote—obviously unverifiable, but interesting for the 
point of view it typifies—that in the past year “party members were mak-
ing lists, and then some people had their aid cut” leaving them with the 
feeling that any talk about aid might result in losing it.13 The arbitrary 
nature of inspections, mentioned earlier, also led to perceptions of unequal 
treatment, opening the way to conflict and divisions among recipients.
The foundation director suggested that within the board itself civil 
society members were chosen by the mayor according to political affilia-
tion.14 Under such conditions, assistance might be subverted to serve elite 
interests rather than furthering individual equality. It is important to 
emphasize that no clear evidence either of political or of personal prefer-
ential treatment was offered. Even so, the suspicion, whether based in 
reality or rumor, that obtaining—and losing—assistance was largely arbi-
trary or could be influenced by political considerations, or that concealing 
11 Interview, 2019.
12 Interview, 2019.
13 Interview, 2019.
14 Interview, 2019.
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income was prudent, speaks of a program that contributed little either to 
empowerment or inclusion.
The Foundation’s director, inspectors, and card users, each for distinct 
reason of their own, found the program to be dysfunctional. Acknowledging 
this result, the SASF decided in 2019 to end this experiment with an 
autonomous instrument and to adopt the PTT card as a tool for distribut-
ing aid. This choice had no impact on the sums distributed; recipients now 
have access to local aid on the PTT card, which most of them already used 
to access other State aid. The result saves resources for the Foundation, 
which no longer has to ensure technical monitoring, but also represented 
the end of any attempt to monitor the consumption behavior of the ben-
eficiaries. The switch to the PTT card also ended the monopoly of the 
shops preselected by the supplier, which presumably allowed recipients to 
obtain food at better prices. The issues noted with respect to inspections 
determining who should or should not receive assistance, however, were 
not addressed and remain problematic.
2  The Case of an uRban DisTRiCT
In our second case, the urban district of U, the instigator of the program 
was the district municipality. Located in an urban area, the district had a 
population of 427,800 in 2018, having doubled in 10 years. This change 
in size compared to R is reflected in the means available. Where, in the 
case of R, only the district SASF, mobilizing a budget from the National 
Solidarity Fund, could envisage the implementation of a local social wel-
fare policy, the U District Municipality could use its own budget, supple-
mented by private donations. The result was a system that did not need to 
call on an outside contractor; the district municipality was both financer 
and implementor. The resulting market-enhancing instrument, we find, 
resulted in a greater degree of integration into the local market. At the 
same time, however, it increased the political dependence of recipients on 
the municipality and the governing party; market inclusion in this case did 
not fully translate into individual autonomy.
2.1  An Innovative Local Instrument
A distinctive element of U’s strategy is the early use of innovative social 
policy instruments as an additional means of inclusion for the poorest part 
of the population. The policy instrument was created in 2010—preceding 
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the World Bank’s SRMP by two years. As in the case of R, a debit card was 
used as the program’s vehicle, this time inspired by the limited-sum debit 
cards introduced by some banks for the younger segments of their clien-
tele. The result was a permanent payment card that is regularly recharged 
by the municipality and used for purchases of food, clothing, school sup-
plies, and some medical items such as wheelchairs. The card is given only 
to women on the basis of family income. In 2018, 5,500 families received 
the social assistance card for food.15 The card is personal and carries a 
photo of the user. The card is topped up in installments of 200 Turkish 
liras (TL) with a supplement of TL 5 for each child between 6 and 18 years 
of age. If one of the parents is deceased, a supplement of TL 5 is added per 
child. The frequency of recharging the card depends on the per capita 
family income, so that poorer families receive more frequent assistance 
(cards are recharged every month instead of every three months or more). 
Those whose cards are recharged monthly also receive assistance for the 
purchase of clothing to the amount of TL 110 for each family member. As 
of 2018, 19,708 persons lived in households eligible for the card.16 Users 
can check the amount available on their card at any time. There is no time 
limit for purchases; the credit is valid until it is exhausted. Criteria other 
than income can also be taken into consideration. People with disabilities 
can receive a credit for the purchase of necessary medical equipment; fami-
lies who have lost their homes in a fire can receive an additional credit for 
the purchase of building materials.
As in the case of R, the payment card issued in U can only be used in 
shops selected by the municipality and equipped with a suitable card 
reader. Sixteen businesses in the district are accredited to accept the card 
for food and as many for clothing payments.17 Participating businesses 
must hold a municipal license, have a space of at least 150 square meters, 
a bar code reader, and must not sell illegal items or food after its expiry 
date. Owners must have a clean criminal record and not employ any unde-
clared workers. The control effort is thus even more evident than in the 
instrument set up in R, since in this case it concerns local shops designated 
by the municipality, and not national supermarkets chosen by a private 
sector service provider.
15 District municipality of U, annual report of activities, 2018.
16 It is illustrative of the greater administrative capacity of U that, unlike in R, authorities 
had an accurate count of individuals—not just households.
17 District municipality of U, annual report of activities, 2018.
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One point in common with R is that the origin of the payment card was 
linked by its creators to local needs and in particular to certain proven 
dysfunctions of traditional systems of in-kind aid. An illustrative anecdote 
along these lines was told to us by the former deputy mayor of the district: 
during the distribution of Ramadan aid by the municipality in 2009, the 
dry chickpeas distributed in the parcels systematically ended up in the rub-
bish bins. After carrying out a survey in the neighborhoods, our interlocu-
tor learned that the chickpeas were thrown away because of the cost of 
cooking them, considered too high by the beneficiaries. A female inhabit-
ant reportedly told him that to cook these pulses she had to spend more 
than half of a gas bottle. Transformed into legitimizing narratives, these 
anecdotes take up the elements of choice that we saw in the first case. 
Here, as in R, we find support for the conclusions of Buğra and Keyder 
(2003), according to which aid in-kind generates considerable costs for 
public administrations, is ineffective for both producers and consumers, 
and is stigmatizing to those who receive it.
The consequences of the difference in resources from one local author-
ity to another was evident in the management of the instruments. Whereas 
the District Foundation in R remained dependent on external for-profit 
service providers, the municipality of U internalized management and 
control activities. Information about users is collected by municipal 
employees who make home visits during which they fill out a 250-item 
questionnaire, 196 of which relate to the economic level of the household. 
According to an official of the municipal social services, these answers are 
entered into an online system created by the district municipality’s offi-
cers, enabling them to follow-up each case in real time. This local mastery 
of the computer tool emerges as one of the most striking differences 
between our two cases.
Contrary to the result observed in R, the popular success of the pay-
ment card in U is not in doubt. While the residents of R were apprehensive 
about the inspectors’ visit, fearing that these would take away the aid they 
were already receiving, we observed women in U queuing, sometimes for 
hours, to ask for home visits, which they hoped would open up the rights 
to the payment card.18 This difference is explained by the fact that the 
visits in question were not made by representatives of the municipality but 
by (systematically women) AKP activists. In principle, these initial visits 
conducted by party activists had no official value; they had to be 
18 Recurring participant observation, 2014.
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completed and validated by municipal officials. In the minds of the inhab-
itants, however, the two institutions were seen as one and the same.
This  perceived role of a political party in  selecting beneficiaries of a 
public program generates obvious questions of partisanship. Has social 
policy become no more than a means of rewarding political support? The 
explanation of the president of a neighborhood party organization could 
be interpreted in this sense when he says, “I know the problems in this 
neighborhood from A to Z. I try to prevent those who are not truly needy 
from obtaining the card.” Truly needy, or truly loyal, a cynical observer 
might ask?19 Residents who supported the opposition CHP believed that 
they faced discrimination in obtaining the payment card. We did observe, 
however, that supporters of other opposition parties were among the card 
recipients. As one woman party worker told us: “Women tell me that they 
will vote for AKP now, even though their husbands do not. What do men 
know? They are never home!” There is no doubt that we are very far, here, 
from a world of neutral disinterested civil servants and universal rights. 
Political calculations are clearly made and openly discussed. In terms of 
objective output, however, this distinction may be less significant than one 
might initially imagine. The dynamic described by Piattoni (2001) in 
which a dominant party finds it in its long-term electoral interest to pro-
vide public services to the population at large, which we see at work here, 
brings results surprisingly similar to what a rights-based dynamic might 
generate.
2.2  From Social Penetration to Local Knowledge
The omnipresence of local workers and activists of the ruling party, the 
AKP, in low-income neighborhoods of the district was a constant of life in 
U after 2012. In addition to organizing political meetings and activities, 
they could be found at purely social gatherings such as weddings and 
funerals. As they were themselves residents of the neighborhoods where 
they worked, the party activists were easily accepted in all these circles. 
This strategy of local anchoring is not new in Turkey. White (2002) has 
shown that Islamist parties have, at least since the 1990s, perfected a 
19 Interview, 2012.
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model of political action deeply rooted in everyday life. Like its predeces-
sor, the Prosperity Party [Refah Partisi], the AKP communicates and per-
sonalizes its messages to local residents.
Significantly, many of the party workers active in low-income neighbor-
hoods of U were also volunteers for religiously based foundations closely 
allied with the AKP at both the local and the national levels. This link, 
which is a frequently observed element of contemporary Turkish reality, 
has been criticized as reintroducing a “logic of charity” (Buğra 2015), 
into what should be a system based on rights of citizenship. While it is 
entirely possible that religious duty was easily allied with political expedi-
ency for many party workers, it remains that this dual role seems to have 
facilitated the construction of relations of trust between them and the 
poorest residents. Religious foundations, in the words of the local repre-
sentative of one of these, “can act as a bridge between the people and the 
state” especially for those, such as internally displaced persons from east-
ern Anatolia, whose personal experience has led them to mistrust the gov-
ernment.20 In the context of a means-tested program, this additional 
element of social penetration was also a source of information allowing aid 
to be targeted and its effects to be assessed.
This social anchoring of the party and its allies facilitated its effort to 
integrate inhabitants into the market while providing an essential relay for 
the municipal authorities who were thus informed of local conditions. The 
neighborhood president cited above who knew his neighbors’ problems 
“from A to Z” was not an isolated case. Information available to public 
authorities was not limited to official databases. Our observation left little 
doubt that the amount and quality of relevant information available to 
authorities in U was significantly superior to what we saw in R. How this 
information was used was a matter of some controversy. As noted above, 
residents who identified with opposition parties generally believed, rightly 
or wrongly, that AKP supporters were systematically given preference. The 
payment card system in U is not an ideal rights-based policy; even so, it is 
arguably more effective at promoting market integration than the system 
of in-kind distribution it replaced.
20 Interview, 2014.
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3  DiD Cash TRansfeR PRomoTe maRkeT CiTizenshiP?
The first conclusion to be drawn from the divergent experience and out-
come of the two programs described above is that we must be wary of 
sweeping generalization, whether it is about CT as an instrument, or 
Turkey as a context. While both cases present undeniable “Turkish charac-
teristics,” shared elements interact with local differences to provide differ-
ent official outcomes and subjective experiences. Both commonalities and 
variation help us to address the central question that emerged from the 
discussion in our first chapters: do the programs we observe use market-
enhancing instruments to contribute to social citizenship? The simple 
answer is that both remain far from a perfect realization of this ideal; cash 
transfer on its own is not a guarantee of social citizenship, even in the 
context of a market society. Differences between the two cases, however, 
are significant.
The objective difference in conditions between R and U can be attrib-
uted, at least in part, to the evident difference in scale; the two districts 
differed by an order of magnitude in population. The result of this differ-
ence was evident in terms of system design and sustainability. The system 
in R was marked by the difference of interest between public authority and 
the private-sector service provider. Because it controlled the digital infor-
mation system required to operate CT, Multinet imposed the choice of 
merchants already in its network without consideration of the needs of 
low-income people. This explains the diminished value of assistance com-
pared to the old system of in-kind distribution. The outcome in U was 
more coherent, since the municipality retained control of the digital infor-
mation system and was able to impose its own choice of participating 
merchants. This difference underscores the fact that the technical require-
ments of digital CT systems are beyond the capacity of small units that 
were able to carry out in-kind distribution.
Even if resources are available, how they are used is a matter of policy 
choice. Other things being equal, the shift to cash transfer tends to shift 
authority and decision-making capacity toward larger and more capable 
units, either public or private. The shift to a market-enhancing instru-
ment, thus, is the very opposite of “policy on the cheap,” or a “retreat of 
the state.” Before we leap to the conclusion that bigger is necessarily bet-
ter, however, the contribution of local knowledge to the success of cash 
transfer in U suggests that there may be a limit to optimal scale. This is a 
point to which we will return in the following chapters, when we look at 
the much larger nation-wide program aimed at refugees.
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From the perspective of the recipients of assistance, and this is what 
really matters, our two cases strongly suggests that how CT programs are 
viewed depends on very practical matters. If, as in R, the move to cash 
translates to the purchase of less food than was in the parcels distributed 
before, it is unsurprising that the program was disliked. If, as in U, the 
practical consequences are positive, acceptance is more easily secured.
Beyond this, we have noted that among the critical questions to be 
asked of any social support program were: is assistance a right or privilege? 
If a right, then for whom? In both of our cases, the answer, at least in 
principle, was that assistance was a right for the poorest families; access was 
determined by need. Assessing actual need, however, is not a straightfor-
ward task; it requires both information and judgment. The experience of 
R shows what happens when this assessment is left to the discretion of 
untrained inspectors. The atmosphere was marked by suspicion and fear of 
losing benefits. Because undeclared income from informal work could be 
concealed, residents expressed a reluctance to take on formal employment. 
In U, authorities were better informed, both officially and informally 
through the networks of volunteers for the incumbent party. The prob-
lem, as it was perceived there, was a suspicion that people likely to support 
the governing party would receive preference.
In neither case did CT meet the standards either of a fully rights-based 
approach to social assistance or to unfettered access to the market. In the 
case of U, the establishment of CT contributed to increasing dependence 
on the party that dominates the municipality. It does not follow, however, 
that the shift from in-kind assistance to CT made no difference at all. 
While it would be absurd to suggest that the sums transferred were suffi-
cient to bring about perfect equality, or even to lift recipients out of pov-
erty, observation suggests that small but significant steps in the direction 
of inclusion did result. In the context of a market society, their “trade- 
based entitlement,” to return to Sen’s (1981) vocabulary, was undeniably 
increased. It is important, moreover, to remember that the alternative to 
this limited move toward market citizenship is not an ideal world of uni-
versal rights, but a reality of poverty and personal dependence on land-
lords and brokers. If even a small additional monthly income makes 
women less dependent on family or households less likely to fall into 
chronic debt to shopkeepers, the gain in autonomy is real. If CT, for all 
the limits imposed on its use, is less stigmatizing and provides more choice 
than in-kind distribution of food or clothing, the gain in dignity is just as 
real. Daily life is made more ordinary, closer to “the life of a civilized being 
according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11).
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CHAPTER 5
Cash Transfer and Humanitarian Assistance
Abstract In this chapter, we turn our attention to cash transfer (CT) as an 
instrument of humanitarian assistance for forced migrants in Turkey. We 
first consider the emergence of CT as a priority instrument for humanitar-
ian assistance in the twenty-first century. We then sketch the political back-
ground of humanitarian assistance in Turkey for persons displaced by 
internal conflicts in Syria focusing in particular on the EU–Turkey agree-
ments that led to the establishment of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey 
(FRiT) in 2016. In a final section we focus on the establishment as part of 
FRiT of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), the largest humanitar-
ian CT program ever established by the European Union. We discuss in 
particular the program’s institutional complexity and the resulting risk of 
ambiguous consensus and conflicts of interest among the agencies involved 
in its design and implementation.
Keywords Humanitarian assistance • Humanitarian cash transfer • 
Turkey • European Union • Forced migration • ESSN
Understanding both the accomplishments and the limits of CT programs 
for forced migrants in Turkey requires a double exercise in contextualiza-
tion. In this chapter, we look first to the rise of CT as an instrument of 
humanitarian assistance and then to the circumstances that led to the 
90
establishment of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) for forced 
migrants in Turkey.
1  Humanitarian action, casH-transfer 
instruments, and citizensHip
Turkish and international efforts to aid persons displaced by conflicts in 
Syria and elsewhere in southwest Asia were initially carried out in the logic 
of humanitarian assistance. To say this, however, opens a vast topic; the 
nature and meaning of “humanitarianism” and “humanitarian assistance” 
have changed significantly in recent decades. Before looking to the specific 
circumstances that eventually led to the establishment of the CT instru-
ment at the core of this and the next chapter, the Emergency Social Safety 
Net (ESSN), we turn briefly to the evolution of humanitarian policy and 
instruments more generally. We begin by noting the emergence of initia-
tives blurring the boundaries between humanitarian intervention, social 
support, and development aid. In a second section, we consider the grow-
ing importance of CT as an instrument this new type of humanitarian 
assistance.
1.1  Humanitarianism, Social Protection, and Development
Humanitarianism has its origins in altruistic efforts to “alleviate the suffer-
ing of distant strangers” (Barnett 2011). Its purpose was to “save life, 
alleviate suffering, and enable those suffering to maintain their human 
dignity during or after natural disasters and man-made crises” (Riddell 
2007: 311). The principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality 
pioneered by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the nine-
teenth century are still cited by states and international organizations 
(IOs) as well as NGOs to justify short-term material distribution to meet 
basic needs as well as actions affording immediate legal and physical pro-
tection (Hoffman and Weiss 2018). Defined in this way, humanitarian 
assistance is distinct both from national social protection policies and the 
programs of development assistance pioneered by states and IOs after 
1945. Social protection became, over the course of the twentieth century, 
one of the central components of citizenship and, as such, the province of 
national states and domestic politics. As for development aid, its potential 
to encourage the adoption of certain social and economic models rather 
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than others, and its frequent use as a tool of international political influ-
ence, go against the disinterested ethic of humanitarianism. Both social 
assistance and development aid, moreover, focus on action over periods, 
rather than in moments of emergency. Clear in principle, however, these 
distinctions are increasingly blurred; recent decades have witnessed the 
increased use in humanitarian settings of instruments that embody com-
mitments to both social transformation and local involvement.
Short-term policy instruments for meeting acute needs have increas-
ingly been found to be inadequate when humanitarian emergencies 
become protracted crises (Harvey et al. 2007). More generally, the move 
to a longer-term vision can be seen as part of the shift noted by Barnett 
(2011) from an “emergency” to an “alchemical” approach to humanitari-
anism. Emergency humanitarianism adheres to the ICRC’s principles of 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Practitioners largely focus on 
immediate efforts to keep people alive and do not seek to transform the 
societies in which they act. Their priority is protecting a humanitarian 
space insulated from politics. Alchemical humanitarianism focuses on 
“addressing the root causes of suffering,” which necessarily implies a lon-
ger time horizon. It “operates with a less binding set of principles and 
treats politics as a necessary and at times even a welcome feature of human-
itarian action” (Barnett 2014: 3). Humanitarian assistance, understood in 
this way, looks increasingly like aid for development.
Further eroding the distinctiveness of humanitarian assistance is an 
increasing move to “localize” humanitarian aid (Kraft and Smith 2019). 
This emerged from a diagnosis that sidelining local governments and 
NGOs by the internationally led structure typical of major humanitarian 
aid efforts was frequently a liability in coping with complex crises 
(Gingerich and Cohen 2015: 8). Reasons for this included the inherent 
limitation of humanitarian logistics (Coyne 2013) as well as the perceived 
need to take better account of local needs and priorities. Other, more 
political factors played a role as well. Writing two decades ago, Barnett 
(2001: 246) noted that UNHCR was encouraged to engage with poten-
tial refugee producing countries because recipient states “had tired of their 
obligations under refugee laws.” More recently, Üstübici (2019) has 
labeled this strategy the “externalization of migration governance.” In 
such context, the policy environment of recipient states clearly matters, as 
these can be called on to act as policy makers, policy implementers, and 
service providers.
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Whatever the underlying motives, the blurring of lines between human-
itarianism, development, and social assistance has become the norm. This 
approach was formalized in a series of commitments and documents pro-
duced by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. Among the “core 
responsibilities” put forward by summit participants was to move from 
“delivering aid” to “ending need”—which sounds very much like the UN 
sustainable development goal of “eradicating poverty.” To this end, an 
important role was given to the injunction; “reinforce, do not replace, 
national and local systems” ( World Humanitarian Summit 2016: 21, 22). 
The “New Way of Working” strategies put forward at the 2016 summit 
sought to transform principles into guidelines for action.
The New Way of Working can be described, in short, as working over multiple 
years, based on the comparative advantage of a diverse range of actors, includ-
ing those outside the UN system, towards collective outcomes. Wherever possible, 
those efforts should reinforce and strengthen the capacities that already exist at 
national and local levels. (UN-OCHA 2017: 6)
Through the “Grand Bargain” document, signed at the Summit’s con-
clusion, major governmental and humanitarian NGOs, committed to 
transfer 25% of aid to local actors by 2020, linking this explicitly to an 
effort to reduce people’s needs, risks, and vulnerabilities and to increase 
their resilience at the end of 3–5 years (UN-OCHA 2017: 6–7).
Recent policy documents by the European Commission (2019) and 
UNHCR (2019) confirm the convergence of humanitarian assistance and 
social protection. This is particularly clear in cases involving internationally 
displaced persons. In short-term crisis situations, “alleviation of suffering” 
(European Commission 2019: 12) can involve various forms of assistance 
or support ranging from physical protection to psychological support in 
cases of trauma. Once these are delivered, however, the problem is not 
over. In a protracted crisis, when refugees are not able to return home, 
addressing the “root causes” or their situation increasingly focuses on the 
host country. In such cases, a shift from short-run to more sustainable 
approaches is unavoidable. Increasing reliance on host-country social pro-
tection systems is often seen as the best option for providing it.
This has direct consequences for the question that has been our central 
focus throughout this book: social and economic citizenship. Yılmaz 
(2019) argues that in cases of protracted humanitarian assistance for 
forced migrants there may be convergence of the rights of immigrants and 
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host-country citizens. The dynamic of incorporation noted by Nuhoğlu 
Soysal (1994) in the case of guest workers, may thus be of relevance here. 
For Yılmaz, however, this is not necessarily a cause for rejoicing; like 
Turner (2019) whose argument about the convergence of citizen and 
denizen rights we saw in Chap. 2, he worries that the rights of migrants 
and citizens may converge toward a point that represents a weakened ver-
sion of citizenship. It is important, thus, to better understand the content 
and context of policies aimed at forced migrants.
Critically, both the EU and UNHCR documents cited above stress that 
assistance should be provided in “a dignified way from the very beginning 
of a refugee crisis” (UNHCR 2019: 6). Along with the “convergence of 
rights” noted by Yılmaz, this emphasis on dignity brings us back to this 
book’s central notion: the potential for promoting social citizenship 
through market-enhancing instruments. There is no question here of 
material equality; the programs in question seek at best to alleviate 
“extreme poverty.” Even—perhaps especially—in the face of material 
inequality, however, being treated in a dignified manner, living the life of 
a “civilized human being” is at the core of Marshallian “social citizen-
ship.” The question is how, in practice, this can be accomplished. For 
humanitarian assistance just as for domestic social policy, the answer 
increasingly is through cash-based programming.
1.2  The Rise of CT as a Humanitarian Instrument
An increased emphasis on CT programs is part of the “new way of work-
ing” in the humanitarian arena. The summary document of the 2016 
summit makes this point explicitly:
Another major trend was the important acknowledgement, by Member States 
and other stakeholders, of the potentially transformative power of cash-based 
programming, particularly in empowering affected people.1
Signatories to the 2016 Grand Bargain pledged that 20% of assistance 
by 2020 would be channeled through local and national responders, with 
cash as an important instrument for doing so (Gentilini et al. 2018: 8). 
This was part of a broader trend. The High-Level Panel on Humanitarian 
1 https://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017/Jul/WHS_com-
mitment_to_Action_8September2016.pdf.
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CT published the report Doing cash differently: How cash transfers can 
transform humanitarian aid2 in 2015. The following year, the United 
Nation’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) commissioned the 
World Bank to write a Strategic note on Cash Transfers in Humanitarian 
Contexts.3 The European Union has moved in a similar direction. In 
March 2015, the Council of the European Union adopted “10 Common 
Principles for Multi-Purpose Cash-Based Assistance to Respond to 
Humanitarian Needs”4 receiving political endorsement in the resulting 
Council Conclusions5 adopted in June 2015. These principles were trans-
lated into concrete policy directives through the Guidance Note on the 
delivery of CT, first issued in January 2017 and updated in November 
2017.6 Further consolidating this trend, the Common Donor Approach 
and the Joint Donor Statement on Humanitarian Cash Transfers were 
published in 2019, and several interagency collaborations were established 
(CaLP 2020: 36). As of 2019, the total value of humanitarian CT pro-
grams was estimated at US $5.6 billion, up from US $2 billion in 2015, 
accounting for 17.9% of total humanitarian assistance (CaLP 2020: 12).
Programs aimed explicitly at international displaced persons have fol-
lowed this pattern, using debit cards, mobile vouchers, and mobile money 
to biometric technologies for identification purposes (Ford 2017). 
Looking specifically to programs aimed at Syrian refugees, examples 
include “Lebanon one-unified interorganizational system for E-cards” 
(LOUISE) launched in 20167 as a multipurpose platform allowing Syrian 
refugees and vulnerable Lebanese to access food, winter, or education 
assistance. Other programs aimed at displaced persons include SCOPE, a 
debit card for displaced Iraqi families and Syrians refugees in Iraq; the 
UNHCR CT program in Jordan; an E-voucher scheme for supermarket 
shopping in Turkey put in place by the Danish Refugee Council for Syrian 
Refugees for the year 2014–2015, and the program that will be the focus 
2 https://www.odi.org/publications/9876-doing-cash-differently-how-cash-transfers- 
can-transform-humanitarian-aid.
3 http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/humanitariancashtransfersfinalcopy-
edited.pdf.
4 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/concept_paper_common_top_line_ 
principles_en.pdf.
5 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10184-2015-INIT/en/pdf.
6 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/guidance_note_cash_23_11_2017. 
pdf.
7 https://leb-louise.azurewebsites.net/about.html.
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of the following section: the Red Crescent Card for displaced persons 
in Turkey.
Justifying these decisions was a growing body of research on the impact 
of CT in humanitarian settings. From the donor perspective, provision of 
in-kind aid—shelter, seeds, and especially food—has drawn criticism. If 
in-kind distribution is prolonged, there is increasing evidence that harm 
may outweigh benefit as the capacity of local producers declines (Dreze 
and Sen 1991). CT instruments, in contrast, help to strengthen local mar-
kets and encourage local production. Where there is an acute local scarcity 
of food, there may be no alternative to providing it from outside. Even in 
these cases, however, problems may persist, such as delays in the aid arriv-
ing and inappropriate food being provided (Clay and Barry 2005). 
Mitigating these problems provided an initial incentive to shift to CT in 
cases of natural disasters as far back as the 1980s (Peppiatt et al. 2001) 
with larger-scale use made after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. It does 
not follow that CT is always appropriate. In a report prepared for the 
High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Cash Transfers, Bailey and Harvey 
(2015: 3) note that:
For cash, markets need to be functioning or able to recover quickly enough that 
an injection of cash will prompt traders and shopkeepers to make goods available.
When it can be used, however, CT is seen by donors as reducing staff-
ing and delivery expenses (Venton et  al. 2015). The turn to CT as a 
domestic instrument of poverty reduction by low- and middle-income 
countries (Barrientos 2015; Hanlon et  al. 2010; Honorati et  al. 2015; 
ILO 2014) further facilitates its use by humanitarian actors. National pro-
grams can provide a readymade financial and IT infrastructure available to 
humanitarian agencies.
For recipients of aid, the conclusions of studies of humanitarian CT are 
similar to those of domestic programs cited in Chap. 2. Proponents of CT 
point to collective outcomes that sustainably reduce risks and vulnerabili-
ties while improving resilience (Ford 2017; OCHA 2017). Various studies 
have shown reduction of negative coping strategies such as excessive debt, 
child labor, or systematic under-consumption (Lehmann and Masterson 
2014); increased quantity and diversity of food (Bailey and Hedlund 
2012); increased social capital (Slater and Mphale 2008); or decreased 
stress and anxiety (Hagen-Zanker et al. 2018). On a larger scale, however, 
Bailey and Harvey (2015) argue that there are few examples showing 
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positive consequences for local markets, with the exception of studies find-
ing a positive multiplier effect of cash on local economy for Malawi (Davies 
2007) and studies for refugees in Lebanon and Jordan (World Food 
Program 2014).
When CT is unrestricted, there remains the eternal question of whether 
beneficiaries will spend it appropriately. While little evidence has been 
found of inappropriate use of benefits, Bailey and Harvey (2015: 3) 
acknowledge that “the fungibility of cash means that grants may free up 
other income to be spent anti-socially and people are unlikely to tell survey 
enumerators about antisocial spending.” They go on to note, however, 
that “[d]oubts that recipients would use assistance wisely suggest some 
troubling biases within the international humanitarian community about 
how they view the people that they assist.” More to the point, in the con-
text of this study, the same authors note that access to cash can have non-
economic benefits.
There is also an aspect of dignity—both in the choices it provides and in how it 
can be provided. Using an ATM or getting cash on a mobile phone is more 
dignified than queuing for a sack of maize. People experience devastating 
repercussions from disasters and their options on how to deal with these are con-
strained. While it would be a stretch to say that assistance is empowering in 
those circumstances, recipients commonly report that cash provides a sense of 
normality.
A similar view was echoed in the European Commission’s report 
cited above:
Those directly affected by conflict, disaster and displacement are often best 
placed to decide what they need. People can derive a sense of dignity and control 
over their situation through the provision of support through established, sys-
tematised (often cash-based) channels. (European Commission 2019: 31)
As we have noted repeatedly, dignity matters. So does normality. The 
dignity that comes from paying one’s own way and being seen to do so—
even if the money comes from humanitarian assistance—draws the link 
between the short-term focus on “alleviation of suffering” and the more 
general principles of market citizenship that have been at the heart of our 
analysis. Even if their presence is to be temporary, social and economic 
elements of market citizenship are increasingly what are proposed to the 
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recipients of humanitarian aid. In the context of this ephemeral social con-
tract, assisted subjects are to be brought one small step closer to the ideal 
of self-reliant citizens by use of market instruments. Rather than being 
protected from the market by in-kind distribution and the provision of 
services, internationally displaced persons and other victims of humanitar-
ian crises are to be empowered within it.
Desiring such outcomes is one thing: bringing them about quite 
another. As we noted in the case of the local programs analyzed in Chap. 4, 
the design and implementation of CT largely determines how they are 
perceived and whether they make any contribution to the empowerment 
of individuals as market citizens. We turn back now to these questions in 
the case of CT for forced migrants in Turkey.
2  casH transfer for refugees in turkey
It is in light of these changing approaches to humanitarian assistance that 
we can situate the response to the forced migration of several million 
Syrians into Turkey. The proximate cause of action, however, was the 
political crisis triggered in the EU in 2015 and 2016 by the possibility of 
onward movement into the EU of these migrants. The design and imple-
mentation of the CT program, which provides the focus of Chap. 6, were 
clearly marked by these circumstances.
2.1  Turkey, the European Union, and the Syrian 
Migration Crisis
The Syrian civil war led to forced migration, with refugees arriving in the 
neighboring countries of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey starting in 2011 
and accelerating quickly in the following years (See Table 5.1).
The initial reaction of the Turkish government was to decline interna-
tional assistance, preferring to cope with the situation on its own 
(Memisoglu and Ilgit 2016; Gökalp Aras and Şahin-Mencütek 2016). 
This changed as the number of displaced persons mounted quickly over 
the course of 2012. The Turkish government realized that the cost of 
hosting refugees would be higher than projected. Public discontent linked 
to the presence and expense of refugees also increased (Kale et al. 2018). 
Turkey requested aid from United Nations, and was included in the UN’s 
regional response plan. The Turkish government did not initially allow 
international agencies access to refugees camps; donors in turn declined to 
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provide assistance in the absence of oversight, preferring to work through 
NGOs rather than governmental agencies (Memisoglu and Ilgit 2016). As 
refugees began to move out of camps, Turkish and international NGOs 
offered different types of ad hoc assistance. Some of these were quite 
extensive: according to research carried out by Yılmaz (2019: 728): “the 
Human Relief Foundation, a faith-based humanitarian NGO based in 
Turkey, distributed food on religious holidays reaching more than 80,000 
households during the Muslim feast of sacrifice in 2015.” Even so, the 
impression left by this early period was largely one of incoherence. In the 
words of an official of DG-ECHO:
Aid in response of the Syrian emergency was initially uncoordinated. Different 
agencies offered different types of ad hoc assistance such as food, clothing or even 
in one case distributing washing machines.8
This situation was altered radically by the direct involvement of the 
European Union starting in 2015. The initial context of EU-Turkey nego-
tiations on immigration questions, as discussed in Chap. 3, was Turkey’s 
long-standing candidacy for EU membership, which had contributed to 
the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP). A turn-
ing point for EU member states came when the Syrian conflict triggered 
large-scale secondary migration toward Europe (see Table 5.2). In response 
8 Interview, 2019.
Table 5.1 Registered 
Syrian refugees in Turkey
Year (January 1) Number
2012 9500
2013 148,441
2014 559,994
2015 1,552,839
2016 2, 503,549
2017 2,274,500
2018 3,424,237
2019 3,622,366
2020 3,575,369
Source: UNHCR: Operational por-
tal—Syrian Refugee Response—
Turkey. https://data 2.unhcr.org/
en/situations/syria/location/113
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to this new development, various member states put in place radically dif-
ferent policies with respect to migrants and asylum seekers ranging from 
Germany’s decision to accept several hundred thousand Syrians to the dec-
laration by others that none could be taken at all (Batalla Adam 2017). 
Attempts to close the EU’s external border led to a surge in irregular 
crossing attempts concentrated on the Greek islands in the Aegean sea.
The refugee crisis on the Greek Islands in 2015 was the proximate 
cause of urgent negotiation between EU member states and the govern-
ment of Turkey.9 Media attention to this situation reached a symbolic peak 
with the widespread diffusion in September 2015 of the picture taken on 
a Greek beach of the body of a child who had drowned while attempting 
to cross with his family from Turkey. Pressure on European governments 
from public opinion made action necessary, but it was evident that this 
same public opinion ruled out any significant reopening of European bor-
ders. The only remaining options required increased cooperation 
from Turkey.
The starting point for negotiation was the Readmission Agreement 
between Turkey and the EU signed on 16 December 2013 and ratified by 
9 For details on the negotiations themselves, in which a leading role was taken on the 
European side by leaders of the German and Dutch governments, see Smeets and 
Beach (2020).
Table 5.2 Total arrivals 
of migrants to Greece (all 
nationalities; all statuses; 
all routes)
Year Total arrivals
2014 43,318
2015 861,630
2016 177,234
2017 63,310
2018 50,508
2019 74,613
Source: UNHCR—Operational portal—
Mediterranean Situation—Greece. 
https://data 2.unhcr.org/en/situa-
tions/mediterranean/location/5179
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all parties in November 2014.10 It committed Turkey to readmit any per-
son who “illegally and directly entered the territory of the member state 
after having stayed on or transited through the territory of Turkey” (Art. 
4.1.c), and imposed reciprocal obligations on the EU (Art. 6.1.c). 
Originally, the Agreement was due to come into effect in November 2017.
Renewed talks resulted initially in the EU-Turkey “Joint Action Plan” 
(JAP) of October 2015, through which the parties agreed to “supporting 
Syrians under temporary protection and their host communities in 
Turkey” and to “strengthening cooperation to prevent irregular migra-
tion flows to the EU.”11 Acknowledging that Turkey had, to that point, 
spent over €7 billion of its own resources in dealing with the crisis, the 
JAP proclaimed the “intention” of the EU to mobilize “substantial and 
concrete new funds” (European Commission 2015a: 1). This was con-
firmed the following month with the commitment of up to €6 billion 
through the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT).12 This was followed 
by the decision taken at the EU-Turkey summit of November 2015 and 
ratified by the European Council in March 2016 to move up implementa-
tion of the readmission agreement to 1 June 2016.13 The JAP also com-
mitted Turkey to “pursue the progressive alignment of Turkish visa policy, 
legislation and administrative capacities notably vis-à-vis the countries rep-
resenting an important source of illegal migration for Turkey and the EU” 
(3). In practice, this meant closing Turkey’s land border with Syria, and 
imposing visa requirements for all Syrian citizens seeking to enter Turkey 
by sea or air, which was done over the course of 2016. A final step was 
taken with the Joint Statement of 16 March 2016, which announced that: 
“All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as 
from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey” and that “For every 
10 The formal title of the agreement was: AGREEMENT between the European Union 
and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorization. 
(Official Journal of the European Union 7.5.2014—L 134/3).
11 The JAP alluded to the possibility of liberalizing visa-free admission to the EU for 
Turkish citizens under the rubric of “commitments taken in other contexts” but made no 
further statement on the topic. The Joint Statement of 16 March 2016 stated the intention 
of the two parties that visa-free entry into the EU for Turkish citizens be effective as of June 
2016. No more was heard of this, however, following the failed military coup in Turkey of 
July 2016.
12 Articles 4 and 9 of the Commission Decision (C (2015) 9500) as amended by the 
Commission Decision of 10 February 2016.
13 European Council Decision (EU) 2016/551 of 23 March 2016. Official Journal of the 
European Union 9.4.2016—L 95/9.
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Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will 
be resettled from Turkey to the EU”14 (European Council 2016: 1).
Analysis of these negotiations and agreements, even in academic publi-
cations, has often taken a distinctly polemic tone highlighting—depend-
ing on the authors’ point of view—the failure of EU member states to 
honor their obligation under international law to accept asylum seekers 
(Aka and Özkural 2015) or the inadvisability of cooperation with the illib-
eral Turkish government (Martin 2019). For our purposes, however, what 
was done and how it was publicly justified matter more than what the 
underlying motives might have been. We propose, accordingly, to take 
seriously the stated reasons given for the policy instruments that followed 
from the JAP and the subsequent FRiT. Whether or not these reflected the 
true motives of governments, the reasons for action given in public state-
ments and official documents that established the FRiT provided the stan-
dard by which the programs it funds would later be evaluated.15 Of 
particular importance in this context, is the JAP’s statement that:
Priority will be given to actions providing immediate humanitarian assis-
tance; provision of legal, administrative and psychological support; support for 
community centers; the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in 
economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey; improved access 
to education at all levels; but also actions supporting host communities in areas 
such as infrastructures and services. (European Commission 2015a: 1)
“Enhancement of self-sufficiency, participation in the economy, social 
inclusion:” these are goals familiar from our discussion of CT programs 
and humanitarian assistance. They are also, we might add, at the philo-
sophical core of the market citizenship model, which is explicitly being 
applied here to forced migrants. Notwithstanding the all-important quali-
fier “during their stay in Turkey,” with its reminder of the persisting 
uncertainty with respect to status, these are the public commitments 
according to which we propose to analyze and assess the Emergency Social 
Safety Net. Other possible motives such as the desire to keep refugees out 
14 The legal status of the EU-Turkey joint statement has been a matter of some contro-
versy. The General Court of the European Union ruled in February 2017 that to the extent 
that a binding international agreement was made, the parties to it are the individual member 
states and not the EU as an institution. (General Court of the European Union: press 
release 19/17).
15 For the distinction between motives and reasons, see Majone (1992).
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of Europe are relevant only to the extent that they had an impact on pro-
gram design or implementation.
A direct consequence of the negotiations and agreements discussed 
above was an order-of-magnitude increase in EU financial assistance to 
Turkey, formalized by the establishment of the FRiT with an initial budget 
of €3 billion—€1 billion from the EU’s general budget and €2 billion in 
contributions from member states (European Commission 
2015b; European Court of Auditors 2018)—committed in 2016. Projects 
focused on six priority areas: humanitarian assistance, migration manage-
ment, education, health, municipal infrastructure, and socioeconomic 
support. On 28 June 2018, the European Council agreed to launch a 
second €3 billion tranche of the Facility, using exclusively resources from 
the EU’s own budget.16 This second tranche funds projects running 
through mid-2025. As of early 2020, all operational funds from both 
tranches had been committed, €4.7 billion contracted, and €3.2 billion 
disbursed.17
As a trust fund to which both the European Union and its member 
states pledged contributions, the FRiT was governed by a steering com-
mittee containing a representative from each member state and two from 
the European Commission.18 As we will see below, however, all spending 
from the FRiT was channeled through agencies of the European 
Commission and subject to their diverse rules and practices. Humanitarian 
aid was managed by the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 
(DG-ECHO), while other types of assistance (for health and education 
programs, for example) was provided through the preexisting Instrument 
for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) administered by the Directorate General 
for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG-NEAR). It is in 
the first category that we find the cash-transfer program that is at the heart 
of our empirical analysis, the Emergency Social Safety Net, or ESSN.
16 Commission Decision of 14 March 2018 on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey amend-
ing Commission Decision C(2015) 9500 as regards the contribution to the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey. Official Journal of the European Union—2018 C 106.
17 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood enlargement/sites/near/files/frit_factsheet.pdf.
18 Commission Decision C(2015) 9500, as amended by Commission Decision 
C(2016) 855.
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2.2  ESSN: A Multiagency Effort
Like all EU humanitarian aid, the ESSN was placed under the overall 
responsibility of the Directorate General for Civil Protection and 
Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG-ECHO), which acted as the pro-
gram’s funding agency. It was not possible, however, for funds to be trans-
ferred directly to Turkish government agencies.19 On-site implementation, 
accordingly, was delegated to the UN’s World food Program (WFP) 
working in partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC). Various 
agencies of the Turkish government played key roles in administering the 
program.
These actors came together in a steering committee cochaired by repre-
sentatives of DG-ECHO and the Turkish government—the latter role 
filled initially by Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) 
and subsequently by the directorate for International labor of the Ministry 
of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MoFLSS). Day-to-day coordination 
was provided by a Joint Management Cell bringing together representa-
tives of the TRC and the WFP country team. While participants underlined 
the importance of these fora, a representative of DG-ECHO20 noted that 
coordination remained limited, and that, unlike assistance efforts for Syrian 
refugees in Jordan or Lebanon, no “humanitarian country team” covered 
all ongoing projects. From all participants interviewed came the clear 
impression that ESSN was unprecedented in its scope and duration, as well 
as in the number and diversity of participating agencies. Its dual origin as 
both response to a humanitarian emergency and political agreement to pre-
vent onward migration were also recognized by European officials inter-
viewed. For all of these reasons a closer look at the points of view, but also 
the prior experience, of key participants is of central importance if we are to 
understand how the program was designed and implemented in practice.
2.2.1  The European Union
A first critical observation is that the EU cannot be seen as a unitary actor. 
Initial negotiations and decisions that led to the establishment of the 
FRiT, from which funding for the ESSN was drawn, were the exclusive 
province of the Union’s political leaders (Smeets and Beach 2020). Only 
19 According to the EU’s humanitarian aid regulation (Reg. 1257/96) funding from 
DG-ECHO can only be transfered to international organizations or NGOs registered in the 
EU. This restriction was evoked spontaneously in multiple interviews by both Turkish and 
international officials.
20 Interview, 2019.
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after the JAP was finalized did the European Commission formally enter 
into the process. The Commission, however, remains a “multi- 
organization” (Cram 1994) whose component agencies vary in proce-
dures and internal culture.
With respect to the ESSN, the primary European interlocutor from its 
inception in 2016 through 2020 was DG-ECHO.  Its role within the 
Commission, dating back to before its promotion to a Directorate General 
in 2014, was strongly focused on short-term crisis response and emer-
gency assistance.21 As a distinct unit within the Commission since 1996, 
ECHO consistently sought to define its role in terms of the prevailing 
norms of humanitarian action. In terms of the debate alluded to in the first 
section of this chapter between an “emergency” and an “alchemical” 
vision, ECHO has clearly privileged the former since the early 2000s 
(Versluys 2008: 216). DG-ECHO was a party to the 2016 “grand bar-
gain” and has internalized the imperatives of localization and sustainabili-
ty.22 Even so, its perspective was self-consciously “humanitarian” and short 
term. DG-ECHO officials and staff  interviewed in both Brussels and 
Ankara insisted on the unusual nature of its involvement in a multiyear 
project. With regard both to CT and to localization, DG-ECHO posi-
tioned itself very much in the spirit of the times. Written into the Request 
for Proposals to potential implementing agencies was a requirement that 
the instrument retained for the ESSN should be multipurpose and uncon-
ditional, that requirements should be based on need, and that cash rather 
than food or vouchers should be distributed.23 In keeping with its short- 
term perspective, however, DG-ECHO’s embrace of localization increas-
ingly took the form of a search for “exit strategies” that would hand over 
responsibility to Turkish actors—an approach that put it at odds with 
some of the agencies in question.
Programs focused on health, education, and other “nonhumanitarian” 
initiatives were added to the activities of the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) administered by DG-NEAR, whose internal rules and 
culture differed significantly from those of DG-ECHO. Established as the 
vehicle for assistance to the states on the EU’s periphery, DG-NEAR 
focuses on development and capacity building programs carried out over 
21 The acronym ECHO initially referred to the European Community Humanitarian 
Office, created in 1996.
22 Interview, 2020.
23 Interview, 2020.
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years and decades. Its natural interlocutor is the national governments of 
partner states.
2.2.2  The United Nations’ World Food Program
The lead implementing agency selected by DG-ECHO through a com-
petitive bid process was the UN’s World Food Program (WFP). Conceived 
in the 1960s as a vehicle for using US agricultural surpluses as an instru-
ment of public diplomacy under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural 
Organization, the WFP has evolved into a full-fledged agency of the 
United Nations and has been characterized as “the world’s largest human-
itarian agency” (Shaw 2011). While its focus remains on emergency food 
assistance, it—unlike DG-ECHO—also participates in longer-term devel-
opment projects such as school nutrition programs. In the context of the 
ESSN, the WFP acted as a service provider, establishing and managing the 
system through which the resources made available by the EU could be 
distributed. It was also responsible for observing and evaluating program 
operations, and ensuring accountability to DG-ECHO in the latter’s role 
as funding agency. As of April 2020, the WFP’s role in the ESSN program 
ended, and the task of lead implementing agency was taken over by the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).
2.2.3  The Turkish Red Crescent
The Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) is an organization with over a century 
of experience in dealing with both natural and man-made disasters.24 It has 
574 branches spread across the country with 1,500 registered volunteers.25 
Like many national Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations, the TRC has 
close and legally defined links with its national government.26 While the 
TRC retains a partly independent status, it has been commissioned by the 
24 Founded in 1868 as the “Ottoman Red Crescent,” the TRC is one of the oldest national 
organizations in the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement—and is at the origin of the use of 
the crescent symbol for movement organizations in Islamic countries.
25 https://www.ifrc.org/docs/appeals/06/Logframes/Europe/TR/Prof.pdf.
26 Regulation of Turkish Red Crescent Society indicates: “Varlığı zamanla sınırlı olmayan 
Türkiye Kızılay Derneği Türkiye Cumhurbasķanının yüksek himayeleri altındadır.”  “the 
presence of Kızılay is not limited within a time period, working under the auspice of the 
Turkish presidency—author’s translation) https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/
eskiler/2009/02/20090219-1.htm. For national disaster response plan, see: https://www.
afad.gov.tr/turkiye-afet-mudahale-plani; For details of TRC funding, see:  https://www.
kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Editor/files/2019-YILI-DERNEKLER-BEYANNAMESI-GELiR-
GiDER.pdf 
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national disaster response plan (Türkiye Afet Müdahale Planı), through 
which it has a legal duty to provide humanitarian aid; it receives a portion 
of its financing directly from the state.27 Organizations such as this are 
accordingly sometimes classed as para-governmental or “quasi-NGOs.”
Critically, in the context of the ESSN, its close relationship with the 
Turkish government allowed it limited access to information maintained 
by Turkish authorities but denied because of national privacy legislation to 
the WFP or the EU.28 As explained by local TRC officials,29 the organiza-
tion had partial and closely controlled access to the Integrated Social 
Assistance System, into which had been put data on Syrians registered 
under temporary protection; it was possible for designated individuals to 
obtain the passwords allowing them to access telephone numbers of 
approved ESSN beneficiaries, but not detailed personal information or 
registered address.
2.2.4  Turkish Public Authorities
Central to the implementation of the ESSN was the Ministry of Family, 
Labor, and Social Services (MoFLSS), established in 2018 by merging the 
ministries of Labor and Social Security, and Family and Social Policies. Its 
core mission is to be an umbrella institution gathering the existing social 
assistance programs and social services as well as all the labor activities and 
social security related issues. Two of the ministry’s Directorates General—
in charge of social assistance and international labor force policies, respec-
tively—are particularly important for ESSN. Originally created in different 
ministries before the 2018 fusion, these Directorates General are seen by 
outside observers as maintaining distinct cultures and policy focus.30
The directorate General of International Labor Force was established in 
2016 within the Ministry of Labor and Social Security after international 
labor force law numbered 6735. Its institutional history goes back to 
2003. With the creation of Work Permit for Foreigners Law no 4817 
dated 2003, it was established under General Directorate of Labor as 
Department of Work Permits for Foreigners. In the context of our case, it 
plays two critical roles. A representative of the Directorate cochairs the 
27 https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Editor/files/2019-YILI-DERNEKLER-BEY-
ANNAMESI-GELiR-GiDER.pdf; https://www.afad.gov.tr/turkiye-afet-mudahale-plani.
28 This restriction is a consequence of the Personal Data Protection Law (Law number: 
6698 of 2016). The importance of this exclusive access to official data was evoked in mul-
tiple interviews.
29 Interview, 2019.
30 Interview, 2019.
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ESSN steering committee. It also manages procedures for the granting of 
work permits.
The Directorate General of Social Assistance (Sosyal Yardımlar Genel 
Müdürlüğü) develops and coordinates poverty reduction and social assis-
tance policies. In the context of ESSN, this unit maintains the database of 
participants. It is also coordinates the activities of the 1,003 local SASFs. 
These, in turn, play a key role as frontline agencies in contact with ESSN 
beneficiaries, processing approximately 65% of applications—the remain-
der being handled by the TRC. As noted in previous chapters, SASFs are 
locally governed bodies. Their autonomy creates the potential for differ-
ent local implementation strategies, a point stressed by grassroots workers 
of the WFP and TRC.31 From the point of view of national officials, this 
arm’s length approach allowed the government to benefit from the local 
information held by the district foundations, as well as from their sensitiv-
ity to local social conditions.32
With respect to the evolution of social support for refugees, we will see 
in Chap. 6 that while the DG for Social Assistance has emphasized inte-
grating the most vulnerable refugees into the Turkish social assistance sys-
tem, the DG for International Labor Force has looked more to labor force 
participation as a medium-term solution.
Other Turkish public actors involved in the ESSN include the Disaster 
and Emergency Management of Presidency (Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi 
Basķanlıgı̆—AFAD), whose role was particularly important at the outset 
of the crisis, both in managing camps and, as cochair of the ESSN govern-
ing board, provided “oversight and strategic direction” for ESSN. The 
Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM) has sole 
responsibility registration of forced migrants and certifies temporary or 
international protection status. As of 10 September 2018, UNHCR 
stopped registering and making referrals of foreigners wishing to apply for 
international protection in Turkey.33 As of the end of 2019, DGMM was 
also responsible for centralizing the required address registration for per-
sons under temporary or international protection.
31 Multiple interviews, 2019, 2020.
32 Interview, 2020. 
33 For all information in this paragraph WFP Turkey – ESSN Fact Sheet, December 2017: 
https://data 2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/62208.
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2.3  ESSN: Product of Ambiguous Consensus
The variety of actors involved in the ESSN and the prominent role played 
by DG-ECHO and the WFP might lead us to conclude that we have here 
a near-perfect example of what Sassen (1999) has described as “de facto 
transnationalising of migration policy.” To the extent that ESSN goes 
beyond the control of migration to address the basic needs of the refugees 
settled in Turkey, we might go farther to characterize it as “transnational 
social protection” (Levitt et al. 2017). A more critical framing of this pol-
icy focuses on the EU’s decision to externalize migration management 
and border control (Üstübici 2019; Çetinoğlu and Yılmaz 2020). A politi-
cal bargain, in this view, allowed European states to avoid their obligations 
under international law to admit refugees, empowering the Turkish gov-
ernment in the process (Martin 2019). Assessing such assertions is not the 
purpose of this book. It is important, however, to consider the conse-
quences of the observation that, in the case of ESSN, a group of actors 
came together to design and manage a policy instrument, all the while 
differing in their definition of the problem to be solved, and on the poli-
cy’s ultimate goals. This dynamic is well captured by the concept of 
ambiguous consensus put forward by Palier (2004) to analyze situations 
in which broad support for the creation of an instrument does not coin-
cide with clear consensus on its justification or ultimate ends.
As set out earlier, a number of distinct sets of reasons can be ascribed to 
the various organizations involved in conceiving, funding, and implement-
ing ESSN, among them:
• Distributing humanitarian aid as a source of international prestige 
(for both Turkey and the EU)
• Preventing onward movement of migrants into the EU
• Distributing emergency humanitarian aid to ensure short-term sur-
vival of a large population of displaced people
• Ensuring the medium-term integration of forced migrants into their 
host society
• Facilitating the registration and control of migrants on 
Turkish territory
• Preparing and encouraging the return of migrants to their 
home country
We must be careful from the outset to avoid simplistic assumptions 
regarding how these reasons were distributed and how they interacted. 
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Most obviously, there is no monolithic “Turkish” or “European” point of 
view. Close observers of the ESSN note important differences of position 
within both Turkish and EU agencies.34 Nor is there an absolute divide 
between public agencies and nongovernmental organizations. The inter-
action of policy goals also proves complex. Some, such as imposing regis-
tration and preventing onward migration, may be complementary. In 
other cases, there are clear contradictions: medium-term integration into 
the host country’s economy and society versus return to the country of 
origin. Just as significant are differences in emphasis that, while not out-
right contradictions, nonetheless pose problems for coherence: the dis-
tinction between a short-term approach to humanitarian assistance and 
a longer-term view that blurs the lines between humanitarianism, domes-
tic social policy, and economic and social integration.
We will ask in Chap. 6, as we have throughout, whether and to what 
extent CT schemes can contribute to economic and social citizenship, 
understood not as a legal status but as the practical experience of integra-
tion into the society and economy of the place where one is residing. Our 
discussion of local cases in Chap. 4 strongly suggests that program design 
and implementation play a key role in determining the answer. A central 
question for the final chapter will be to determine to what extent the con-
tradictions and ambiguities highlighted above matter in this context.
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CHAPTER 6
The Consequences of Ambiguity: Designing 
and Implementing the ESSN
Abstract The stated purpose of the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) 
was to contribute to meeting the basic needs of the most vulnerable refu-
gees in Turkey. In the context of this book’s argument, we ask whether it 
achieved this goal but also whether and to what extent it contributed to 
extending elements of market citizenship to forced migrants. We conclude 
that while the ESSN’s CT program made a limited contribution to meet-
ing basic needs and empowering displaced persons as consumers, other 
elements of market citizenship, or even “denizenship,” are lacking. With 
regard to its explicit targets, the effectiveness of ESSN was limited by the 
ambiguities of its design, linked to the different priorities of the agencies 
involved, which exclude some vulnerable persons from the program. More 
broadly, very limited access to the formal labor market remained an obsta-
cle to fuller market citizenship.
Keywords Turkey • European Union • Syria • Refugee policy • ESSN 
• Outcomes
As detailed in the previous chapter, the humanitarian response to the 
emergency created by the mass forced migration of Syrians to Turkey, and 
the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) cash-transfer (CT) program in 
particular, were inextricably tied to the security-centered provisions of the 
broader EU–Turkey agreements. The ESSN, we concluded, is best 
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understood as the product of an ambiguous consensus, in which the vari-
ous parties agreed on the creation of a policy instrument, but did so for 
different reasons and with different medium-term ends. In this chapter, 
we explore the consequences of ambiguity. We note in particular that it 
contributed to important departures from the logic and ideals of market 
citizenship. Particularly important were security-based restrictions on par-
ticipation and an approach to determining need based on indicators gen-
erally recognized as imperfect. All of these, call into question the capacity 
of ESSN to function as a “citizenship approach to poverty” (Leisering 
2019) even in the limited sphere of market integration and Marshallian 
“social citizenship.” In ongoing debates concerning the program’s future, 
as seen in the chapter’s final section, we find further evidence that the 
underlying ambiguities inherent in its creation have yet to be resolved. 
Critical among these are tensions among policy agendas of various Turkish 
agencies focused, respectively, on incorporating Syrians under Temporary 
Protection (SuTP) into the Turkish economy, maintaining EU financial 
engagement for their social support, and encouraging repatriation to Syria.
1  From Uncoordinated initiatives to the essn
The ESSN, when it was established in 2016, built on the experience and 
incorporated tools and procedures pioneered by an earlier generation of 
CT programs for forced migrants. The order-of-magnitude increase in 
scale of budget and beneficiaries led to significant modification to this 
starting point, and generated procedures that marked the program 
throughout its existence.
1.1  CT Programs in the Initial Responses 
to the Syrian Emergency
Cash assistance to out-of-camp refugees prior to 2015 was provided 
largely by NGOs, but was often patchy geographically, and ill-coordinat-
ed.1 The Support for Life Association, a secular humanitarian NGO based 
in Turkey, implemented a CT program reaching approximately 54,000 
households from 2012 to 2016 (Yilmaz 2019: 728). The Danish Refugees 
Council distributed cash voucher to refugees in Şanlıurfa and Hatay in 
2014–2015. From an organizational standpoint, however, the most direct 
precursor of the ESSN was a program put in place for in-camp refugees by 
1 Interview, 2019
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the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) from 2012 to 2016. Its origins go back 
to 2007, when the TRC started to distribute food packages collected from 
donors wishing to honor the religious requirement to provide an offering 
(zekat) for breaking of the fast to the needy at the end of Ramadan. This 
initiative soon encountered logistical problems typical of in-kind distribu-
tion. Food packages are heavy, around 20 kg, which created problem of 
transportation and increased the need for distribution personnel. In 2011, 
TRC created the zekat kart (alms card) for Turkish citizens to replace 
food packages.2 This program was subsequently extended to Syrians. An 
important decision taken at the outset was to use a newly created vehicle 
the Kızılaykart (Red Crescent Card) for this purpose, rather than the 
existing zekat kart. Like the national PTT card, the Kızılaykart makes use 
of the capacity of chip-enabled smart cards to access multiple cash assis-
tance program at the same time. Operations began in October 2012 as a 
pilot in-camp food assistance project in partnership with World Food 
Program (WFP), AFAD, and Halkbank.3 Through this program, 65 TL 
per family member per month was provided via the Kızılaykart to all per-
sons in the camp, without any additional conditions. The Kilis Öncüpınar 
camp was chosen as location for the pilot project because the camp was 
built out of containers, not tents, which did not allow expansion and kept 
the population stable. The program was extended to 14 camps as of July 
2013, functioning as an e-voucher, with three shops designated in each 
camp and equipped with POS machine for payment.4 Initially, AFAD 
determined the shops where money could be spent; WFP transferred the 
funds, TRC distributed the Kızılaykart, and Halkbank produced the cards 
and inserted them into its financial systems.
In addition to addressing supply-side problems such as food spoilage 
that are typical of food distribution, the Kızılaykart helped to resolve 
demand-side issues such as cultural and dietary differences. After a year of 
regular but monotonous food distributions, these were near to causing 
revolt in the camps especially in Karkamıs ̧and Altınözü.5 An out-of-camp 
version of the program was launched in May 2015. The new plan was 
funded by WFP in four cities: Hatay, Antep, Urfa, Kilis, and then expanded 
to two more Osmaniye and Maras.̧ The Kızılaykart at that time  functioned 
2 Interview, 2020
3 Halkbank (people’s bank) is a public–private partnership of which the Turkish state owns 
a majority share.
4 E-vouchers enable recipients to make purchases up to the value of the voucher and are 
often for one-off use in designated stores, within a specified time frame.
5 Interview, 2019.
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as in the camps: usable only in designated shops.6 Between 2015 and 
2017, out-of-camp assistance was provided to approximately 300,000 
refugees (160,000 from the WFP/TRC out-of-camp Kızılaykart and 
140,000 through other NGO programs) (Maunder et al. 2018: 18).
1.2  Establishment and Implementation of the ESSN
An immediate outcome of the FRiT was a major reorganization of the 
actors and instruments of humanitarian assistance in Turkey. The estab-
lishment of the ESSN was intended to bring about not only an increase in 
the absolute amount of assistance but a consolidation and rationalization 
of these diverse initiatives.7 The result was the largest single program to 
come out of the FRiT, indeed the largest humanitarian project ever funded 
by EU. As stated in its program documents, the purpose of the ESSN was 
to contribute to ensuring refugees’ access to basic needs (food, non-food 
items, and services). A requirement of DG-ECHO from the outset was to 
use cash assistance as a vehicle of aid. Unrestricted and multipurpose cash 
was preferred to food vouchers or other more limited forms of assistance.8 
While not applicable to all situations, this was considered appropriate in 
Turkey because two critical conditions were met:
• Supply and distribution of basic needs items was not a problem
• There was a robust financial system in place (large banks with exten-
sive ATM networks)
The instrument selected as a vehicle for CT was the preexisting 
Kızılaykart, which was transformed as a result from a de facto e-voucher 
into an instrument for multipurpose cash. The choice of this vehicle was 
symbolically important, as a sign that programs for Turks and those for 
migrants remained distinct. ESSN payments are made using the Kızılaykart 
by agreement with Halkbank, contracted by the TRC  (Maunder et  al. 
2018). The TRC was put forward as the public face of this new program 
to avoid criticism by Turkish citizens for giving money to Syrians.9 Using 
the PTT card, universally identified with Turkish public programs, might 
6 Interview, 2020.
7 Interview, 2019.
8 Interview, 2020.
9 Interview, 2020.
 C. ARK-YILDIRIM AND M. SMYRL
119
create tension. Indeed, our experience of participant observation with 
TRC and WFP teams produced anecdotal examples of this sentiment from 
Turkish citizens encountered during the visits. Even the distinction 
between the two cards, let alone between Turkish and EU funding was 
not clearly understood, with several people expressing indignation that the 
TRC was helping Syrians rather than Turks.10
As of 2020, the Kızılaykart had become the common platform for a 
number of assistance programs. In addition to the ESSN, the card was 
used for targeted programs such as Conditional Cash Transfer for 
Education, which was launched in May 2017 and Adult Language Training 
was launched in 2019. It also kept its original function, dating back to 
2012, as a vehicle for in-camp food assistance.
Program Participants as of February 2020
In-Camp Food Assistance Program 54,700
ESSN 1,707,486
CCT for education 608,082
Source: Red Crescent Report February 2020 (http://platform.kizilaykart.org/tr/Doc/rapor/
KIZILAYKART_TR.pdf)
The operational rules of DG-ECHO imposed a number of the central 
design features of the ESSN. One of these, as discussed in Chap. 5, was 
the multiagency nature of the program. While DG-ECHO, acting in the 
name of the FRiT trust fund and its steering committee, played the role of 
the funding agency, implementation was delegated to the WFP in partner-
ship with the TRC. These, in turn, worked closely with Turkish authorities 
at both the national and local levels. Although it remained distinct, the 
ESSN was embedded in the infrastructure of Turkish national social assis-
tance. The National Integrated Social Assistance System (ISAIS), man-
aged by the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MoFLSS) 
became the national database of all ESSN participants. The 1,003 local 
Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASF) were the frontline 
agencies, processing applications and carrying out inspection visits.11
For practical reasons, the procedure for ESSN could not be identical to 
that used with Turkish citizens. For citizens, information about income 
10 Participant observation 2020.
11 https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/sygm/genel-mudurluk/sosyal-yardimlasma-ve-dayanisma- 
vakiflari/.
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(from official employment) and assets are already in the SAIS, allowing 
SASF boards, as we saw in the case of R, to assess applicants with respect 
to a predetermined “poverty threshold.” For refugees, whose income can-
not always be determined from data in the ISAIS as they may have income 
or assets outside of Turkey, the conditionality requirement of being unem-
ployed was retained. Those employed with a valid work permit or who 
own registered assets in Turkey are formally ineligible to receive assistance 
(WFP 2019a: 1). How strictly this prohibition was followed is not clear; 
one official of the WFP interviewed acknowledged it but noted that “we 
will give it less importance.”12
As with the domestic CT programs discussed in previous chapters, the 
operational logic of the ESSN is one of needs-based targeting. In a context 
of imperfect and incomplete information about actual needs, however, the 
best that could be done was to establish observable indicators of vulnera-
bility. Families wishing to participate in the program were required to 
submit an application form to the SASF of the district in which they are 
registered or, in certain districts where the Syrian population is particularly 
concentrated, to special offices set up by the TRC.
Formally, eligibility was determined by an assessment of economic vul-
nerability based on six demographic criteria, any one of which was consid-
ered sufficient to qualify a family without employment for ESSN.
• Elderly headed households if no other adults are present
• Single headed household with at least one child under 18
• Single women
• Families with 4 or more children
• Families with 1 or more disabled members (at least 40% disability)
• Families with a dependency ratio of 1.5 and above
The decision as to whether a family meets one or more of these criteria 
was taken by the board of trustees of the district SASF. Families who quali-
fied through the demographic criteria were subsequently visited by home 
inspection teams from the SASF, as in the case with Turkish families 
requesting social assistance. 
12 Interview, 2019.
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As of early 2020, the ESSN was used by over 1.7 million beneficiaries, 
selected from a pool of 2.7 million applicants.13 A great majority (89%) of 
these is Syrian, but other nationalities are present as well: Iraq (6.9%), 
Afghanistan (3.4%), and Iran (0.2%). In light of these numbers, and of the 
fact that the Syrian migration was the precipitating event for the creation 
of ESSN there is a tendency, which we share, to refer generally to ESSN 
recipients as SuTP or simply “Syrians.” Just over half, (51.3%) are women 
(IFRC July 2020). The population of beneficiaries is predominantly 
young, with 60% under 18. Persons 18–59 years of age make up 37% of 
beneficiaries, while those 60 and over are only 3% (IFRC 2020). Of fami-
lies receiving the card, the largest number qualified through having at least 
four children (41.7%) followed by families with a dependency ratio above 
1.5, which make up 26.3% of households. Households with single-parent 
families with no other adults living in the household make up 14.13%. 
Households with at least one disabled person make up 9.2% of beneficia-
ries (IFRC, July 2020). Some families may fall into more than one of these 
categories. An additional 7.497 households, or 2.4% of the total, live in 
families that do not fit the formal demographic criteria and are included at 
the discretion of local Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (IFRC, 
July 2020). The largest number of participants was found in Gaziantep 
(13.9%), Istanbul (12.2%), and Şanlıurfa (10.2%). The total amount spent 
on the ESSN Program had reached €1.4 billion as of June 2020 (TRC 
2020) out of a potential budget of €1.725 billion.14
Participants in the program received the Kızılaykart, topped-up each 
month by 120 TL per family member.15 Beneficiaries may receive an addi-
tional quarterly payment. For families that include severely disabled per-
sons, this payment was 600 TL (WFP 2019b). The card could be used at 
any ATM machine in order to withdraw cash or to make purchases using 
a point of sale (POS) machine. The beneficiaries of each card were regis-
tered and identified by name. The identity of the cardholder was verified 
13 Except as otherwise noted, all data in this paragraph are taken from the Turkish Red 
Crescent Refugee Center Directorate Report, February 2020. http://platform.kizilaykart.
org/en/Doc/rapor/ESSN_ENG.pdf. http://platform.kizilaykart.org/en/Doc/rapor/
ESSN_ENG.pdf
14 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6212
15 See introduction for discussion of currency conversions. For the reasons set out there, 
we continue in this chapter the practice of defining assistance payments exclusively by their 
value in TL.
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initially by a physical check and then monthly by telephone.16 Each month 
the MoFLSS updated its list of beneficiaries. A WFP/TRC Joint 
Management Cell checked this for any problem, such as double registra-
tion. The card was blocked if an attempt was made to use it outside the 
country or if the monthly check did not confirm the presence of the card-
holder. The card could also be canceled if it went unused for 6 months or 
more. Once the list was verified every month, it was forwarded to Halkbank 
for payment.17
The ESSN’s immediate objective as stated by a 2018 independent eval-
uation report produced for the WFP was to “stabilize or improve living 
standards of the most vulnerable out-of-camp refugee households” 
(Maunder et  al. 2018: iv). By this standard, the report found positive 
outcomes:
ESSN beneficiaries are better off in terms of food security as measured by their 
food consumption score, while the food security of non-beneficiaries has declined. 
Debt has reduced after transfer for beneficiaries, with average debt per adult 
equivalent falling by TL 57 among beneficiaries and rising by TL 81 among 
non-beneficiaries. (29)
The distinction made between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, 
however, suggests an obvious question: why are families with deteriorat-
ing nutrition and rising debt not included in the program? The reasons for 
this, it turns out, were embedded in design elements of the ESSN to which 
we turn our attention in the following section.
2  Who is eligible? Problems oF registration 
and targeting
On the most immediate level, the ESSN clearly made an important 
positive contribution. But did it meet its larger goals? As expressed by 
the WFP:
WFP Turkey’s Transitional Interim Country Strategic Plan builds on WFP’s 
partnership with the Government of Turkey and other stakeholders to contrib-
ute to refugee households’ ability to meet their basic needs, ensuring no vulner-
able refugee is left behind. (WFP 2019b)
16 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_19_6212
17 Interview, 2019.
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More generally, as set out in the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP), 
the broader effort of which it was a part sought to promote integration of 
SuTP through “the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participation in the 
economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey” (European 
Commission 2015: 1). This objective brings us back to our central ques-
tion: do CT instruments contribute to market citizenship? The situation 
of SuTP, we have argued, presents a particularly challenging test for the 
hypothesis that they might do so, since this is a case in which elements of 
Marshallian social citizenship would be provided in the absence of civil or 
political citizenship. Our discussion of “denizenship” in Chap. 2 suggests 
that this is not impossible, but did it happen in this case?
We suggest in the pages that follow that a number of obstacles have 
hindered progress in this direction. Central among these is the political 
imperative behind the 2015 deal, which was to stop the flow of undocu-
mented migrants into the EU. The result of these original conditions can 
be seen in two of the program’s central features, the dependence on 
demographic criteria for eligibility and the link between eligibility and 
registration. Each has proven to be a barrier both to the short-term goal 
of “ensuring no vulnerable refugee is left behind” and to the broader 
objectives of social and economic inclusion set out in the JAP. These bar-
riers are not a question of “theory and practice” or of “implementation 
failure” but, just as in the local cases studied in Chap. 4, of program 
design. In this context, the ESSN’s shortcomings are just as instructive as 
its successes. Both help to improve our understanding of the requirements 
for CT to contribute meaningfully not just to short-term survival but 
more importantly to broader and more sustainable social integration as a 
“citizenship approach to poverty” (Leisering 2019).
2.1  Enforcing Security Priorities through Registration
Ensuring that migrants did not attempt to enter Europe required that they 
be identified and fixed in place within Turkey. The requirements of the 
ESSN reflect this political imperative. Two distinct types of official regis-
tration are required in order to be eligible for ESSN18:
• All family members must be registered under temporary or interna-
tional protection status.
18 https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000104792/download/
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• All family members must have a residence registration in a city where 
they are permitted to live.19 If members of the family are registered 
in different cities, they are not allowed to get ESSN. To obtain resi-
dence registration, families must prove that they have a legally recog-
nized address.
Prior to 2016, the Turkey–Syria border could be freely crossed. The 
procedure for Syrians seeking TPS was to approach the Provincial 
Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM) in the province where 
they settled. Applicants were asked to submit any available Syrian identity 
documents. In the absence of documents, Turkish authorities would pro-
vide registration based on the testimony of protection seekers (Özer 2015; 
Batalla and Tolay 2018) According to Baban et al. (2017: 91) the registra-
tion process was initially “chaotic” as different government offices applied 
“contradictory criteria” in registration, and the speed of registration var-
ied among government offices. In the summer of 2015, the Turkish gov-
ernment sought to address this by issuing new identity cards for migrants, 
which caused delays in registration.
A major change to this process came in 2016, when Turkey moved to 
close its borders and imposed visa requirements for all persons coming 
from Syria, as well as to citizens of 18 additional countries entering into 
Turkey by air or sea.20 The border closing was an explicit provision of the 
2015 EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan (JAP), which stated that:
In line with the Visa Roadmap requirements, pursue the progressive alignment 
of Turkish visa policy, legislation and administrative capacities notably vis-à- 
vis the countries representing an important source of illegal migration for 
Turkey and the EU. (European Commission 2015)
The registration of migrants into the Turkish migration system is also 
required under the JAP. The March 2016 EU-Turkey statement empha-
sized the “achievement” of Turkish border control implementation such 
as “the introduction of new visa requirements for Syrians and other 
19 Migrants with International protection status, can live only in so-called satellite ci,ties 
according to the regulation of the implementation of LFIP article 3/hh. These are 51 small 
Turkish cities, which are outside of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.
20 Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Eritrea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Uganda. https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-12/third_
progress_report_on_turkey_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_en_0.pdf
 C. ARK-YILDIRIM AND M. SMYRL
125
nationalities, stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and 
police and enhanced information sharing.” Construction of a border wall 
began in 2016 and was completed in June 2018 (Batalla and Tolay 2018).
The 2016 migration reform also brought changes for SuTP already in 
Turkey. The registration process changed again and new restrictions on 
mobility were applied. According to this change, Syrians will get services 
and assistance only in the city where they were registered. Persons wishing 
to change their province of residence must apply to the provincial direc-
torate of migration management in the province where they first regis-
tered in order to obtain permission to move to another. They must then 
apply to the PDMM of the new province to obtain a new ID card (Baban 
et al. 2017). Unauthorized travel can cause cancelation of status and loss 
of rights to social assistance.21
For families seeking assistance from the ESSN, registration under the 
rules of temporary or international protection is only a first step. Eligibility 
for the ESSN also requires all members of applicant families to have a legal 
proof of address in a single location. Obtaining this requires that the resi-
dence itself be recognized by local authorities. This poses a serious prob-
lem for those who cannot register their address into Turkish System. As a 
WFP grassroots official indicated to us, refugees who cannot afford to pay 
formal house rent and are living in informal housing without an official 
street address and/or not officially recognized by authorities as residential 
property.22 WFP data suggests that such informal lodging includes tents, 
containers, unfinished buildings, shops, warehouses, and even caves (WFP 
2017). Solutions to problems like this can only come from circumventing 
the system: according to another WFP official, local authorities will some-
times assign addresses to refugee families in order to allow them to regis-
ter. However, this is dependent on local authorities’ willingness.23 
Changing address poses a challenge. TRC puts payments on hold until 
the new address has been validated. This can force refugees to put up with 
abusive landlords or rent increases in order not to lose benefits (Maunder 
et al. 2018). Further complicating the situation, Istanbul and nine Syrian 
borders’ cities—Adana, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaras,̧ Kilis, Mardin, Mersin, 
Osmaniye, Şanlıurfa, and Hatay—stopped registering new refugees in late 
21 https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/suriyelilere-yol-izin-belgesi-uyarisi-Jdnxk5PTCkq 
TKOx6q7-KyA
22 Interview, 2019.
23 Interview, 2019.
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2017 or early 2018.24 Even for those already registered elsewhere in 
Turkey, relocating to Istanbul was stopped in 2018.25 Citing the increas-
ing population, the Istanbul Governor’s Office announced that people 
under temporary protection registered elsewhere than Istanbul province 
needed to return to other provinces where they are registered no later 
than 20 August 2019.26 According to the governor of Istanbul, this 
resulted in the departure of 97,255 Syrians from the city.27
The negative consequence of registration requirements on the ESSN’s 
ability to reach all of the most vulnerable refugees is recognized by both 
the EU and the WFP:
The programme did not sufficiently anticipate the challenges that unregistered 
households—who are also some of the most vulnerable—would face in becoming 
registered or include activities to address this. (Maunder et al. 2018: 18)
…despite substantial support to partners providing services directly (as a com-
plement to the large programmes using government systems), DG ECHO has 
not been able to ensure full service coverage to a significant portion of the refu-
gee population which is either unregistered, or registered and living outside its 
provinces of registration. (DG-ECHO 2019: ix)
From our perspective, two broader observations are relevant. The first, 
as we have argued, is that the registration requirements that proved prob-
lematic from a humanitarian perspective were an integral part of the pro-
gram’s larger rationality. The second is that the restrictions on movement 
are antithetical to a fundamental principle of market citizenship. Returning 
to Sen’s  (1981) logic of market entitlements, we noted in this book’s 
introduction that restrictions on what one can buy, where one can live, or 
whether and how one can work are barriers to market inclusion. The 
24 https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/16/turkey-stops-registering-syrian-asylum- 
seekers
25 https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-government-stops-relocating-syrians-to- 
istanbul-127084
26 https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbul-valiliginden-suriyeliler-ile-ilgili- -
onemli-aciklama-20-agustosa-kadar-sure-41281036. Implementation of this decision 
was not applied fully during the Covid-19 crisis, resulting in toleration of SuTP who would 
otherwise have been sent away from Istanbul province, but public assistance remains denied 
to such persons. (Interview, 2020)
27 https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbul-valisi-acikladi-97-bin-255-suriyeli- 
istanbuldan-ayrildi-41412205
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central place of such restrictions in the system design of the ESSN attests 
to the ambiguity of its inception: security concerns—both Turkish and 
European—influenced the life chances of refugees as or more than the 
JAP’s commitment to “the enhancement of self-sufficiency and participa-
tion in economy and their social inclusion during their stay in Turkey” 
(European Commission 2015: 1).
2.2  Identifying the “most vulnerable” through 
Demographic Criteria
A distinct issue in the design of the ESSN is the way in which assistance is 
allocated among those who have fulfilled the registration requirements 
discussed above. There are two distinct questions here: the decision to 
target aid to the “most vulnerable” rather than providing it to all regis-
tered refugees, and the specific means by which targeting is carried out. 
The first of these brings us back to the largely theoretical debate between 
the partisans of universal basic income and those of means-tested assis-
tance. For the former (Buğra and Adar 2008), any deviation from undif-
ferentiated treatment for all constitutes an affront to a rights-based model 
of ideal citizenship. The approach taken in practice by the “safety net” 
programs of Europe and North America relies on a different understand-
ing of universality, understood as a “right to protection against poverty” 
as opposed to a “right to a given benefit” (Leisering 2019: 57). Means- 
tested programs can, in this view, be conducive to social citizenship if they 
are targeted to those who need them most. How this targeting should be 
done, however, is not self-evident. In the case of the ESSN, it posed a 
number of practical problems.
The term “vulnerability” as a determinant of priority for assistance 
recurs in all official descriptions of the ESSN, whether from the EU or the 
implementation partners. The way in which vulnerability is determined, 
however, is an artifact of the program’s history. The assessment report 
prepared for the WFP states that: “the scale of the refugee crisis in Turkey 
and the objective of rapidly scaling-up to reach over a million refugees 
meant that the targeting approach needed to be capable of identifying a 
large a number of refugees in a short timeframe” (Maunder et al. 2018).
The EU’s final evaluation report details the initial informational chal-
lenges faced:
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DG ECHO and its partners planned and implemented their initial projects 
with limited data and severe time constraints. The only planning information 
available in early 2016 was a dated disaster and Emergency Management 
Presidency of Turkey (AFAD) study from 2013, and a patchwork of thematic 
or local academic studies and NGO surveys, none of which provided a full pic-
ture or at a level of detail useful for design and implementation of a large 
programme. Specifically, there was little disaggregated data available on 
women, children, elderly and disabled people. The EU’s Facility Needs 
Assessment (2016), itself decries the lack of data: “the lack of comprehensive 
data that has been collected and/or shared on demographics and vulnerabilities 
is also a serious hindrance to assessing needs and designing programs and inter-
ventions.” (DG-ECHO 2019: 13)
Even the initial scaling-up of the program was complete, the same 
assessment estimates that the “exclusion error” attributable to the use of 
the demographic criteria was on the order of 5% (14).
In principle, it might have been possible to overcome this imperfect 
targeting through direct inspection. For Turkish citizens, as we saw in the 
case of R, eligibility is based on individual assessment using both nation-
ally determined objective criteria—information in the ISAIS database and 
the “poverty score” calculated for each family—and locally organized on- 
site inspection carried out by the district SASF. An analogous procedure of 
on-site inspection was included in the design of the ESSN, with local 
SASFs once again tasked with carrying it out. An advantage attributed to 
this system by national officials, as we noted in the previous chapter, is the 
local knowledge provided by this decentralized system.
In practice, two important differences were evident between proce-
dures used for the ESSN and those for domestic policy. In the first place, 
initial assessments of eligibility depend for the most part on the demo-
graphic criteria, since the ISAIS does not contain complete information 
about refugees’ income or assets, and thus cannot be used to generate a 
“poverty score.” The only information initially available through the 
ISAIS is whether refugees have a valid Turkish work permit or own prop-
erty in Turkey, either of which eliminates them from ESSN eligibility 
(European Commission 2019: 3). Home visits for ESSN recipients were 
postponed until after they began receiving benefits—within 12 months of 
registration in order to ease the burden on the foundations (Maunder 
et al. 2018: 12). According to grassroots staff of the WFP, some founda-
tions do not carry out house visits at all, but instead summon the family 
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for an interview in the office of the SASF.28 Moreover, despite the pres-
ence of translators, cultural distance between Turkish social workers and 
forced migrants is necessarily greater than in the case of domestic pro-
grams. This goes beyond questions of nationality or language; the life 
experience of a long-term low-income resident of a Turkish community is 
self-evidently different from that of a family that has just gone through 
war and forced international migration. It seems reasonable to suggest, 
accordingly, that the advantage of using local agencies to assess vulnerabil-
ity is less in the case of forced migrants than for domestic populations, or 
at the very least that significant differences may exist among local SASFs in 
this respect.29
For families denied assistance, there is no formal appeals process: the 
only option is to begin a new application (Maunder et  al. 2018: 28). 
Claimants were not left entirely to their own devices, however. An infor-
mational call center was maintained by the TRC. While TRC staff could 
not revisit the decisions made by the SASF boards, they could advise 
claimants on how best to reapply and, in some cases, intervene on their 
behalf directly with the MoLFSS. If foundations reject applicants without 
examination, the ministry can intervene and advise the SASF to reconsid-
er.30 The boards have the final say in their districts, however; the minis-
try  can only advise. According to the IFRC website, as of April 2020, 
TRC’s ESSN hotline answered 1.2 million calls, sent more than 1.3 mil-
lion SMSs and reached out to more than 85,000 refugees thorough its 
multilingual Facebook page.31
Even in the absence of any appeal mechanism, solution can sometimes 
be found in order to overcome problems of eligibility. DG-ECHO esti-
mates an “exclusion error” of 5% and provides a discretionary allowance 
to district SASFs (DG-ECHO 2019: 14). This was created explicitly in 
order to find a solution  to the problem  that some vulnerable families 
would be excluded by the formal process. As of 2018, boards of trustees 
can decide to include some households (up to 5% of the total number of 
applications received by that SASF) that do not meet the demographic 
criteria (Maunder et  al. 2018; TRC 2018). From the perspective of 
national authorities, however, this did not constitute an absolute right for 
28 Interview, 2020.
29 Interview, 2020.
30 Interview, 2020.
31 https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/2020/04/28/5-ways-cash-assistance-transformed-humanitarian- 
response-refugees-turkey/.
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claimants; as noted earlier, eligibility determination remained under the 
authority of SASF boards, who could choose not to use it, leading to varia-
tion from one Foundation to another. For the frontline representatives of 
the WFP, failure to use the additional discretionary amount presented a 
problem. “When we see that they are not using their discretionary allow-
ance, we open an issue.”32 National-level officials had a different 
view, pointing out that it was important for the local foundations to main-
tain a reserve in the case of increased local demand. It was mistaken, in 
their opinion to consider the 5% as a target to be met.33 It remains, how-
ever, that the 5% discretionary allowance is neither a legal target for foun-
dations nor a right for recipients. Its use is left to the  judgment, or 
eventually the compassion, of the program’s implementors.
At an anecdotal level, stories of perceived inequities are easy to find. 
Although he personally was an ESSN beneficiary, a man encountered dur-
ing one of our participant observations indicated that “the real needy can-
not get assistance.” One Syrian woman ESSN beneficiary indicated her 
vulnerability by explaining:
I could not get card for a long time because I did not have a fourth child. I had 
difficulty to find enough to eat for me and my children. However, they did not 
give us the card. After, I had my fourth baby I got assistance. I was vulnerable 
at the time before this new baby. I should get the assistance at that time. I do not 
think that all vulnerable people benefit from this.34
From the perspective of this woman, many necessary expenses such as 
utility bills and rent are constant and not related with the number of refu-
gees. For those in the program, this issue is taken into account by the 
quarterly top-ups, which are proportionally larger for smaller families.35 
This cannot be applied, however, to a person such as this woman who does 
not qualify in the first place.
Beyond individual stories, a general limit to all such solutions is that 
they treat refugees not as holders of rights but as victims needing charity. 
The resulting logic of paternalism brings us back to our initial discussion 
of the justification for moving toward market-enhancing instruments of 
social support in the first place. These were meant to break the practice of 
32 Interview, 2020.
33 Interview, 2020.
34 Participant observation, 2019.
35 Interview, 2019.
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individuals being treated as helpless “pawns” by the all-powerful (even if 
altruistic) “knights” of the welfare state bureaucracy (Le Grand 2003). 
The blurred lines between state and nonstate actors in the case of ESSN 
do not obscure the fact that the “knights” are back in charge. Strengthening 
the elements of market citizenship in CT policy would require moving 
toward a regime with less scope for arbitrary decision. If we follow 
Leisering’s (2019: 57) logic of “universal protection against poverty,” 
promotion of equal rights is not incompatible with means-testing and tar-
geting benefits to the most vulnerable, but it would require these to be 
identified in a more objective manner.
3  From ambigUoUs consensUs to Uncertain FUtUre
We noted in Chap. 5 that the lines between humanitarian assistance and 
domestic social support are increasingly blurred. The case of ESSN illus-
trates that the reasons for this go well beyond the pragmatic altruism of 
the “New Way of Working.” Political context has a direct impact on policy 
design. The limits on eligibility explored in the previous section are direct 
consequences of this: a product of the short-term consensus that led to an 
instrument necessarily addressing both humanitarian and security 
concerns.
As the agreed programming period for the FRiT and the ESSN came to 
an end, unresolved questions at a more fundamental level emerged anew. 
Differences of interest between Turkey and the European Union are only 
the most obvious of these. Also important are ongoing tensions between 
different understandings of humanitarian assistance and, in particular, on 
what constitutes an “emergency.” Differences in priority were also evident 
among and within various Turkish and European agencies with respect to 
what form an “exit strategy” from ESSN should take. From ongoing 
debates at the time of this book’s writing, in the autumn of 2020, three 
possible scenarios could be discerned: one for continuing CT and two for 
transitioning away from it. For beneficiaries, however, what mattered most 
was the ongoing uncertainty perpetuated by the underlying divergences in 
priorities and principles among decision-makers.
3.1  CT as an Ongoing Necessity
As of the summer of 2020, virtually all of the €6 billion total budget of 
the FRiT had been committed. With the Syrian–Turkish border effectively 
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closed, the number of registered SuTP in Turkey was no longer increas-
ing.36 Did it follow that the emergency was over? From the perspective of 
DG-ECHO, the structure of ESSN mandated that the program be tempo-
rary. Faithful to this logic, DG-ECHO was preparing to end its role in the 
program by the end of 2020.
In line with long-standing humanitarian policies to promote local integration 
as a durable solution to displacement and more recent Turkish commitments to 
refugee solutions, DG ECHO’s exit strategy is premised upon the GoTR taking 
on (or continuing) service delivery, in some sectors with support from 
DG-NEAR, and eventually integrating refugees fully within Government sys-
tems. (DG-ECHO 2019: 20)
The support alluded to in this document took the form of a “top-up” 
of the ESSN from the EU’s 2020 budget (with the IFRC replacing the 
WFP as the implementing agency), followed by a grant to the Turkish 
MoFLSS of €245 million for continuation of social support to SuTP to 
begin in January 2021. In both cases, DG-NEAR was the designated EU 
funding agency.37 What if any EU funding might follow this was uncer-
tain. What seemed clear, on the other hand, was that ongoing support for 
forced migrants would be necessary into the indefinite future.
Our interviews, carried out in 2019 and 2020, found Turkish officials 
insisting on the importance of continued budgetary burden-sharing from 
the EU and contesting the relabeling of humanitarian assistance as devel-
opment aid. The clear, and unacceptable, implication of this shift in 
European vocabulary, from this perspective, was a significant decrease in 
financial support.38 This sentiment was acknowledged in Brussels: “We 
have a plan and a transition strategy. The Turks didn’t like this because 
transition implies exit, and end of EU support which they do not accept.”39
In the short term, the “transition strategy” proposed took the form of 
a support program modeled on the ESSN and using the same instrument, 
but aimed at beneficiaries deemed incapable of integration into the labor 
market. Significantly, there was disagreement between the EU and Turkish 
authorities as to what this program should be called. Officials of DG-NEAR, 
36 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113
37 Interview, 2020. The “top-up” amount was to be on the order of €485 million to be 
divided between ESSN and the Conditional Cash for Education program.
38 Interview, 2020.
39 Interview, 2020.
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who would be called on to administer it from the European side, referred 
to it as a “direct grant” to the Turkish government, thus marking the dis-
tinction with the original ESSN and its indirect funding mechanism and 
emphasizing the goal of eventually integrating aid to forced migrants into 
the Turkish domestic social welfare system.40  From the perspective of the 
MoFLSS, which would be called on to administer it, the program was bet-
ter called “complementary ESSN” or C-ESSN, to highlight the continuity 
of the program and the European commitment to funding it. This nomen-
clature was officially adopted as of January 2021.41 
This debate over labels was symptomatic of deeper disagreement over 
funding and, more generally, responsibility. Multiple interviews suggested 
that Turkish support for ESSN was inextricably linked to the Readmission 
Agreement. EU Burden-sharing, in this perspective,  must continue as 
long as the agreement remained in place.42
3.2  Beyond the Emergency: Two Contrasting “Exit Strategies”
Beyond the EU–Turkey tension over whether and how CT for SuTP 
should be more deeply integrated into the Turkish social assistance sys-
tem—and who should pay for it—two divergent strategies for more radical 
change illustrated the extent of uncertainty. Each of these sought to end 
the ESSN program as it had existed since December 2016. While one 
proposed to use support payments as incentives for SuTP to begin return-
ing to Syria, the second accepted the long-term presence of Syrians in 
Turkey and sought to support their integration into the labor force. In 
both cases, the existing CT system would be used both for transitional 
assistance and as an incentive for desired action.
40 h t tps ://ec .europa .eu/ne ighbourhooden la rgement/s i te s/near/f i l e s/
annexes/c_2019_5454_f1_annex_en_v2_p1_1040405.pdf.
41 This point was made in a public statement by the Vice President of the MoFLSS, as 
reported in Milliyet, 17 December 2020. https://www.milliyet.com.tr/ekonomi/abden-
turkiyedeki-siginmacilara-yonelik-780-milyon-euroluk-destek-6382340. The program 
under this new name was signed on that day and went into effect on 1 January 2021. 
https://www.kizilay.org.tr/Upload/Dokuman/Dosya/january-2021-syria-crisis-humani-
tarian-relief-operation-09-03-2021-41886931.pdf.
42 Multiple interviews, 2019 and 2020.
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3.2.1  CT as an Incentive for Repatriation
As of 2020, AFAD estimated that 150,000 Syrians had permanently 
returned to Syria since 2017 (in northern areas where there is a Turkish 
military presence).43 In a 2018 speech, President Erdoğan announced his 
government’s intention “…to secure all Syrian lands and ensure that all 
our guests return to their homes”44 While no significant move in that 
direction was evident in the two years that followed, the possibility of 
using the Red Crescent Card as an instrument for repatriation was evoked 
in a 2020 interview with a TRC official.
We can include a monetary incentive to return to Syria in the amounts trans-
ferred through the TRC card… we already used this kind of incentive to 
encourage people to move out of the camps. There are many PTT banks in Idlib 
and Afrin (in Syria), we can open more ATMs over there if needed. The people 
who go there can collect their cash. Return can become a condition. This is not 
an issue for this year, but for years to come. We are thinking about using TRC 
cards as part of a scenario for returning to Syria.45
This approach also sought explicitly to ground planning about forced 
migrants in the broader context of historic Turkish migration policy. The 
centrality of this was emphasized by officials, who insisted that ESSN must 
ultimately be compatible with the national migration system.46 While we 
have had occasion to note changes in the past decades, it remains that 
Turkish migration policy has never defined migrant integration from the 
perspective of creating a cosmopolitan community with equal rights. To 
date, efforts at longer-term integration have been limited to migrants of 
higher socioeconomic status or with Turkish ethnic or linguistic origins 
(Ark-Yıldırım and Özer-Yürür 2019). The explicit designation of migrants’ 
status as temporary, in this context, takes on renewed importance, and 
repatriation is put forward as a rational next step.
43 https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/some-150-000-syrians-have-returned-from- 
turkey-131108
44 Author’s translation of “Seçimin ardından tüm Suriye topraklarını güvenli hale getirmeyi 
ve misafirlerimizin tamamının evlerine dönmelerini sağlamayı hedefliyoruz.” https://www.
haberturk.com/ankara-haberleri/15742051-erdogan-secimin-ardindan-tum-suriye-topraklarini- 
guvenli- hale-getirmeyi-ve-misafirlerimizin.
45 Interview, 2020.
46 Interview, 2020.
 C. ARK-YILDIRIM AND M. SMYRL
135
3.2.2  CT and the Transition to Formal Employment
A very different “exit strategy” was also being considered by both Turkish 
and international agencies, one premised on the prospect of eventually 
integrating a significant Syrian population for the longer term through 
gradual inclusion in the Turkish labor market. This strategy was premised 
on accepting the longer-term presence of Syrians on Turkish soil and grad-
ually transforming them from recipients of aid into productive members of 
the economy. The 2018 “exit strategy from the ESSN program” report 
states that while direct assistance was required in the early phases of forced 
migration:47
it is considered that it is the right time to incline for SuTP to labour market in 
a formal way with better skills and competences. Thus, it is believed that depen-
dence of SuTP on social assistance will be lessened to a certain extent. Secondly, 
it is observed that SuTP are informally employed in the Turkish labour market. 
However, the entitlements derived from social assistance scheme makes transi-
tion from informality to formality more difficult. It is utmost necessary to man-
age a balance between conditions of social assistance scheme and formally 
employment for SuTP. (Presidency and MoFLSS 2018)
An initial €50 million package of active labor market measures was 
financed by the first tranche of the FRiT. Building on this base in the sec-
ond tranche of FRiT, DG-NEAR put together a package of measures col-
lectively worth €465 million as part of joint projects with  international 
partners and the Turkish Employment Agency (IŞ̇KUR) to help skilled 
and semi-skilled people improve job and language skills through voca-
tional training.  Initial projects signed in December 2019 involved 
Expertise France and  the International Center for Migration Policy 
Development (European Commission 2020: 12–13). This was intended 
to take its place in a gradual policy of transition through work incen-
tives. Although open in principle to all registered forced migrants, it was 
expected that this aid would go primarily to existing ESSN beneficiaries 
(Revel 2020: 7–8). The role of IŞ̇KUR, using a system already in place 
for Turkish citizens, is to act as a clearing house. Program participants, like 
47 Turkish and international officials interviewed suggested that this report represents 
above all the point of view of the Directorate of International Labor Force within 
the MoFLSS.
6 THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMBIGUITY: DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING… 
136
Turkish recipients of social aid, would go to IŞ̇KUR to apply for a formal 
job. For the first year of employment, CT would continue.48
Implementation of this policy, however, seemed problematic for a 
number of reasons; integration of labor does not depend only on the social 
aid mechanism. The overall employment rate in Turkey is relatively low 
and it is estimated that, for Turkish citizens, one-third of employment is in 
the informal sector. Under these conditions, the overall efficiency of 
IŞ̇KUR in matching Turkish workers with jobs has been limited (Yılmaz 
2019: 730). For refugees, an additional barrier is obtaining the right to 
work at all. Turkey granted Syrian under temporary protection the right to 
work only in 2016, but only subject to a number of conditions:
• To be eligible for formal employment a Syrian under temporary pro-
tection must have been registered in TPS for at least 6 months.49 For 
those under the conditional refugee status, the relevant date is six 
months after application.50 Only for those with legally recognized 
refugee or subsidiary protection status is the right to work perma-
nent. ID card serves as proof of this.51
• Employers must apply for work permit on behalf of any foreigners.
• For persons under TPS, work permits must be renewed annually.
• There is a quota for SuTPS in a given workplace: maximum 10% of 
total workers.52 An additional quota of 5% is available for persons 
under International Protection.53
• Foreigners are not allowed to work in certain professions (such as 
lawyers, veterinarian, etc.),54 others require prior official permission 
(health, education services providers).
48 Interview, 2020.
49 https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/media/6360/gecicikoruma.jpg.
50 www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/
51 www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/yabancilar/uluslararasi-koruma-saglanan-yabancilar/
52 http://calismaizni.gov.tr/calisma-izni-hakkinda/gecici-koruma/
53 https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahU
KEwi4xtTktsfsAhVvC2MBHXK5Dt4QFjABegQIAhAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fdata2.
unhcr.org%2Fen%2Fdocuments%2Fdownload%2F67638&usg=AOvVaw0DJkRlBPFi10
zQWVRbHlg9
54 https://www.ailevecalisma.gov.tr/uigm/calisma-izni/turk-vatandaslarina-hasredilen- 
meslekler/
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In addition, formal employment requires employers to pay at least min-
imum wage and make the mandatory social security contribution. In prac-
tice, the number of work permits issued remains limited. For all foreigners 
it increased from 17,466 in 2011 to 145,233 in 2019 (MoFLSS 2019: 
195), the last year for which data were available. This is still a small minor-
ity of a registered population of over 2 million SuTP of working age.55
Looking to the future, the scope of programs aimed at transitions to 
the formal workforce remains small compared to this potential population. 
Examples include a project by World Bank “Employment Support Project 
For Syrians Under Temporary Protection and Host Communities,”56 and 
one by the FAO “Better Job Opportunities For Syrians and the Host com-
munities,” which seeks to enhance the employment prospects of ESSN 
beneficiaries, but also of host country nationals. This is done by means of 
“certified vocational training courses in crop production, livestock and 
food sectors in the rural area,” but is projected to create only some 1500 
jobs.57 In the estimation of a WFP official,
Even IFRC has gone from talking about “graduating” people to employment to 
talking about “referring” them to employment, that’s the only commitment they 
are making—very few refugees have actually gotten work permits, employers 
also prefer informal employees.58
For this observer, this can be explained in part by economic conditions. 
“Construction is declining; the hospitality sector is also a big consumer of 
Syrian labor; so is the textile industry, which is also down.” The further 
downturn of the Turkish and international economy following the 
Covid-19 virus crisis of 2020 further weakened these same sectors. At the 
same time, financial and administrative barriers to formal employment 
persist, since employers must pay for work permit application. In practice, 
enforcement of the rules requiring workers to have an official permit is 
uneven. The European Commission, reports that 57% of ESSN beneficia-
ries and 67% of non-beneficiaries defined unskilled labor as their primary 
income source and estimates that between 750,000 and 950,000 Syrians 
55 https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638, accessed 17.04.2020.
56 https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/project/employment-support-project-syrians-under- 
temporary-protection-and-host- communities-7005
57 https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/news/better-job-opportunities-farming-syrians- 
and-host-communities-10098
58 Interview, 2020.
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worked in the informal sector as of 2018 (European Commission 2018: 
55; 71). The World Bank estimated that in 2020 86% of working-age per-
sons in the population of SuTP held some form of informal employment.
3.3  From Social Assistance to Market Citizenship
Bringing together these contrasting scenarios for the future of the ESSN 
allows us to regain a measure of critical and analytical distance from day- to- 
day operations of the program, and illustrates a number of more general 
points. From the humanitarian perspective, the tension between “emer-
gency” and “alchemical” approaches (Barnett 2011) discussed in Chap. 5 
is seen to be as much a question of organizational culture as of general 
philosophy, with DG-ECHO embodying the former approach while 
DG-NEAR, although avoiding the vocabulary of humanitarianism, was in 
effect promoting the second. To the extent that these lines were blurred in 
practice, this was a cause of expressed concern within both agencies, with 
officials from DG-ECHO emphasizing that “emergency assistance” could 
not go on indefinitely, while those from DG-NEAR stressed the impor-
tance of medium-term capacity building and systemic change.59
Where did this leave the recipients of aid? With onward migration ruled 
out for the foreseeable future and return to Syria at best a long-term objec-
tive, the question focused on their future within Turkey. Should social CT 
be seen as a permanent element in a “citizenship approach to poverty” or, 
conversely, is it at best a transitional element in a strategy focused on labor-
force participation? The debate over the future of the ESSN puts into stark 
focus both the limits and the imperatives of both options.
We have noted the disparate origins of the Directorates General for 
Social Services, on the one hand, and International Labor force, on the 
other hand. It is the viewpoint of the latter that is found in the “exit strat-
egy” report cited above.60 Here we find an emphasis on shorter-term entry 
into the labor force and concerns that ongoing CT will ultimately be a 
disincentive to work—a distant echo of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
debates over “outdoor relief.” This view was not universally shared, how-
ever. Others pointed out that, even if they reached their targets, projects 
for formal employment would provide work for a few thousand people, a 
tiny fraction of those potentially in need of jobs. In this perspective, 
59 Multiple interviews, 2020.
60 Multiple interviews, 2019, 2020.
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ongoing CT was a necessary element of the transition to meaningful par-
ticipation. 61
From this perspective, the priority was maintaining CT programs into 
the indefinite future, pinning hopes for inclusion on education and the 
gradual integration of multigenerational migrant families. With short- 
term access to the formal labor market extremely limited, only ongoing 
support through CT, in this view, could ensure that progress of this sort 
continued.
While diverging on means, however, these two approaches converge 
with respect to ultimate ends. The right and the means to engage in buy-
ing and selling—what CT programs at their best can ensure—is only one 
of the entitlements central to an active role in the market. The ability to 
work, Sens’s  (1981) “own-labor entitlement,” is just as important. 
Wanting work, however, is not the same as having legal access to it. So 
long as protecting the domestic labor market takes precedence over incor-
porating migrants into it, market citizenship is truncated. CT can empower 
individuals only as consumers, not as workers or producers.
Beyond this debate, and whatever “exit strategy” eventually emerges, a 
defining feature of the ESSN was ongoing uncertainty, and this was a prob-
lem in and of itself. Citizenship-like rights, even if based on a status that is 
formally defined as temporary, have meaning only if they are perceived as 
stable at least into the humanly relevant medium term—the time it takes to 
raise a family, to establish a business, to acquire employable skills. Leisering’s 
(2019: 320) assertion that CT can constitute a “citizenship approach to 
poverty” makes sense only in such a context. The very real prospect that 
the future of social support for SuTP may be a victim of the ambiguous 
consensus at the origin of the ESSN without being replaced by generalized 
access to the Turkish labor market means that this tenuous extension to 
forced migrants of the right to that “modicum of economic welfare and 
security” necessary “to live the life of a civilized being according to the 
standards prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950: 11) may prove fleeting.
Bringing these points together with those made earlier in this chapter 
should not blind us to the contribution made by the ESSN not only to the 
short-term survival but to the potential for market integration of forced 
migrants in Turkey. Making good on that potential, however, transform-
ing market-enhancing instruments of social assistance into elements of 
market citizenship, would require addressing limits and shortcomings evi-
dent in this case.
61 Interview, 2019, 2020.
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CHAPTER 7
Does Cash Transfer Promote Market 
Citizenship?
Abstract The most obvious conclusion of this book is that there is no 
single Turkish experience. Nor can we reach definitive once-and-for-all 
conclusions about the impact of CT as an instrument of social assistance. 
Comparison among our cases highlights variables grounded in local con-
ditions and policy design that help determine the outcome of CT projects, 
and whose relevance extends far beyond Turkey. Among these are human 
and financial resources, but also of the capacity for local knowledge. When 
these allow consistent and appropriate targeting, CT can provide an 
important step in the direction of inclusion and equality in a market con-
text. It would be misleading, however, to believe that this instrument on 
its own is sufficient. At the core of market citizenship is the dignity con-
ferred not only by paying one’s own way, but also by earning one’s own 
way: CT instruments work best as a complement to, not replacement for, 
access to the official labor market.
Keywords Social cash transfer • Citizenship • Rights • Outcomes • 
Labor market
The case studies presented in this book warn us away from any premature 
reification of national models, let alone of CT itself. We are brought back 
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instead to one of the starting points of this enquiry, the notion of policy 
instruments as tools:
To say that something is a tool is to say that it can produce certain results under 
appropriate circumstances; it is not to say that it is drilling, sawing, or welding 
at any particular moment. (Majone and Wildavsky 1979: 169)
What, then, are the appropriate circumstances in this case?
1  Conditions of suCCess
CT is not social policy on the cheap; even less is it a retreat of the state. In 
terms of resources, the actual sums transferred are only a starting point. 
Successfully targeting, management, and monitoring requires more 
administrative and technical resources than in-kind distribution of equiva-
lent scope, and this in turn demands that programs be designed on an 
adequate scale. The lack of resources that proved problematic in R is 
largely attributable to its size—too small for the SASF to have the internal 
resources to manage it directly or to be of real interest to private partners. 
Bigger, however, is not necessarily better. While a national network of 
financial services provided by Halkbank allowed the ESSN system to func-
tion smoothly, the unprecedented scale of the program and the need for 
multiple partners to work together to scale it up in a short time using 
necessarily incomplete information contributed to a system design cen-
tered on imperfect indicators of vulnerability. The high institutional start-
 up costs of the system established a strong dynamic of path dependence, 
leading to this design being maintained even after the program’s size had 
stabilized. Its sustainability should EU resources be withdrawn, finally, 
remains in question.
At any scale, information about the situation and needs of individuals is 
among the critical resources required for effective targeting. The cursory 
nature of home visits carried out by untrained inspectors in R contributed 
to inadequate information there. In the case of ESSN, officials interviewed 
claimed that training was provided for SASF inspectors, but the lack of any 
evidence for this in R suggests considerable local-level variation. A distinct 
set of challenges were unique to ESSN.  The impossibility of knowing 
what, if any, assets migrant families might be able to access from Syria and 
the refusal of the Turkish government to allow implementing agencies full 
access to personal information contained in national databases combined 
 C. ARK-YILDIRIM AND M. SMYRL
145
to hinder any systematic  in-depth evaluation of impact at the individual 
level. The contribution to successful targeting made by local knowledge in 
U provides the mirror image of these situations. Getting this right is criti-
cal. For CT to contribute to social citizenship, aid must go to those who 
need it the most; more than that, it must be seen as doing so. Suspicion of 
political favoritism, of cheating by recipients (systematically failing to 
report informal income, etc.), or of flawed indicators of vulnerability 
detract from the principle of rights founded on need.
A second critical feature emerging from the case studies is the impor-
tance of coherence. The design and implementation of a policy instrument 
is seldom the work of a single agency. Even when it is, the example of the 
SASFs suggests that agencies themselves can be collections of individuals 
with diverse points of view. The question is whether those involved share a 
common goal. Departures from consensus, as in the diverging interests of 
public and private partners evident in R, detract from citizenship- enhancing 
outcomes. The case of ESSN is critical here for a number of reasons. Most 
obviously, the ambiguous consensus inherent in its origins influenced the 
conflict of goals evident in its implementation. Preventing migrants from 
reaching Europe and assisting the most vulnerable of them in Turkey are 
goals with at best imperfect overlap. Considering the presence of Syrians in 
Turkey as temporary or indefinite implies a different focus even in the short 
term. Integrating migrants into the labor market and restricting access to 
work permits is contradictory. All of these points of view, nevertheless, 
were present in one or another of the relevant Turkish, European, or 
International agencies. The persistent limits in the program’s ability to 
reach all of the most vulnerable or to move participants beyond the most 
limited forms of market integration can largely be traced to this situation.
We must be careful, however, not to confuse the need for consensus on 
ends with other much less useful distinctions: those between public and 
private or between national and transnational.
A clear lesson of the case studies is the need to get beyond the increas-
ingly sterile debate between empowerment and control. These are not 
contradictory; at the local level U illustrates high levels of both; R largely 
failed to accomplish either. The ESSN  included elements of control 
through its registration and address requirements, but also measures of 
market empowerment through its use of unrestricted cash transfer. More 
importantly—and too often lost in the polemic over “rights-based citizen-
ship”—all forms of citizenship imply a balance between empowerment and 
control, differing chiefly on the forms and locus of control. Premodern 
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society placed it in the hands of “family, church, or lord” (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 35); the turn to the market was in part a struggle for liberation 
against these. The ideal of “industrial citizenship,” in turn, was a reaction 
to the perceived excesses of the market. It allowed a degree of decommodi-
fication but ushered in the control of civil servants, labor unions, or corpo-
rations. A market-centered approach offers yet another set of possibilities 
for striking this balance but, as illustrated in all of our cases, discretion and 
hierarchy can persist to the detriment of a fully rights-based model of mar-
ket citizenship.
Another false dichotomy is between “public” and “private.” How 
should we conceptualize the role of private companies such as Multinet, or 
of hybrid enterprises such as Halkbank when they are incorporated into 
policy and perform a public function? Both acted as for-profit policy sub-
contractors, and presumably in their own interests. The contrasting expe-
rience of R and ESSN, nevertheless, shows us that this is not systematically 
good or bad. Effectively integrating a private partner is a technical ques-
tion of program design, not an ethical one of “corporate social responsi-
bility.” Even more vexing is any attempt to put parastatal bodies such as 
the SASFs or even the TRC into neat categories. Once again, what they do 
matters more than how they are labeled.
Similarly blurred boundaries are evident in the international sphere. 
How should we characterize the WFP? Formally a UN agency, it behaves 
as a not-for-profit corporation, competing for contracts and offering 
attractive careers in return for effective provision of services. On the public 
side, finally, there is no unified actor that can unambiguously be identified 
either with the Turkish state or with the European Union. In both domes-
tic programs and the ESSN, Turkish public actors include local bodies and 
national agencies. Directorates found within a single ministry, can be the 
source of competing projects. The EU is represented in the ESSN by three 
distinct actors—political leaders for whom humanitarian budgets are a 
price worth paying to reach an agreement about migration, and the two 
DGs, ECHO and NEAR, with distinct missions, procedures, and internal 
cultures focusing, respectively on short-term humanitarian assistance, and 
medium-term development and national capacity-building.
Taking all of this together brings us back to the importance of coordina-
tion and consensus. What matters is not identity: public, private, charitable, 
international; any and all of these can work together effectively, as munici-
pal authorities and civil society organizations did in U, or the WFP and 
TRC did in the case of ESSN. Whether they do so in practice in any given 
case proves to be among the most important indicators of policy success. 
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2  soCial Citizenship in Context
We began this book with a question: can market-enhancing instruments 
contribute to “equality of membership”? Our answer is cautiously posi-
tive. There is no doubt that, like the policy instruments of premodern and 
those of industrial societies, CT programs can be used as instruments of 
exclusion; some aspects of the experience of the ESSN illustrate this in 
direct and distressing ways. This does eliminate the potential of these same 
instruments to play a more constructive role. A very low-income family, 
whether Turkish or Syrian, given additional purchasing power through a 
digital CT card has a greater (albeit far from absolute) degree of autonomy 
in its consumption choices. More importantly, perhaps, the very act of 
purchasing necessities, rather than acquiring these through charitable gift 
or in-kind distribution, increases its integration into the economic and 
social life of its local community. The family’s life is made more ordinary, 
in the sense of being more similar to that of its slightly better-off neigh-
bors. As such, this can be seen as a small but significant step away from 
stigma and personal dependence. The degree of market integration is 
clearly different across our cases. The two local examples retained strong 
nonmarket controls over what could be purchased, and where. With 
ESSN, assistance can be drawn in cash, removing this particular element of 
control, but others remain; program participation is used as an incentive 
for migrants to register and to comply with restrictions on movement. 
Despite all of these limits, however, each in its own way represents a small 
step in the direction of market citizenship. There is no doubt that CT 
instruments can and frequently do serve as a force for social discipline, but 
this too is an element of membership. Market-enhancing instruments of 
social policy, CT among them, can  contribute to social and economic 
inclusion—if they are deployed at an appropriate scale; if sufficient finan-
cial, technical, and social resources are available; if they offer stability in 
the medium term; and if the agencies central to policy design and imple-
mentation share the goal of inclusion and actively work together to 
promote it.
The contribution made by CT is real; it is also necessarily incomplete in 
the very logic of the market itself. CT programs contribute to empowering 
and integrating individuals as consumers, but fuller inclusion and true 
equality of membership in a market-centered society requires participation 
as workers. We are brought back to the historical anecdotes evoked in 
Chap. 2. It is less burdensome, as Montaigne reminds us, to purchase 
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something than to receive it as a gift. True dignity in a market society, 
however, as the feminist movement of the 1970s rediscovered, implies 
earning one’s own way. The final word goes to Frederick Douglas: “I am 
now my own master! The thought ‘I can work for a living’ placed me in a 
state of independence” (Shklar 1991: 83). Who better than a former slave 
to appreciate the market as a “social conquest” (Fontaine 2014).
In a coherent logic of market-enhancing policies, CT programs would 
go hand-in-hand with policies that facilitate fuller market participation, 
and in particular access to formal labor markets. To be effective, such poli-
cies require a significant degree of stability and medium-term legal secu-
rity. Persons effectively limited to working in the informal sector or 
migrants uncertain of whether they will be able to remain in their host 
country are far from full membership, even in economic and social life. 
Critically, overcoming these barriers requires looking beyond the strictly 
economic sphere. In addition to economic support, integration into a 
market society requires an extension of legal rights which, to date, have 
been denied to the overwhelming majority of Syrian migrants in Turkey.
The ability to grant status, in the sense of legal rights, remains unique 
to states, and it turns out to be of the first importance. In the logic of 
Polanyi, politics defines the conditions in which markets operate, and 
accordingly determines the extent to which they can serve as instruments 
of inclusion. In the end, thus, we return to citizenship in the fullest sense. 
The final lesson of this study is that social and economic inclusion can 
indeed be pursued in advance of civil rights and political participation, but 
that these must ultimately follow. The interdependence among the ele-
ments of citizenship is inescapable. Cash transfer to very low income fami-
lies is a useful step on the path leading ultimately to “market citizenship” 
as we have defined it, as effective equality of membership in a market 
society, but it is only a first step.
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